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ABSTRACT
ARCHIVING THE CITY
A GUIDE TO THE ART OF URBAN INTERVENTIONS
by
OLATOKUNBO ADEOLA ENIGBOKAN
Adviser: Professor Susan Saegert

The topic of this dissertation is the development and exploration of alternative methodologies for
understanding and relating to everyday urban experience. The project is a psychogeographical
exploration of methodologies used in contemporary art and architectural practice to create
street-level “urban interventions.” For the purposes of this study, urban interventions are defined
as actions, performances, installations and objects created by artists, and or activists and
sometimes architects, and inserted into, or responsive to, everyday urban environments, usually
taking place outside of official art spaces, such as museums and galleries. In most cases these
interventions are unexpected, express a “do-it-yourself” aesthetic and have not been
commissioned by any governmental or private entity. This dissertation in Environmental
Psychology discusses creative transdisciplinary methods of engaging urban experience,
focusing on urban interventionist art and architectural practice in Moscow and New York over
the past few decades. Drawing upon archival records, attendance and participation at public
exhbitions of artworks and talks, selected urban interventions are subjected to
psychogeographical analysis, in addition to thematic analyses of the discourse surrounding the
artworks. While some of these interventions have been situated within various genealogies of
modern and contemporary art history and criticism, these practices are placed within a
genealogy of urban theory rooted in psychogeography and historical geography. As such, the
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focus here is on selected urban interventions that creatively combine cartographic and design
practices with archival practice, and that engage with a distinct sense of urban temporality. The
various examples of urban interventions provided throughout this dissertation present a
provocation to develop alternative ways of talking about and researching urban experience
within the social sciences.
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1.
INTRODUCTION

Craftsmanship is at the center of yourself and you are personally involved
in every intellectual product upon which you may work.
– C. Wright Mills
Before I arrived in Moscow, there were many strands of my thoughts, my methods, my
understanding, unconnected. I had been drifting—in books and theories about architecture and
(non)violence; about the effects of war and planning on our urban lives; about the difference
between envisioning the future, and anticipating what is yet to come; between preparing for
emergency and emerging through catastrophe. The link between these drifts was formed for me
by practices of archiving—collecting and storing things, even habits and gestures, sedimented
knowledge—understood as an everyday form of interaction between citizens, living and dead,
and the design and architecture that shape their experience of the city. Specifically, I was drawn
towards cities caught in moments of transition and transformation: I made an ethnographic
study of the design, construction and marketing of vast new luxury towers in historical sections
of Tel Aviv; an archival exploration of Alvin Baltrop’s elegiac photography of the crumbling New
York City piers between 1975 and 1986; collaborated with artist and architect Jana Leo on an
installation-archive-account of her own rape, in her Harlem apartment, during the
neighborhood’s more brutal moments of gentrification in the early 2000s. As an artist, I designed
and conducted a series of street-level ‘interventions’ into urban space, inserting interactive
objects, and participatory performances into the course of everyday life in New York City
neighborhoods. And all the while I maintained a weblog, itself an archive of various archival
practices spanning the fields of architecture, art and social science.
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Each of these investigations or explorations into transitional moments in urban areas was
accompanied by close reading of texts spanning philosophy, psychology, history, anthropology,
sociology and theory of art and architecture, with the intention of following threads, and weaving
the transdisciplinary connections necessary to understand the way people go about constructing
their urban lives. These readings took me through the side-alleys and back roads of the social
sciences, through William James’ (1890/2007; 2000) theorization of the problem of the one and
the many, Felix Guattari’s (1995) attempts to think subjectivity beyond the subject, Alfred Gell’s
(1998) search for an anthropological theory of visual art and distributed personhood, Walter
Benjamin’s own sojourn to Moscow in the 1920s (1986, 1996, 1999b), and his resulting theories
of art, authorship and time in the city (Benjamin 2005), and Foucault’s notions of ‘genealogy’ as
a history of the present and art as a way of living (Foucault 1984, 2003). Readings in urbanism
put me on the trail of phantasmagoric urban experience, beyond the “material stuff of life” (Pile
2005), and the urban theory generated out of lives lived in cities like New York, Chicago,
London and Berlin, towards notions of urban living originating out of what could, until recently,
be considered backwaters of urbanism: cities of the Global South and the former Soviet Union
(see: Abbas 1998, Simone 2004a, 2004b, Rao 2009, Hirt 2013). Following these off-center
theoretical paths opened up encounters with theories and practices of architecture and
conceptual and performance art that in turn pointed me in the direction of alternative
methodologies for engaging and exploring urban experience.

When the offer materialized to be a resident artist and urbanist in Moscow from October 2011
until August 2012, I jumped at the opportunity to test and develop some of these alternative
methodologies for understanding urban experience. Moscow is a city in the throes of a longterm transition from a center of the sprawling yet closed Soviet Socialist empire, towards “world
city” status, opening itself to the vagaries of neoliberal capitalism and its all-powerful markets.
Additionally the city has a rich history of art, socio-psychological theory and influential urban
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design and planning, spanning the decades of Soviet rule, and encompassing the city’s ongoing
transformation since the end of the Soviet era (Kolossov and O’Loughlin 2004; Golubchikov and
Badyina 2006, Hirt and Stanilov 2009). All of these circumstances contribute to particular local
expressions of “the urban experience,” which may hold the potential to both challenge and
expand traditional theories of the urban everyday, based on life in cities of Western Europe and
the United States. The period of my stay in Moscow coincided with a series of massive street
actions expressing popular discontent with the country’s current regime, which involved
reclamations of public space for political purposes on an order that had not been witnessed in
the capital during the preceding twenty years. This politically charged climate drew me towards
the activities of artists and activists involved in creative responses to the widespread discontent,
which focused not simply upon public demonstrations, but made closer examinations of, and
aesthetic and ethical responses to, the conditions of living in the Russian city today. Could these
collections of artists and activists be proposing, through their ad hoc experiments, ways of
understanding and engaging urban experience that upend existing notions of what is possible to
know and to do in the city? My research explores this question from the starting point that at the
very least, this emerging work presents implications for psychogeographical urban theory and
practice, which are impossible for me, as an artist, urbanist and environmental psychologist, to
ignore.

So the topic of this dissertation is the development and exploration of alternative methodologies
for understanding and relating to everyday urban experience. The project is a
psychogeographical exploration of methodologies used in contemporary art and architectural
practice to create street-level “urban interventions.” For the purposes of this study, urban
interventions are defined as actions, performances, installations and objects created by artists,
and or activists and sometimes architects, and inserted into, or responsive to, everyday urban
environments, usually taking place outside of official art spaces, such as museums and
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galleries. In most cases these interventions are unexpected, express a “do-it-yourself” aesthetic
and have not been commissioned by any governmental or private entity. This dissertation in
Environmental Psychology discusses creative transdisciplinary methods of engaging urban
experience, focusing on urban interventionist art and architectural practice in Moscow and New
York over the past few decades. These urban interventions, are subjected to
psychogeographical analysis, in addition to thematic analyses of the discourse surrounding the
artworks. While some of these interventions have been situated within various genealogies of
modern and contemporary art history and criticism, this dissertation places these practices
within a genealogy of urban theory rooted in psychogeography and historical geography. As
such, the focus here is on selected urban interventions that creatively combine cartographic and
design practices with archival practice, and that engage with a distinct sense of urban
temporality. The various examples of urban interventions provided throughout this dissertation,
some being pivotal examples of the genre, and others of my own design, present a challenge to
more mainstream ways of talking about and researching urban experience within the social
sciences. In taking up projects, which can be called “urban interventions” within the arts and
architecture, this dissertation asks:

1. Might the emergent field of contemporary art and conceptual architecture known
as "urban intervention(ism)" hold theoretical significance for psychogeographical
urban research? If so, in what ways?

2. Could a study of urban intervention(ism) contribute to a deeper understanding of
the nature of urban experience? If so, in what ways?
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3. Could engagement with urban interventionism precipitate the development of
alternative styles of knowledge production, which transcends entrenched
disciplinary boundaries? If so, in what ways?

In addressing these questions, the methodological approach:

critiques selected urban interventions created by artists over the past decade to
understand the methods by which they are or might be productive of
psychogeographical and archival knowledge about urban experience.

draws artistic urban interventionist practice into a discursive genealogy of
psychogeographical methods for engaging urban experience, in such a way as to
expand contemporary discourse on urban experience within the social sciences that
tends not to include art practice as generative of fields of knowledge about the urban
world.

pulls from the researcher’s own experience as an artist creating urban interventions in
Moscow, Saint Petersburg and New York in a radically empiricist (James 1996, Jackson
1989) and autoethnographic (Ellis et al. 2011, Jones 2002) mode. The aim of this
method is two-fold: to provide the reader with practical details of conceptualizing and
producing urban interventions that traverse the boundaries between social science and
art, and to situate these practices within a broader transdisciplinary context.

discusses the aesthetic and ethical implications of this transdisciplinarity for urban
research.
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experiments with an artistic approach to presenting knowledge created in and about the
city.

In the series of discussions that follow, I will provide an account of theoretical and
methodological bases for the research approach outlined above. Each discussion walks the
reader along the same paths that I have taken to arrive at the psychogeographical and
urbanistic conceptions and the approach to archival art/research practice, that combine to lay
the groundwork for the explorations contained within subsequent chapters.

TALKING ABOUT EXPERIENCE
Life is confused and superabundant, and what the younger generation
craves is more of the temperament of life in its philosophy, even though it
were at some cost of logical rigor and of formal purity.
– James 1996:39
[Experience] is made of that, of just what appears, of space, of intensity, of
flatness, brownness, heaviness, or what not.
–Shadworth Hodgson,
cited in James 1996:27
Lived experience overflows the boundaries of any one concept, any one
person, or any one society.
--Jackson 1989:2

My dissertation focuses upon how city dwellers experience their surroundings. In this project
“experience” refers to the affective dimensions of everyday life. “Experience” is the realm of
perception and sensation, made available in the encounter between body and world, or body
and city. I am particularly concerned with picking up threads of discourse in psychology,
anthropology, urban theory and philosophy that attempt to address the quality or character of
affective experience of urban areas. “Affective experience,” broadly defined, refers to the range
of emotional and sensory interactions, attitudes and postures that accrue in the course of
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everyday life. Affective experience is not always localized to the body or psyche of individuals,
but often, like contagious viruses, render porous the seemingly rigid boundaries between
citizens, such that we may speak of “moods,” “feelings,” and “habits,” shared by the residents of
a given area (Stewart 2007). For anthropologist Kathleen Stewart, “ordinary affects are public
feelings that begin and end in broad circulation, but they’re also the stuff that seemingly intimate
lives are made of” (2007:2). Considering such “ordinary affects,” allows us to recognize another
register of everyday urban life, lived in the shadow of conventional senses of subjectivity and
scale. Affective experience does not immediately imply intelligibility, or understanding, but rather
resists tried and true methods and established epistemologies for making sense of the world.
What is valuable about such experience, for social research, is that it often makes tangible and
immediate the powerful, and seemingly distant forces and ideologies that shape and structure
our socio-environmental relations:
Ideologies happen. Power snaps into place. Structures grow entrenched.
Identities take place. Ways of knowing become habitual at the drop of a hat. But
it’s ordinary affects that give things the quality of a something to inhabit
and animate. Politics starts in the animated inhabitation of things, not way
downstream in the various dreamboats and horror shows that get moving…
There’s a politics to being/feeling connected (or not), to impacts that are shared
(or not), to energies spent worrying or scheming (or not), to affective contagion,
and to all the forms of attunement and attachment. (Stewart 2007: 15-16
emphasis added)
Becoming attuned to this experiential register of everyday life points us towards the
transpersonal dimensions of human-environmental interactions, where affects spread like
contagions and efface socio-spatial or ideological boundaries—a register impossible to address
without blurring traditional distinctions between subject and object.

In his famous essay addressing the existence of ‘consciousness,’ psychologist William James
proposes an understanding of ‘pure experience,’ which is fundamentally relational. James
suggests that experience is made of the (often unpredictable) interaction between ‘real’ or
verifiable external facts, along with hidden memories, objects of imagination, projections, shared
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histories and personal biographies (1996). This interaction between externally verifiable facts,
and the phantasmagorical aspects of experience, challenges notions of experience based on a
singular or individual consciousness, and points instead to the fundamentally in-between,
transpersonal, or “double” aspect of experience—every experience is made up of the here and
the not-here; the me and the not-me:
The things in the room here which I survey, and those in my distant home of
which I think, the things of this minute and those of my long-vanished boyhood,
influence and decide me alike, with a reality which my experience of them directly
feels. They both make up my real world, they make it directly, they do not have
first to be introduced to me and mediated by ideas which now and here arise
within me…. This not-me character of my recollections and expectations does
not imply that the external objects of which I am aware in those experiences
should necessarily be there for others. The objects of dreamers and hallucinated
persons are wholly without general validity. But even were they centaurs and
golden mountains, they still would be ‘off there’ in fairyland and not ‘inside’
ourselves. Munsterberg cited in James 1996:20 emphasis added
This relational character of experience proposed by James and his colleagues contradicts
Cartesian notions of space, in which every room can be plotted on a coordinated grid, and in
which all objects can be definitively mapped, as well as notions of linear and chronological time,
in which the past remains ever in its proper place. Instead, James’ “World of Pure Experience”
asks us to pragmatically accept the multiple character of space-and-time-as-experience, as
subjects who are simultaneously ‘me,’ and ‘not-me,’ perceiving of ourselves across time and
space, while able to conceive of experience even as it happens. At this point, it may be
necessary to better define who or what this project takes to be the “subject” of affective
experience.

Affect, when interpreted as feeling or emotion originating within a given “consciousness,” is
often relegated to the scale of the individual or subject. In this way, talk of affect becomes the
purview of those psychiatrists, psychologists and phenomenologists who concern themselves
with the analysis (and cure) of the (human) subject. However, within my project affective
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experience is not conceptualized as being simply about feeling and emotion contained within
the psyche or body of the individual subject, but instead focuses on the energies generated in
the friction between people, places and things. This energy may or may not originate within
bodies, living or non-living, (Deleuze 2003); may or may not be made of the material histories of
places and things and the ghosts of these existences (Straight 2007, Gordon 1997); may or may
not be generated in the exertion of force to establish equilibrium common to family systems, for
example the bonds created between mother and infant within this inherent instability (Elkaim
1997, Stern 1985); may concern the movements, physical or political, inherent to everyday life,
which tend to crystallize into the shapes of lives or works of art (Stewart 2007, Massumi 2002).
Whatever the case, this approach to thinking about affective experience is no longer concerned
with the individual as the subject of feeling or emotion. In short, this project accepts a
redefinition of subjectivity that extends subjecthood beyond the discrete individual, and
highlights the importance of affect as a generation of transpersonal relationality. An extended
quote from the work of psychoanalyst and ecologist Felix Guattari might elucidate these points:

Whether one considers contemporary history, machinic semiotic productions, the
ethology of infancy, or social and mental ecology, we witness the same
questioning of subjective individuation, which certainly survives, but is wrought by
collective assemblages of enunciation. At this stage, the provisional definition of
subjectivity I would like to propose as the most encompassing would be: ‘The
ensemble of conditions which render possible the emergence of individual
and/or collective instances as self-referential and existential Territories, adjacent,
or in a delimiting relation, to an alterity that is itself subjective.’ We know that in
certain social and semiological contexts, subjectivity becomes individualized;
persons, taken as responsible for themselves, situate themselves within relations
of alterity governed by familial habits, local customs, juridical laws, etc. In other
conditions subjectivity is collective—which does not, however, mean that it
becomes exclusively social. The term collective should be understood in the
sense of a multiplicity that deploys itself as much beyond the individual, on
the side of the socius, as before the person, on the side of the preverbal
intensities, indicating a logic of affects rather than a logic of delimited sets
(Guattari 1995, pp10-11, emphasis added).
1
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For Guattari, the stakes of re-defining subjectivity as the conditions of possibility for the
emergence of “territories” are immense. An expanded concept of subjectivity no longer accepts
experience to be phenomena proper to the individual, as an atomic unit within a field of social
relations. This approach lets go of the dialectical relation between “individual” and “society,”—a
dialectic that has served to relegate affective experience to the level of individual—and instead
focuses upon “individual” as a particular instantiation of a relations between “collectivities” and
“multiplicities” and various forms of “otherness” (alterity)—relations which have their own
historicity. Implied is the understanding that all of these elements remain in flux, and are
irreducible to any all-encompassing notion of “the social.” In other words, Guattari’s invocation
of subjectivity turns this project towards the complexities of affective experience, as what
emerges in the friction between bodies, living and non-living, before the personal, between
elements always-in-motion, within the socius, and not merely what is thought to originate in “the
individual,” (or in the individual’s relation to social form) in the form of feeling and emotion.

MAKING RADICAL EXPERIMENTS

The notions of affective experience that inform this project all call for an approach to conducting
and presenting research that recognizes and embraces the porosity of the borders between self
and other, between subject and object, between knower and known. For William James, “the
peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, which their ‘conscious’
quality is invoked to explain, is better explained by their relations—these relations themselves
being experiences—to one another” 1996:25. This relationality, in which experiences run
together in “streams” that flow both within and beyond the boundaries of personality and
rationality, becomes the foundation of the method of “radical empiricism.”
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To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any
element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that
is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that connect
experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation
experienced must be counted as ‘real’ as anything else in the system. James
1996:42
Focusing on the relational qualities of experience is a pointed challenge to rationalistic, or less
‘radical’ empirical approaches that attempt to place experience in a conceptual hierarchy of
orders of knowledge about the world. Radical empiricism accepts experience at “face value,
neither less nor more,” which means “to take it just as we feel it, and not to confuse ourselves
with abstract talk about it, [inventing] conceptions in order to neutralize [experience] and to
make [it] again seem rationally possible” James 1996:49. Taking our experiences at face value,
as James suggests, requires us to cut across the rational devices by which we tend to theorize
social relations within the social sciences. Anthropologist Michael Jackson (1989), through a
close reading and translation of James into the language of ethnographic practice, finds that a
focus on lived experience calls attention to “the interplay rather than the identity of things,” in
ways that have serious consequences for received orders and hierarchies of knowledge:
Lived experience accommodates our shifting sense of ourselves as subjects and
as objects, as acting upon and being acted upon by the world, of living with and
without certainty, of belonging and being estranged, yet resists arresting any one
of these modes of experience in order to make it foundational to a theory of
knowledge. Such an all-encompassing conception of experience avoids
narrowing down the field of experience to either the subject or the object, theory
or practice, the social or the individual, thought or feeling, form or flux. (Jackson
1989:2 emphasis in original)
To work within a field defined not by classification and boundaries, but by the propensity of
seemingly fixed objects towards flow and dissolution, is to accept that the knowing (or
researching) subject is also always a participant in the experience, and at no point stands
outside of it. In fact, according to Jackson (1989), “there is no constant substantive ‘self’ which
can address constant substantive ‘others’ as objects of knowledge” (3). The radically empiricist
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approach accepts this constant dissolution of self and other, taking the interexperience, the
interaction between researcher and research object, as the main subject of research:
Our habit of excluding the lived experience of the observer from the field of the
observed on the grounds that it is a ‘regrettable disturbance’ is… a stratagem for
alleviating anxiety, not a rule of scientific method. A radically empirical method
includes the experience of the observer and defines the experimental field as one
of interactions and intersubjectivity. Accordingly, we make ourselves
experimental subjects and treat our experiences as primary data. (Jackson
1989: 4 emphasis added)
Jackson’s interpretation of radical empiricism as methodology allows us to notice the close
connection between experience and experiment. When speaking of experience as the subject of
research, we tend to refer to it as a thing, a noun, something ‘out there’ to be taken up and
observed as a phenomenon outside of the self. However, when the researcher is also
understood to be the subject of experience, experience emerges in its verb form. We
researchers no longer simply observe the experiences [of others]: We experience things.

Making the subtle shift from experience-as-noun (something that happened, usually to someone
else, like another person’s memory, for example), to experience-as-verb (the visceral actions of
being alive) puts us in the mind of making experiments: testing or trying things out (for the first
time), meeting with or participating in some (life-changing) event, or even being converted, as in
a religious sense. Experience-as-verb is practical, and implies time and duration, possibly even
regular or measured repetition, until one is able to say one is “experienced,” or has “learned
from experience.” It is here that “experiment” emerges as an aspect of experience-in-action, a
state of moving, adjusting, trying, repeating, in which there is a larger sense of encounter with
the unknown and unexpected.2 In fact, the very measured precision of a scientific experiment in
a “controlled” environment, for example, is intended to make space in which the scientist may
be brought face to face with what he or she has not previously known, which then allows him or
her to better isolate and explain any possibly unexpected or extraordinary occurrence. To work
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with and through experience, requires an experimental practice of some sort, a way of learning
by trial, encounter with, or exposure to, what was previously unknown. According to Jackson
(1989):
Experience, in this sense, becomes a mode of experimentation, of testing and
exploring the ways in which our experiences conjoin or connect with others,
rather than the ways they set us apart. In this process we put ourselves on the
line; we run the risk of having our sense of ourselves as different and distant from
the people we study dissolve, and with it all our pretensions to a supraempirical
position, a knowledge that gets us above and beyond the temporality of human
existence. (Jackson 1989: 4)
For me, approaching the topic of (urban) experience is always about method, especially
developing an experimental method through which I may reflect on my own practice and the
practice of others, artists and social scientists. Radical empiricism, as a philosophical and
methodological disposition to engage experience, is necessarily experimental, in the sense of
acknowledging, in theory and practice, how the very acts of exploring and participating in the
field of study shapes, and even constitutes that very field. It may be important here to note, as
does Martin Jay (2005), that in the case of William James, the first radical empiricist, the
experimental exploration of a world of pure experience could not be limited to the traditional
bounds of the academic inquiry, but extended far beyond:
Experience was the paradoxically foundationless foundation that provided an
answer, or at least sparked the persistent questioning that drove [William James’]
work for much of his career. Translated into his personal life, this quest meant a
willingness to open himself up to practices that more cautious scientists would
have found anathema—experiments with the occult and the paranormal, dubious
mind cures, hallucinogenic drugs, and the like… Always more than a mere
professional, academic philosopher, he risked entering the public realm to
espouse unpopular political opinions and promote causes like mind-care reform
(Jay 2005: 276-277)
The spirit of the exploratory experiment was a key part of James’ personal and professional
interest in pure experience, and within his own life he charted a course through “the multiplicity
of experiences… [believing that] more experiences—varied, novel, risky—had the potential to
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yield a portrait of himself as knower, perceiver, interpreter, actor” (Simon 1998 cited in Jay
2005: 277).

Studies of experience expose the researcher to the uncertainty, anxieties and even ecstasies
that accompany the move away from the explanatory modes that accompany much work in the
social sciences. In exchange for accepting this ambiguous position, the researcher exposes
him- or herself to the affective intensities, that flow through the taken-for-granted habits of
everyday existence. The method of radical empiricism, finds cognate practices in the field of
anthropology, and the more subversive versions of ethnographic method. While anthropologists
like Michael Jackson (1989) conceptualize their studies of ‘Other’ cultures with reference to
James’ radical empiricism, some, like Victor and Edith Turner (1982), interrogate their own
research practices through designing radical experiments that render porous the boundaries
between psychology, anthropology, art and performance studies. In fact, the Turners’
ethnographic experiments are foundational to the theory and method of “performance
ethnography,”3 and the related “autoethnography,”4 ways of developing and addressing
alternative forms of knowing about the world as experienced, beyond traditional empiricism
(Adams & Holman Jones 2008; Atkinson 2004; Conquergood 1998 & 2002; Denzin 2003; Ellis
et al. 2011; Jones 2002).

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Turners undertook a series of pedagogical experiments
with their students at the University of Virginia, the University of Chicago and New York
University, in order to explore the methodological ramifications of taking experience seriously:
… while it may be possible for a gifted researcher to demonstrate the coherence
among the “parts” of a culture, the models he presents remain cognitive.
Cognizing the connections, we fail to form a satisfactory impression of how
another culture’s members “experience” one another. For feeling and will, as well
as thought, constitute the structures of culture—cultural experience, regarded
both as the experience of individuals and as the collective experience of its
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members embodied in myths, rituals, symbols and celebrations. For several
years, as teachers of anthropology, we have been experimenting with the
performance of ethnography to aid students’ understanding of how people in
other cultures experience the richness of their social existence… [W]e’ve taken
descriptions of strips of behavior from ‘other cultures’ and asked students to
make ‘play-scripts’ from them. Then we set up workshops—really playshops—in
which the students try to get kinetic understandings of the ‘other’ sociocultural
groups (Turner & Turner 1982: 33-34).
While many of the experimental “plays” written and performed by the Turners’ students were
based upon ethnographic fieldwork and monographs describing cultures other than their own,
the most poignant of the experiments were the ones in which students acted out ritual
performances based on their own sociocultural experiences. Of particular interest is the
performance of one group of graduate students at the University of Chicago, in which they
designed an elaborate ritual interrogating the anxieties that infused their everyday lives within
the university system.
[The ritual] was divided into three stages, each occupying a different space. Each
participant brought along a cardboard box in which he/she had to squat,
representing his/her constricted, inferior social status. There were episodes, of a
sado-masochistic character, representing registration, in which the actors were
continually referred between different desks, monitored by sinister lhadamanthine
[sic] bureaucrats, who continually found fault with the registrants. Another scene,
using multimedia, portrayed a typical student, being harangued from a lectern by
an ‘anthropology professor’ spouting technical gobbledygook (actually excerpts
from published texts), while he was typing his dissertation to the accompaniment
of a series of rapid slides of familiar architectural details of the University of
Chicago. Finally he “died,” and was solemnly buried by a group of his peers clad
in black leotards. The scene then shifted from a room in the students’ activities
hall to a yard in the campus, where the constraining boxes were placed so as to
resemble a kind of Mayan pyramid which strongly resembled the new Regenstein
Library, scene of many painful graduate attempts at study. The whole group
danced around the pyramid, which was set on fire. This ‘liminal period’ was
followed by a final rite in another room of the hall, where student papers that had
been unfavorably commented upon by faculty were cremated in the grate; the
ashes were then mixed with red wine, and two by two the students anointed one
another on the brow with the mixture, symbolizing ‘the death of bad vibes.’
Finally, all joined together in chanting ‘Om, Padne, Om,’ representing a
‘communitas of suffering.’ This production involved music, dancing, and miming,
as well as dialogue. Many of the participants claimed that the performance had
discharged tensions and brought the group into a deeper level of mutual
understanding. It had also been ‘a lot of fun’ (Turner & Turner 1982: 40).
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Reading the Turners’ account of their students’ ritual examination of their own abject
experiences as graduate students, we are struck by the attention to detail written into the
performance script. The ‘actors’ perform minute and repetitive tasks, not particularly driven by
an overarching plot. The play evokes several different spaces within the university system in
order to unearth the residue of affective material embedded therein, and requires that particular
actions be performed in relation to these spaces in order to dislodge this sedimented affect. The
absence of plot of “goal” of the performance, taken with the student-performers’ attention to
environmental detail, reveals the ritual to be more than a simple protest of their lowly position
within the university hierarchy, or even of the bureaucratic regime that governs their lives as
students, or the small humiliations that accompany the public performances of knowledge
routine to academic life. Rather, the ritual might be read as an artistic experience designed to
evoke and articulate the affective dimensions of everyday life for a graduate student—a level of
experience that is often unremarked and unexplored within academic literature—and to make
this affective dimension consciously available to the graduate students themselves. By
designing one set of experience to better explore another, the students are experimenting with
and expanding the methodologies typically available within the social sciences, and in the
course of this exploration, are producing an alternative form of knowledge about their own
affective experiences as graduate students, that might have otherwise remained unavailable to
them as a group, and to the university as a whole. This assertion is borne out by the Turners’
account of the aftermath of the event, during which participants expressed that the performance
had “discharged tensions and brought the group into a deeper level of mutual understanding”
(Turner & Turner 1982: 40). Before long, the “discharged tensions” dislodged by the ritual
appeared to find their way into the community at large, like “affective contagion” (Stewart 2007).
In the weeks following the ritual, a series of small fires spontaneously broke out in several of the
university buildings prominently featured in the ritual performance, as sites of the students’
torture and humiliation (Turner and Turner 1982: 40). These mysterious burnings led to a critical
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discussion, between (a very perplexed) university administration and the Turners, about their
methods of teaching and about the effects of their use of such experimental techniques. One is
not surprised that the kinds of knowledge made available by the ritual caused concern within the
administration of such a venerable institution as the University of Chicago, a spiritual home of
the American social sciences. After all, the notion that scholarship ought to be based upon
(controlled) empirical observation and subsequent data analysis, whether quantitative or
qualitative, dominates academic pedagogy and practice in the social sciences (Conquergood
2002). The ideology that rules the social sciences tends to privilege “knowing that,” and
“knowing about,” forms of knowledge that can be gleaned from a great and carefully guarded
distance from the object (Conquergood 2002; Haraway 1991). This ideology operates within the
policed boundaries of the (Judeo-Christian, and Western) hermeneutic tradition, in which all
knowledge must be made from text, made into legible text, or be forgotten, ‘cleaned’ or
eliminated.5 In a powerful discussion of the potentials of “radical research,” Dwight
Conquergood (2002), presents an alternative to this textual knowledge:

This propositional knowledge is shadowed by another way of knowing that is
grounded in active, intimate, hands-on participation and personal connection:
‘knowing how,’ and ‘knowing who.’ This is a view from ground level, in the thick of
things. This is knowledge that is anchored in practice and circulated within a
performance community, but is ephemeral. (146).
Know-how/know-who are indicative of alternative ontologies, which exist in the shadows of the
textual, and whose ephemerality keep them outside of the purview of the hermeneutic
interpretative paradigms.
What gets squeezed out by this epistemic violence is the whole realm of
complex, finely nuanced meaning that is embodied, tacit, intoned, gestured,
improvised, coexperienced, covert—and all the more deeply meaningful because
of its refusal to be spelled out. Dominant epistemologies that link knowing with
seeing are not attuned to meanings that are masked, camouflaged, indirect,
embedded, or hidden in context. (Conquergood 2002: 146)
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By contrast the students’ method of knowledge production—or maybe better to call it a method
for the release of knowledge sedimented within the layers of everyday routines—addresses
affective experience directly, by developing a hybrid methodology that combines
autoethnography, social theory and performance art to create a parallel experience that acts as
both the instrument for probing the unspoken, and the vessel for catching and eventually
spreading this knowledge into a wider sphere of action, the outcome of which might be as
dangerous and unpredictable as a series of small, mysterious fires.

UNEARTHING (sedimented, and subjugated) EXPERIENCE

As evidenced by the graduate students’ fiery ritual, affective experience, as energy expressed
and embedded within the practice of everyday life, is not a simple sort of “data.” It does not lend
itself easily to control and manipulation by the researcher, and can very easily exceed the
parameters set by the research project itself. In fact it is this excessiveness that often alerts the
researcher, and other participants in the experience, to its presence. Considering the students’
ritual, we can imagine affective experience as ‘sedimented,’ or ‘subjugated’ forms of knowledge,
captured in between the layers of life-as-lived, until they may or may not be released. These
concepts, of the sedimented and the subjugated, are key to recognizing the ways in which
experience can be productive of “other” forms of knowledge. Notions of the sedimentation and
subjugation of certain forms of knowledge emerge most strongly for me within the
archaeological and archival practices of both Michel Foucault and Walter Benjamin. Both men’s
special attention to forming a critique of the conventions by which knowledge (about ‘the past,’
within ‘the present’) is produced is instructive, and combined, these critiques can form a second
methodological basis for addressing affective experience, alongside radical empiricism. The
following discussion of some aspects of the writings of both men, along with related works within
the social sciences, will help to clarify the forms of knowledge with which we will be most
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concerned within this dissertation, and the archaeological and archival methods that may be
applied to unearth them.

A historian by training, Foucault takes up the prodigious task of questioning the evidentiary
foundation of his own methodology: the archive. In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972),
Foucault re-defines archives away from an institutional storage facility for documents with which
the historian may stitch together “the truth” about a particular time or place. He imagines the
archive as discursive system, rather than a neutral collection of potential facts and artifacts. The
question is no longer what was said or done at a given time, but rather what was possible to say
or do at a given time. Foucault turns our attention to how the boundaries of possible statements
shape discourse itself—shape even the very terms upon which the researcher launches his or
her investigation. This approach is oriented towards the connections between power and the
production of knowledge, in which the archive itself, and any work involving archives—creating
them, searching them—are discourses of and on power. By investing the archive itself and all of
the “documents” therein with their own histories, and demonstrating that they are always already
embedded within complex discursive fields and power relations, Foucault allows us to see how
knowledge (about ‘the past’) becomes sedimented, and how this very quality of sedimentation
helps to determine what we are able to say, or do (in ‘the present’). The archaeology of
knowledge, then, is an excavation of discourse, in a search for the rules organizing seemingly
disparate and unconnected statements, which point us towards the places, usually unmarked
and taken for granted, in which power congeals. As such, researchers working in a Foucauldian
mode are often drawn to the documents margins, the marks and scratches, which reveal, the
palimpsestic history of the document itself. As anthropologist Ann Laura Stoler (2009) observes
of her own work within the Dutch colonial archives:
… Dutch colonial archival documents serve less as stories for a colonial history
than as active, generative substances with histories, as documents of their own.
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What was written in prescribed form and in the archives margins, what was
written oblique to official prescriptions and on the ragged edges of protocol
produced the administrative apparatus as it opened to a space that extended
beyond it. Contrapuntal intrusions emanated from outside the corridors of
governance but they also erupted—and were centrally located—within that
sequestered space. Against the sober formulaics of officialese, these archives
register the febrile movements of persons off balance—of thoughts and feelings
in and out of place. In tone and temper they convey the rough interior ridges of
governance and disruptions to the deceptive clarity of its mandates (Stoler 2009:
1-2).
Stoler’s description of the archive as filled with documents that hold complex histories of their
own, complicates the task of the researcher, moving her beyond making a mere determination
of the bias within a document and its suitability as historical ‘evidence.’ Instead, the research
must pay attention to “archival form:”
By archival form I allude to several things: prose style, repetitive refrain, the arts
of persuasion, affective strains that shape ‘rational’ response, categories of
confidentiality and classification, and not least, genres of documentation. The
book’s focus is on archiving-as-process rather than archives-as-things. Most
importantly, it looks to archives as condensed sites of epistemological and
political anxiety rather than as skewed and biased sources (Stoler 2009: 20,
emphasis added)
Stoler’s extension of Foucault’s method turns the researcher into one who is not seeking out
‘facts’ but is instead listening for rhythms, and watching for pattern, repetition and rupture in the
‘rational’ order of things. The researcher is no longer trying to develop an explanatory and
‘complete’ historical narrative, but maintains instead an improvisational disposition towards the
material, bringing about heightened awareness, both for the researcher, and his or her
audience, of the complex and competing rhythms that make up every archival form.

What if the concepts and methods suggested by Foucault’s archival archaeology, were turned
towards the excavation of affective experience, in sites beyond the traditional archive? 6 Could
the city itself be considered a kind of archive? The latter question is taken up by anthropologist
Vyjayanthi Rao (2009), in her discussion of the Indian city as a rich site for anthropological
study. Relying upon Georg Simmel’s notion of the “metropolis as medium,” or “totality of effects,
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which transcend their immediate sphere,” Rao asks us to think of the city as “a form of media,
which saturates the life of its residents” (374). Rao suggests that once the city is understood as
media, we may perceive its ‘archival form:’
In the understanding of metropolis as medium, which engenders social
exchanges, the archive becomes an emergent notion, a principle of ordering
stimuli upon which future transactions are imagined and made present rather
than given a notion of the past that has been deemed significant and marked for
preservation. This sense of the city-as-archive is always in conflict, sometimes
productively and sometimes corrosively, with the city-as-archive that emerges in
acts of preservation and strategies to inscribe space with particular social and
political understandings. (Rao 2009:374)
In this formulation, the city becomes a base or principle of both history and memory, in which
experiences are collected and recollected, according to principles may be particular to each city.
The city-as-archive is a site for intervention by the researcher, but not simply as a textual
palimpsest. Rao’s city-as-archive is not a container for historical text, to be read “along the
grain” as Stoler’s colonial documents. Instead, Rao’s archive is oriented towards the city as a
generator of perpetual stimuli and media effects, with the archive “providing a means of
recording and including the fluidities of urban informality as vital information” (Rao 2009: 381,
emphasis in original). As such, the city-as-archive is open to the constant disruptions of the
present and the emergent, tracking the ever-shifting dynamics of everyday life in urban areas.
This methodological shift in the conception of the archive brings us into an understanding of the
past as a “history of the present” (Rao 2009: 381).

Rao’s city-as-archive resonates strongly with the theories of Walter Benjamin, whose archival
practice, honed in Berlin, Moscow and Paris during the 1920s and 30s, calls our attention away
from the traditional textual archive, towards an expanded urban ‘mediascape,’ in which the city’s
changing temporality can be tracked through the discarded traces of everyday life. Benjamin’s
work on the Paris Arcades of the late nineteenth century, for example, took the form of a
collected archive of discarded objects like toys and pamphlets as well as an indexed collection
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of excerpts from books (Benjamin 2007). For Benjamin, the importance of these discarded
objects was not simply that they provided evidence of some event or existence of the past, but
that they acted to engage the interested researcher in an education of the senses: “to educate
the image-making medium within us, raising it to a stereoscopic and dimensional seeing into the
depth of historical shadows” (1999a: 458). Benjamin named his method for working with such
objects “literary montage,” as a way of capturing the affinity that his method had with the then
new practice of filmmaking. Besides suggesting an urban research methodology that could rival
filmmaking, Benjamin’s memory-work also resonates with Foucault’s invocation of archaeology,
except with an added emphasis on excavating experience:
Language has unmistakably made plain that memory is not an instrument for
exploring the past, but rather a medium. It is the medium of that which is
experienced, just as the earth is the medium in which ancient cities lie buried. He
who seeks to approach his own buried past must conduct himself like a man
digging. Above all, he must not be afraid to return again and again to the same
matter; to scatter it as one scatters earth, to turn it over as one turns over soil.
For the “matter itself” is no more than the strata which yield their long-sought
secrets only to the most meticulous investigation… It is undoubtedly useful to
plan excavations meticulously. Yet no less indispensable is the cautious probing
of the spade in the dark loam.(Benjamin 2005: 576)
In this visceral analogy, Benjamin present us with an image of research as an archaeology of
the self, casting the researcher as a main character in whatever (hi)story he is constructing.
Inside the researcher, lie whole cities, waiting to be excavated, layer by sedimented layer. Even
when the artifacts found or collected appear to be evidence of a bygone civilization, medium is
always memory, activated in the form of what is found through the particularity of the search,
and the singularity of searcher’s own experience:
Epic and rhapsodic in the strictest sense, genuine memory must therefore yield
an image of the person who remembers, in the same way a good archaeological
report not only informs us about the strata from which its findings originate, but
also gives an account of the strata which first had to be broken through.
(Benjamin 2005: 576)
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As earth is scattered, the landscape of knowledge is reshaped, and the digger must adjust to
the shifting ground beneath her feet. In this vision, research is cast as an unstable and
destabilizing activity, equivalent to probing a spade into dark loam. Comparing Benjamin’s
archaeology to Foucault’s the former appears a messier kind of excavation. While Foucault’s
method points us to the archive as a technique for producing knowledge with a history that must
be unearthed, Benjamin asks us to recognize research as a digging through archives of the self,
in which no item can be ignored, or discarded: a technique that brings us face to face with the
ultimate unknowns: what we have hidden from ourselves. My own research practice emerges at
the intersection of these two differing archaeologies. On the one hand, I take the archive not as
a pre-existing, ahistorical space but as a powerful technique for ordering and explaining the
urban world, which requires constant examination. On the other hand, archiving becomes a
creative practice—productive of a particular researcher—even as it excavates, making and
remaking the city of experience through the mundane activity of everyday life.

THE ART OF MAKING (UP) ARCHIVES
The artist is the one who is capable of making a sensation, which does not mean being
sensational, like television acrobats, but rather, in the strong sense of the term, putting
across the level of sensation—that is, touching the sensibility, moving people—analyses
which would leave the reader or spectator indifferent if expressed in the cold rigor of
concept and demonstration.
You should be a sort of technical advisor to all subversive movements.
--Pierre Bourdieu (sociologist) in conversation
with Hans Haacke (artist)
Bourdieu and Haacke 1995: 23-8
In his well-known essay “On Intellectual Craftsmanship,” C.Wright Mills, suggests that the
sociologist ought to keep a journal, or “file,” in which there is joined the personal experience and
professional activities, studies underway and studies planned” (2000: 196). The practice of
keeping such a file would train the social researcher to use his or her experience as a guide, to
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become alert to ways in which the meandering intensities of everyday life intersect with the
intellectual work of systematic reflection. This file would be the very picture of intellectual
craftsmanship: a living archive that follows the unique flows of one social researcher, inflecting
his or her work with the indelible flavor of life experience. At the same time, this file, or personal
archive, becomes the site of struggle for control over one’s own experience:
To say that you can “have experience,” means, for one thing, that your past plays
into and affects your present, and that it defines your capacity for future
experience. As a social scientist, you have to control this rather elaborate
interplay, to capture what you experience and sort it out; only in this way can you
hope to use it as a guide and test your reflection, and in this process shape
yourself as an intellectual craftsman. (Mills 2000: 196)
For Mills, the consummate social scientist is the one who can capture and subordinate
experience and its excesses. Such a researcher is like an efficient hunter: moving mimetically
with the flow of experience, tracking it carefully, all the while creating a profile of experience
itself that can be used to control it, and eventually to permanently freeze its unruly movements,
skin it, and clean it, into knowledge fit for scientific consumption:
By serving as a check on repetitious work, your file also enables you to conserve
your energy. It also encourages you to capture ‘fringe-thoughts’: various ideas
which may be by-products of everyday life, snatches of conversation overheard
on the street, or, for that matter, dreams. Once noted, these may lead to more
systematic thinking, as well as lend intellectual relevance to more directed
experience. (2000:196)
Here we see the file as the most important tool for hunting and capturing experience: more than
a simple repository of odd facts and notions, this archive is able to train instinct, to create in the
researcher a compulsion for recording and collecting. It comes to be the physical incarnation of
a curious habit of mind. In this essay Mills asks the reader to consider the researcher’s mind as
an open field and endless source of the wild game of experience. As such, this field must be
carefully watched and tended. It must even learn to watch itself:
You will have often noticed how carefully accomplished thinkers treat their own
minds, how closely they observe their development and organize their
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experience. The reason they treasure their smallest experiences is that, in the
course of a lifetime, modern man has so little personal experience and yet
experience is so important as a source of original intellectual work. To be able to
trust and yet to be skeptical of your own experience, I have come to believe, is
one mark of the mature workman. This ambiguous confidence is indispensable to
originality in any intellectual pursuit, and the file is one way by which you can
develop and justify such confidence. (2000: 197)
And so the file, or archive—in the way it trains the hunting instinct of the researcher to capture
experience in order, through the application of healthy doses of skepticism, to turn its parts into
‘science,’ or a controlled sort of knowledge—operates as a complex technique of surveillance,
more than just a tool for the organization of loose bits of information. Mills’ method of archiveas-subject-surveillance contributes to the sort of writing, often a kind of phenomenological
realism, which has come to be associated with legitimate knowledge production in the social
sciences. What is presented as knowledge, through this social-scientific archival practice, is not
the ‘animal of experience’ itself, alive and roaming, but its stilled shadow, and what is most
interesting about the affective experience of the researcher’s hunt is often left out, forgotten in
the archive.

In his essay “Ilongot Hunting as Story and Experience” (1986), anthropologist Renato Rosaldo
makes a critique of both ethnoscientific and ethnographic realism, arguing that neither mode of
studying and interpreting experience “makes central the stories people tell themselves about
themselves, and this crucial omission robs a certain human significance from anthropological
accounts” (1986: 97-98). As an alternative to this omission, Rosaldo calls for researchers to pay
closer attention to storytelling as a technique of engaging experience, presenting “novelistic
realism,” as a way of gathering together the sensations collected in everyday life, which
resonates more closely with the rich narrative traditions of the Ilongot hunters whose
experiences he studies. The Ilongot use of storytelling as archival practice bears a striking
contrast to the sociological filing techniques presented by Mills. If ‘hunting’ is a way of tracking
experience, then we should note here that the Ilongot teach a very different style of hunting,
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emphasizing improvisation and the ability to respond to unexpected encounters in the field.
Where typical ethnoscientific or ethno-realist accounts of Ilongot hunting might privilege
taxonomic, or monographic details, presenting the hunt as an everyday practical of economic
subsistence, Ronaldo argues instead that “the significance Ilongot men seek in hunting derives
more from cultural notions about what makes a story (and lived experience) compelling” (1986:
98). In this respect Ilongot storytelling can be thought of as a creative archival practice, in which
the stories the hunters tell about themselves (as opposed to Mills’ files) are collections of details
that are neither taxonomic, nor monographically coherent, but that aim, first and foremost, to be
evocative in their arrangement. In this way of making and using archives, the details of
(affective) experience are not necessarily subordinate to narrative alignment, or overarching
explanations:
Although they find certain tales to be better told than others, Ilongots claim that
listing the place-names where somebody walked is just as much a story (and
indeed cannot be omitted from any true story) as a more fully elaborated
narrative. Perhaps, this indigenous viewpoint can be placed in sharper relief by
juxtaposing minimal Ilongot narratives and history's conventional threefold
division into the annals, the chronicle, and history proper. Ordered only by
chronological sequence rather than by narrative logic, Ilongot hunting stories
resemble the supposedly lowest order of historical texts; that is, they
resemble annals, not chronicles, and certainly not history proper. Yet precisely
where historical studies see differences of kind, Ilongots perceive only
differences of degree. Indeed, I shall argue that this ethnographic evidence
suggests that history's threefold division, particularly insofar as it is
hierarchical and evolutionary, derives more from parochial modern canons
of narrative excellence than from the realities of other times and places. In
this respect, we can lump together the errors of presentism and ethnocentrism
(Rosaldo 1986: 106-7, emphasis added).
This dissertation examines the relationship between creative archival practices and the ability to
shape the stories that we tell ourselves about ourselves, especially as these creative archival
practices turn into urban interventions, which might generate alternative forms of knowing and
shaping the city. In my search for such experimental practices, I look beyond the social sciences
to the world of conceptual art, and sometimes architecture. As I try to understand the ways that
our perception and understanding of urban experience, as social scientists might be enhanced
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by extending our theoretical and methodological frameworks, I find myself in a similar position
as Raymond Williams (1965/2011), at the start of his great study of the role of ‘the creative
mind’ in Britain’s sociocultural transformation during the last century:
We ‘see’ in certain ways—that is, we interpret sensory information according to
certain rules—as a way of living. But these ways—these rules and
interpretations—are, as a whole, neither fixed, nor constant. We can learn new
rules and new interpretations, as a result of which we shall literally see in new
ways… In each individual, the learning of these rules, through inheritance and
culture, is a kind of creation, in that the distinctively human world, the ordinary
‘reality’ that his culture defines, forms only the rules that are learned… [B]ut the
individuals who bear these particular cultural rules are capable of altering and
extending them, bringing in new or modified rules by which an extended or
different reality can be experienced. Thus, new areas of reality can be ‘revealed’
or ‘created,’ and these need not be limited to any one individual, but can, in
certain interesting ways, be communicated, thus adding to the set of rules carried
by the particular culture. (36-37)
For Williams, creativity specifically refers to the individual or group ability to simultaneously
perceive ‘reality’ and the rules and interpretations of which it is made, along with the skill to alter
and extend reality—to create alternative realities—through tinkering with rules and
interpretations, and the inclination to communicate the results of this tinkering to a variety of
audiences. Williams’ interest in tampering with ‘reality’ informed his interest in art practice as a
“means of transmitting our experience in so powerful a way that the experience can literally be
lived by others” (1965/2011: 44). As he goes on to suggest, “[art] is more than a metaphor; it is
a physical experience as real as any other” (1965/2011: 44). Williams’ observations about art,
echoes the Ilongot use of storytelling, not simply as a way to convey ‘practical’ information about
the hunt, but rather as a spatial-archival technique which evokes in the listener a corresponding
experience of the hunt itself.
My own project is concerned with archival practices and psychogeographical urban
interventions that make available for sensation and perception, the “rules and interpretations”
that govern our sense of what constitutes our contemporary urban realities, at the same time as
they subvert, or reinvent them.
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DISSERTATION CHAPTER ABSTRACTS
Chapter 1—Introduction
Sets out the theoretical questions guiding this dissertation. Gives brief preview of each of the
coming chapters.

Chapter 2—Delai Sam: Social Activism as Contemporary Art in the Emerging Discourse of
(DIY) Urbanism in Russia.
This chapter addresses Research Question 1:
Might the emergent field of contemporary art and conceptual architecture known as "urban
intervention(ism)" hold theoretical significance for psychogeographical urban research? If so, in
what ways?

Delai Sam, or “Do It Yourself,” is a deeply rooted phenomenon in Russian life. However, as a
form of contemporary art, this phenomenon has taken on an activist tenor in post-socialist urban
Russia. Founded in 2010, the Delai Sam Festival of Urban Actions represents a politicized
approach to DIY urbanism in today’s Russia, in which artists, designers, activists and scholars
are joining together to develop alternatives to official visions for the design and planning of their
cities. This article critically examines the discourse of the first few Delai Sam festivals in
Moscow and Saint Petersburg, and related urban interventions, to understand how these
actions are both situated within their local context, and linked discursively to global trends in art
and urban activism. DIY actions like Delai Sam open windows into the convergence of art and
social activism, the aesthetic and the political, currently taking shape within the global city.

Chapter 3—Unraveling the City: A Psychogeographical Experiment at the edge of Moscow
This chapter addresses Research Question 2:
Could a study of urban intervention(ism) contribute to a deeper understanding of the nature of
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urban experience?

This chapter addresses the artistic experiments of Moscow-based artists the Collective Actions
group (CA), who gathered participants to make excursions out of the city in order to take
meditative walks and perform mysterious tasks. These Trips out of Town (Poezdki za Gorod),
sometimes translated as Journeys out of the City, or Trips to the Countryside, can be understood
as designed responses to the claustrophobic spaces of Soviet Moscow. What alternative forms of
spatial knowledge are produced through this modest action? How could engaging in meditative
walks open possibilities for other ways of relating even within highly regulated Soviet social
space? These questions are addressed by contextualizing the work of CA within a broader space
of contemporaneous Soviet-era experimentation in the fields of environmental psychology.
Chapter 4—“Enstranging” the City: The Art of Being Foreign in Moscow
This chapter addresses Research Question 3:
Could engagement with urban interventionism precipitate the development of alternative styles
of knowledge production, which transcend entrenched disciplinary boundaries? If so, in what
ways?

Between 2011 and 2013, artist Yevgeniy Fiks collected over 200 official images of African and
African Americans created in Soviet Russia, between 1920 and 1980. Drawn from propaganda
posters, paintings and films, the images represented a vision of friendship and brotherhood
between the Soviet nation and people of color from around the world. The collection is named
for Wayland Rudd, a little known African American actor who traveled from New York to
Moscow in 1932, along with other prominent communist members of the Harlem Renaissance,
to lend his artistic services to the building of the fledgling nation. Unlike his more famous
companions, such as Paul Robeson and Langston Hughes, Rudd found an affinity with his new
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city and stayed in Moscow until his death in 1952. While compiling the archive of rare images,
artist Yevegeniy Fiks began conversations with artists, writers, documentarians and historians,
asking them to respond to the collection. The full Wayland Rudd collection, along with the newly
created responsive artworks is currently traveling, from Moscow to New York and on to Harare
and London. This chapter draws upon theory of self and personhood in psychology and
anthropology, along with Russian and Soviet art theory, and the author’s own experiences and
experiments as a black artist living in Moscow, to better understand experiences of “not quite
filling in,” both in the city and in the academy.
Notes
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To take a closer listen to Guattari, it may be helpful to pay special attention to some of the key terms he
‘deploys’ in the above quote. Terms such as ‘conditions of possibility’, ‘emergence,’ ‘ multiplicity’ and
‘socius,’ are particular to the work of those interested in re-thinking subjectivity beyond the subject, and
re-thinking affect beyond the individual. The use of these terms, as opposed to others makes a difference.
Take the example of “socius.” Sociologist Bruno Latour (2005) points out that the meaning of the term
“social” has shrunk from its origins in the Latin “socius,” which indicated a simple and broad notion of
association (as between companions, for example), to now refer to “what is left after politics, biology,
economics, law psychology, managements, technology, etc. have taken their own part of the
associations” between persons, places and things proper to life. In his own usage of the word social,
Latour seeks to revive the notion of socius, or associations between “heterogeneous elements,” not
simply limited to the relations between humans. This slight change in emphasis has huge methodological
implications, as far as Latour is concerned: “it is [now] possible to remain faithful to the original intentions
of the social sciences by redefining sociology not as the science of the social, but as the tracing of
associations.” In so doing, sociologists may be able to notice and draw “a type of connection” between
things that are not necessarily social to begin with (2005:5-6).
2

In his short genealogy of the terms “empirical and the related empiricism,” cultural critic Raymond
Williams (1985) highlights the (forgotten) relationship between experience and experiment, that is at the
th
root of scientific practice: “Experience, in one main sense, was until [the late 18 century] interchangeable
with experiment (cf. modern French) from the common rw experiri, L – to try, to put to the test.
Experience, from the present participle, became not only a conscious test or trial but a consciousness of
th
what has been tested or tried, and thence a consciousness of an effect or state. From [the 16 century] it
took on a more general meaning, with more deliberate inclusion of the past (the tried and tested), to
indicate knowledge derived from real events as from particular observation. Experiment, a noun of action,
maintained the simple sense of a test or trial” (Williams 1985: 116, emphasis in original).
3

According to Denzin (2003), performance ethnography is a method for creating “an emancipatory
discourse [connecting] critical pedagogy with new ways of writing and performing culture” (p. 2). This
methodology draws upon Mills’ critical sociological imagination, and Mead’s model of “the act,” taking the
ethnographer from and understanding of performance “as imitation, or dramaturgical staging, to an
emphasis on performance as liminality and construction [citing Turner 1986], then to a view of
performance as struggle, as intervention, as breaking and remaking, as kinesis, as a sociopolitical act
[citing Conquergood 1998]” (Denzin 2003: 2). Applications of performance ethnographic method often
give attention to variations and nuance in participants’ embodied experience, and use participatory
experiments in poetry, drama and art as practical methodologies for activating embodied experience as
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an alternative, even subjugated, form of cultural knowledge (Adams & Holman Jones 2008; Denzin 2003;
Jones 2002).
4

Autoethnography is a method for producing knowledge about cultural experience that takes as primary
data the researcher’s own experience of the world, combining autobiography with ethnography. As such,
autoethnography can be thought of as both a process of producing knowledge about the cultural world,
and its product (Ellis et al. 2011). According to Adams & Holman Jones (2008), “autoethnography,
whether a practice, a writing form or a particular perspective on knowledge and scholarship, hinges on
the push and pull between and among analysis and evocation, personal experience and larger social,
cultural and political concerns” (p. 374). Taking seriously postmodern critiques of the epistemological and
ontological limitation of the social sciences, autoethnography, like performance ethnography, emerges as
a “positive response” that would “produce meaningful, accessible, and evocative research grounded in
personal experience, research that would sensitize readers to issues of identity politics, to experiences
shrouded in silence, and to forms of representation that deepen our capacity to empathize with people
who are different from us” (Ellis et al 2011: 2).
5

For a genealogy of this tradition as it pertains to the division and relationship between the human and
physical sciences, see Gadamer 2004. For a rich discussion of the application of hermeneutics to the
analysis of human cultures, see Geertz 1973, and for a critique of the hermeneutical paradigm in the
social sciences, which itself succumbs to the tyranny of textuality, see Derrida 1974 & 1978.
6

For example, film and photography have long been considered archival practices. Urbanist Lewis
Mumford, in his essay “Death of the Monument” (1937), pointed out the ways that film is like the city
itself—a jumble of disparate things and sensations—making film and photography forms of mimetic
preservation, which might connect us to other times and places. Both media are particularly useful for
thinking about urban experience, especially in an affective register. According to historian Giuliana Bruno
(2007): “Cinema is a materialization of our psychic life. It makes visibly tangible all psychic phenomena,
including the work of memory and the imagination, the capacity for attention, the design of depth and
movement, and the mapping of affects. …Film repeatedly shows that pictures—moving pictures—are the
current documents of our histories. Indeed, filmic memories–fragile yet enduring–are fragments
of an archival process porously embedded in our path, part of our own shifting geography” (p.4
emphasis added).
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2.
DELAI SAM:
SOCIAL ACTIVISM AS CONTEMPORARY ART IN
THE EMERGING DISCOURSE OF DIY URBANISM IN RUSSIA

The urban interventions considered in this chapter represent points of view that involve them in
a global discourse about the possibilities of art and design as both social research and social
activism. The move to question the institutionalization of art and to push art off the museum
gallery walls and into the streets has been alive since at least the 1960s in cities in Western
Europe and the Americas, with the rise of Conceptual, Feminist and Sociological Art and
Situationism, and has seen a resurgence of interest since the mid 1990s, especially through the
Relational and Street Art movements. Art that eschews gallery walls for more investigative,
interactive and participatory interventions, which often have an activist bent, is commonly
described in recent art criticism as “socially engaged art” or “social art.” (Bishop 2012; Bourriaud
1998; Helguera 2012; Thompson 2012; Reckitt forthcoming; Pinder 2005). The participatory
approach of socially engaged art is often transdiciplinary, drawing together disparate methods
and forms of knowing. As artist and educator Pablo Helguera (2012) points out, “socially
engaged art can’t be produced in a knowledge vaccum:”

Artists who wish to work with communities, for whatever reason, can greatly
benefit from the knowledge accumulated by various disciplines—such as
sociology, education, linguistics and ethnography—to make informed decisions
about how to engage and construct meaningful exchanges and experiences. The
objective is not to turn into amateur ethnographers, sociologists, or educators but
to understand the complexities of the fields that have come before us, learn
some of their tools, and employ them in the fertile territory of art. (Helguera 2012:
xii-xiv)

33

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Active engagement with worlds beyond the traditional boundaries of the artist’s studio leads
socially engaged art into political terrains, in which the stakes for particular actions rise to the
possibility of effecting direct social change. Critic Nato Thompson asserts that socially engaged
art has moved so far afield from traditional art historical discourse, as to no longer be
categorized as a distinct artistic movement but “rather, these cultural practices indicate a new
social order—ways of life that emphasize participation, challenge power, and span disciplines
ranging from urban planning and community work to theater and the visual arts” (2012: 19).
Aimed at presenting challenges to increasingly privatized and regulated urban public space
worldwide, the works created by urban activists and socially engaged artists often take the form
of “insurgent” or “guerilla” actions. (Hou 2010). A large part of this work is concerned with
creating “self-made urban spaces,” which provide “new expressions of the collective realms in
the contemporary city” (Hou 2012: 2).

In Russian approaches to DIY urbanism, we can observe this ongoing convergence between
activism and art. They appear to be following a natural path taken by artists oriented by a desire
to be useful, to be practical and to explicitly address social and political realities through
providing design solutions (Bruguera 2011). This is an emergent global discourse, and projects
like the Delai Sam Urban Festivals are part of growing streams of art becoming activism and
activism becoming art. However, this mutual becoming draws “activist art” into the powerful
cultural economy of the global city, raising complex and perplexing questions about the
autonomy of these “insurgent” actions.

In this chapter notions of art as being about individual expressions of beauty are not addressed.
Neither will we evaluate the aesthetic merits of the actions described and discussed. Nor will we
measure the “effectiveness” of these efforts in terms of amounts of viewership or changes in
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urban policy. Finally, the essay does not purport to give a comprehensive survey of DIY actions
in Russian cities. Rather, drawing from several closely observed examples, the art of urban
intervention is considered as a way of making visible and available to public discourse, a variety
of complex relationships between spatial aesthetic regimes, and sociopolitical norms. The
argument is that in performing the tricky, and at times antagonistic, operation of revealing latent
connections between disarticulated problems designed into everyday urban life, contemporary
art practice intersects with urban activism and thereby intervenes in mainstream urban planning
and design discourse. This article situates these interventions within their local political and
aesthetic context, demonstrating the complex ways in which DIY urbanism, as alternative forms
of knowing the city that encompass art and activist practices, might challenge and expand
institutionalized methods of producing knowledge about the urban.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY & SCOPE
This chapter, and much of the arguments in this dissertation, is based upon fieldwork conducted
in Moscow and Saint Petersburg between October 2011 and July 2012, with additional follow-up
correspondence and archival research during September and October 2012. In Moscow and
Saint Petersburg I was invited to collaborate with artists, architects, sociologists, and activists
recently committed to “Do-it-yourself” (DIY) methods for reclaiming urban development at the
grassroots level. As an artist, I participated in the Delai Sam Festival for Urban Actions in Saint
Petersburg by contributing an urban intervention and a workshop. As a social scientist and
urbanist, I collaborated with and observed three arts and research groups involved in the
organization and sponsorship of the Delai Sam Festivals in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. My
engagement with these groups afforded sustained, in-depth conversations with artists,
architects and social researchers about the motivations and processes underpinning the
festivals. To gain a better sense of the political context informing the intersection of art and
activism in DIY urban actions, in addition to the Delai Sam Festivals, I participated in the
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planning and implementation of several art-activist actions in Moscow during the winter of 20112012. Additionally, I attended public programs offered by the Moscow Biennale, public protests
during the winter of 2011-2012, exhibitions and symposia at key galleries central to arts and
activist efforts during that period in Moscow and meetings of art-activist groups. I also organized
a public workshop series on community engagement in urban initiatives.

To better understand the public discourse on planning initiatives, I attended neighborhood
hearings about the local consequences of the municipality’s Moscow 2020 Plan. I also observed
public presentations of Moscow government officials and planning experts, including the
Moscow Urban Forum,[1] and was able to engage in discussions with experts involved in the
debates around preservation and planning in Moscow, including planners and architects
consulting with the municipal planning department. Finally, I conducted a series of one-on-one
neighborhood walks with members of the architecture and preservation community, and life long
residents of Moscow. The purpose of these walks was to have participants guide me through
the history of their neighborhoods, combining their own memories with knowledge about the
(often undocumented) effects of major architectural and planning projects on the everyday lived
experience of Moscow residents.
Archival research was conducted using the web and print resources of various art activist
groups, MAPS, the Moscow Urban Forum and the Moscow Biennale. Additional materials were
gathered through personal correspondence with members of relevant organizations.

THE POLITICS OF URBAN AESTHETICS IN POST-SOCIALIST RUSSIA
At first glance, urban development in Moscow and Saint Petersburg are on par with what can be
experienced in most “world cities.” Global trends point to the increasing financialization of urban
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real estate (Aalbers 2008; Peck et al. 2009; Smart & Lee 2003) and city centers are restructured
through the indiscriminate deployment of “iconic architecture” and other mega projects in the
competitive quest for “world city” status (Charney 2007; Ren 2008; Sklair 2010). However, postsocialist cities have seen especially drastic transformations since the 1990s. Economic
restructuring in the wake of the Soviet collapse, including the liberalization of trade, increasingly
fluid movements of capital, the arrival of multinational corporations and the elimination of many
centralized industries have led to irreversible changes in these cities’ economic foundations and
labor markets. This restructuring extends to the social level, resulting in increased inequality and
social differentiation, evident in rising rates of urban poverty in post-socialist cities.[2] And of
course, all of these institutional, political, economic and social transformations are visible within
the continuous re-design and reconstruction of the built environment (Tsenkova and NedovicBudic 2006).

In Moscow, vast and complex schemes for the privatization of personal and public lands, along
with open-armed (or sometimes coerced) embrace of neoliberal policies have led to a culture of
back-room negotiation between financial and political interests, in which public plans are slowly
gutted and urban districts restructured without the democratic input of city dwellers (Golubchikov
and Badyina 2006). The center of Moscow in particular has borne the brunt of gentrification
efforts: while accounting for only 6.4% of the city’s area, and housing 8% of the population, it
has received 40% of real estate investment capital (Kolossov and O’Loughlin 2004). The human
costs of these disproportionate investments have yet to be adequately measured, however
Golubchikov and Badyina (2005: 125) note that between 1992 and 2004 one gentrifying central
Moscow neighborhood saw the displacement of 2847 people, or 1518 families, out of an original
3725 residents, all without significant public input into the process. While Moscow’s general plan
of 2009 was the first in the city’s history to incorporate mandatory public hearings in order to
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gather input from local residents into the planning process, the effectiveness of “the public” in
having its voice reflected in the general plan was questionable at best (Chubara 2012).
However, one tangible result of the new process is to generate increased media coverage for
municipality-led urban developments. Such coverage tends to galvanize public protest
movements, and even before the mass political protests of 2011-2012, successful
demonstrations against proposed city plans to demolish modernist buildings in central Moscow
and replace them with “iconic” designs by world-famous architects had already entered the
urban consciousness (Chubara 2012).

In this newly politicized sphere of Russian urban development, debates about urban design and
planning take on a particular charge. An example of this charged atmosphere can be observed
in the grassroots movement organized in protest of the Gazprom corporation’s 2006 proposal
for a new skyscraper in Saint Petersburg’s historic center (Dixon 2010). As neoliberal incursions
into the urban landscape increasingly take aesthetic forms, grassroots movements against
structures like the Gazprom skyscraper reveal residents’ struggles to sustain local rights to the
globalizing city (Dixon 2010). In his analysis of the controversy surrounding this proposal,
anthropologist Alexei Yurchak notes that debates about urban design in Russia extend “far
beyond questions of urban beauty and architectural style to a deeper confrontation over
power—over who has the power to define and dictate what this city is, how it looks, for whom it
exists, and who can benefit from living in it—in short, who owns the city” (2011: 3, emphasis in
original). In an adaptation of the theory of Jacques Ranciere (2004), Yurchak takes the debates
over the city’s changing skyline as evidence that what is “at issue is not an aesthetic image per
se, but the right to determine it and interfere in it or, aesthetic politics” (2011: 6). These debates
then, allow “aesthetics [to] function as a proxy for politics,” where grassroots movements tend to
gather around shared places, rather than shared ideas (Yurchak 2011: 4). In Russia’s over-
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determined political climate, in which there has been centralized one-party rule firmly
entrenched for over a decade, until very recently organized political movements were often met
with skepticism, while the battles to participate in designing the aesthetic futures of the city
become a fertile and unifying ground for heartfelt exchange between disparate oppositional
groups (Yurchak 2011).

This volatile convergence of aesthetics and politics is especially visible in today’s Russian cities,
where recent performances by activist art groups like Pussy Riot have presented direct
challenges to the political status quo, through short-lived (and severely punished) interventions
at iconic centers of urban power. The fall 2011 performance of ‘Punk Prayer,’ an original protest
song, in one of Moscow’s largest and newest churches, the Church of Christ the Savior, led to a
very public trial followed by a sentence of years of incarceration for at least two of the group’s
members. Having been destroyed in Stalin’s campaign against religion, and rebuilt in 2000, the
Church of Christ the Savior is unparalleled as an expression of the absolute “break with the
principles of modernist/socialist urban aesthetics,” and simultaneous “architectural nostalgia” for
a decadent imperial past that dominates the urban aesthetic of post-socialist Moscow (Boym
2001; Hirt 2013). The Pussy Riot performance and ensuing criminal case made audible and
visible in mainstream public discourse the connection between the church and the sitting
regime, and at the same time presented a sparse DIY punk aesthetic that challenged the
aesthetic of imperial nostalgia represented by this particular church.

Any consideration of DIY urbanism in Russia, therefore, must take into account the political
valence of arguments about, and interventions into, the city’s aesthetics. DIY movements in
Russian cities operate in an atmosphere of aggressive neoliberal economic restructuring, in
which the redesign of the city is pushed by mega projects. These mega projects can act as
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catalysts for wholesale spatial reconstructions of the city, which usurp urban planning directives
through opaque partnerships between government and business that undermine public
participation through official channels. Recent moves to officially include the public in urban
planning processes by increasing transparency about proposed designs, while invisible in the
final plans, have created a space for grassroots movements to form and respond with
alternative city plans. It is into this aestheticized political space that I place the following analysis
of the rise of DIY urbanism in Russian cities, and its global resonances.
CREATING DIY ROUTES
Much walking in Moscow takes place in the underground marble and cement passageways
(perekhod), connecting metro stations, or spanning the length of the 12-, 16-, or 18-lane
boulevards that circle the city. Walking these halls can be a long, grim affair: nothing but beige
walls for hundreds of meters, with the odd graffiti here and there, and the only exit out of sight
for much of the walk. At night they can be a source of fear, as the solitary pedestrian hurries
along, imagining her assailants lurking in occasional recessions in the long corridor. It is clear
these passages were designed for expedience, not experience. In February and March 2013, a
group of young artists appropriated the recessions in passageways surrounding the
Dobrinskaya and Proletarskaya metro stations and turned them to use for a less utilitarian, and
marginally less criminal, purpose.
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[Figure 1: Making the Passageway Gallery, Metro Proletarskaya, Moscow. Photos
courtesy Vystavka v perekhode]
Vystavka v perekhode, or “The Passage Gallery Project,” turned the passageways into
temporary art galleries, exhibiting photographs submitted by local citizens. According to the
artists’ statement:
Underground crosswalks are for people: We want to make these public spaces
more interactive and comfortable. This is an experiment as a temporary gallery
inviting anyone to submit photographs they would like to share with people in the
city… [W]e want to discuss with a larger audience, the perekhods as an
overlooked space in Moscow. Question: What do you think of perekhods as
galleries? What would make the perekhods nicer and more comfortable for you?
(Vystavka v perekhode, personal communication, April 26, 2013)
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For the artists, Moscow’s passageways, those most humble of urban affordances, deserve a
closer look. As an unavoidable feature of everyday life in the city, the grim experience of using
these passageways are overlooked by official planners and designers, even while they are
endured by Muscovites as yet another inconvenience programmed into a city notorious for its
indifference to pedestrians. Appropriating such ‘non-spaces’ for ‘galleries,’ the blank walls are
plastered with citizens’ photocopied photographs that blend in with the sparse graffiti, while
acting as crude ‘windows’ out of this everyday trudge, or curious reflections of life aboveground
caught in the corner of a passing eye. At the same time, this humorous “experiment” brings to
the surface an affective experience common to almost all Muscovites, and yet rarely articulated
within public discourse about the city’s aesthetic. This simple intervention contains the ethos of
much Delai Sam (Do-It-Yourself or DIY) urbanism in Moscow and Saint Petersburg today: There
is the sense of highlighting the mundane experiences of everyday life, by calling into relief the
features of the urban landscape that normally blend into the background, often far away from
the attention given to the skylines and iconic architecture of the global city. In the artists’
approach, there is a refusal of what art historian Ekaterina Degot has called the “strange mix of
overt aesthetics and repressed politics [that] is the defining characteristic of the Moscow art
scene today” (Degot 2010: 107). Instead, these artists fashion themselves more along the lines
of what Degot (2010: 110) dubs “‘artist workers,’ who actively seek audiences outside of the art
world,” using a stripped down ‘punk’ aesthetic, (Darms 2014; Hebidge 1987; Hemphill &
Leskowitz 2012; O’Hara 2001) in contrast with the opulence that characterizes new
development. In this self-fashioning we can also see the appropriation or mimicry of “powerful
knowledge”—officially-produced urbanist discourse, normally deployed within institutionallysanctioned social sciences, urban planning and architecture—deployed as a critique of the city’s
more official design and knowledge-production practices. Within these parameters, the
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“Passage Gallery Project” can be read as an artistic, and even activist, intervention into
institutionalized discourse on planning in Moscow.

[Figure 2: Image from the Passageway Gallery, Metro Proletarskaya, Moscow. Photos
courtesy Vystavka v perekhode]
If we think of urbanism as a multi-sited and transdisciplinary form of producing “powerful” and
“empirical” knowledge about the city (Kirby 2013), then we can imagine DIY urbanism as forms
of creative thought and action developed in parallel to official, expert and institutionalized
knowledge about the city, sometimes for the purposes of intervening into, disrupting, mirroring,
mocking or otherwise transforming these official discourses. DIY practices may be found in
many aspects of the everyday lives of many urban citizens in Russia. However, I address only
those urban-interventionist practices at the intersection of art and activism that specifically aim
to comment upon, revise, or create alternatives to the institutionalized knowledge about the city,
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promoted by governmental, corporate or even established non-state organizations. These less
institutionalized creative practices (often) take the form of public interventions into the practice
of everyday life in the city, which render “sense-able” previously under-examined aspects of
urban landscapes and politics (Pinder 2008; Holmes 2007; Aristarkhova 2007).

A MOSCOW MANIFESTO
Delai Sam, Russian for “Do it yourself,” as a form of contemporary art, and urban
interventionism, is a relatively recent phenomenon in post-Soviet Russia, and from its outset
appears to be deeply engaged with global trends in nongovernmental urban development.
Spurred on by The Global Day of Action of October 10, 2010, several Moscow-based architects,
artists and environmental activists developed “Moscow 2020,” a manifesto presenting an
alternative to the municipal government’s recently released plan for the City of Moscow. The
Moscow 2020 manifesto opens with the following statement:
Moscow: not the most comfortable city for living. Last year the Moscow
[municipal] authorities presented a master plan for the city, which ignores a lot of
its current problems. We want to live in a green city with convenient public
transport, bicycle lanes, beautiful old and new buildings, tolerant mayor,
authorities and residents. We must begin to build for ourselves a city in which we
want to live.
The plan itself was first presented at a roundtable event held at the Strelka Institute for Media,
Architecture and Design, a newly incorporated nongovernmental think tank providing
consultation on urban development projects in Moscow. The plan includes twenty suggestions
for the reorganization of the city’s transport systems, twelve standards and directions for
architecture and urban design, and several cycling-oriented project ideas. The plan generally
calls for a reorientation towards “people-centered” public transportation, with the aim of
addressing Moscow’s notorious traffic congestion by focusing on making movement easier for
pedestrians and cyclists. The directions for architecture and urban design call for

44

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
“decentralization” of the city, moving business activities from the historic center into the
periphery, and the “preservation and development” of cultural centers and tourism-oriented
activities. The architectural provisions focus heavily on the conservation and restoration of the
city’s “pre-Soviet and Soviet” heritage, addressing the lack of concern for architectural history
evident in the municipality’s own plan.[3] Among the most pressing calls the manifesto makes
are those that specifically demand “integrated design that covers all urban and social issues,”
and “public discussion of [new buildings] projected on the city.” These last calls articulate
frustration with the lack of effective municipal mechanisms through which city residents can
actively and effectively propose and participate in the design and implementation of public
works. In fact, it is this severe lack of participatory opportunities among the general population
that makes issues of urban planning and design in Russia particularly fraught. Participatory
planning trends have barely taken hold among Russia’s urban decision-makers, thus leaving
wide open a highly charged field of intervention for designers, artists and activists. In fact, the
Moscow 2020 manifesto goes on to enlist the participation of any sympathetic architects,
designers, environmentalists and artists, who wish to join the effort to present an alternative
vision for the city’s development.
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[Figure 3: Participants in DIY action in the Voikovskaya district of Moscow creating a
giant chessboard out of a discarded road barrier; led by Strasbourg-based urban
hacktivist Florian Riviere, in collaboration with Partizaning, July 2012. Photo credit: Maria
Semenenko]
As a manifestation of DIY urbanism, Delai Sam and related activities in Moscow and Saint
Petersburg, can be situated firmly within the “creative” or “cultural” fields of architecture, design,
art, media and to a lesser extent, social science. With the exception of an environmental activist
group, sponsors for the first Delai Sam in autumn 2010 were almost all cultural institutions,
including the Goethe Institut, Strelka Institute for Media, Architecture and Design and cultural
issues websites The Village and Openspace.ru. According the event website, Delai Sam actions
“consisted of activities like garbage collection, bike rallies, urban art interventions, and
architectural presentations all over Moscow.” While these activities were sometimes oriented
towards practical interventions at the street level, they focused heavily on issues of urban
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design and planning, including rethinking systems for performing road maintenance and
creating pedestrian crossings and bike paths. Additionally, the Delai Sam interventions had a
notably aesthetic orientation, relying heavily upon the participation of street artists who created
monuments to Soviet history made from the remains of refuse they had collected and painted
benches shaped like crocodiles and colorful bird houses.

For Moscow-based Partizaning, an organization formed out of collaborations between artists, art
historians and activists, and central to the creation of the Moscow 2020 manifesto and the Delai
Sam festival, the distinction between art and non-art or activism is irrelevant. According to a
statement on the group’s website:
Today's activist urban residents do not think of art [as] a distinct system. They
use the language of art as a tool to challenge and change their daily reality: from
DIY urban repair to struggling for new forms of state representation.
Unsanctioned interventions and interactions in our urban environments,
combined with mass media connectivity, have become effective transformative
tactics for a new, alternative vision for the future.
Partizaning is not just the name of our website. It is also a term to define a new
phenomenon and strategy at the intersection of street art and social activism. We
devised this term in Russia, where we demonstrate in a revolutionary tradition
how self-motivated, unauthorized statements and unsolicited action can become
key drivers of social and cultural change.
Our goal is to reflect and promote the idea of art-based DIY activism aimed at
rethinking, restructuring and improving urban environments and communities.
Partizaning aims to introduce a brand of urban activism that converges with street art, such that
their interventions into the city’s landscape must be read simultaneously both as art and non-art,
which has the aim of transforming the city at the aesthetic, political and social levels. The
group’s projects often reflect these simultaneous ambitions. For example, a map produced by
Anton “Make” Polsky, a founding member of Partizaning, sets out to mark all the informal
bicycle paths in Moscow. As part of the participatory mapping process, urban cyclists may

47

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
download a printable map of the city from Make’s website, mark the map with their own routes,
and then return the marked maps to selected galleries across the city, from which the artist
collects and collates them. The project is called USE/LESS and the artist’s statement reads like
an exultation of the chaos of biking through city streets, aiming to encourage other cyclists to
reclaim the streets, in direct opposition to the incessant privatization of urban space (Polsky
2010).

[Figure 4: USE/LESS Bike Map. Photos courtesy Partizaning]
As in Moscow, Saint Petersburg’s approach to Delai Sam urban actions have an artistic
orientation. Free Space, an architecture and design NGO, which is a hosting organization for
Delai Sam in Saint Petersburg, emphasizes the importance of art practice to urban activism.
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Mikhail Klimovsky, an activist, designer, critic and founding member of Free Space, has spoken
publicly on the political uses of public art:
…We are planning to bend [the] forces [of the gallery] toward social reflection, in
particular, to make art in the public space of the city, to work with the various
manifestations of the urban environment.
Art objects housed in an urban environment, in public space, work on an
unprepared audience, and [then] there is some interest. Any resident has the
opportunity to interact with a work of art, and sometimes, possibly [engage in a]
direct act of co-creation. The inclusion of residents in the process of
implementing an art project, artist's interaction with his audience - residents,
bystanders, etc. - is the most important task that should be put in front of an artist
who works in the space of the urban environment. We also plan to implement a
number of projects directly involving urban residents (and not only), in particular
to try suburban bedroom communities - Kupchino, for example. (Zhelnina 2011)
The insertion of art practice into social activism within the urban environment has geo-political
implications beyond aesthetics. In fact, Klimovsky aims to activate an alternative geography for
the circulation of art outside of its traditional circuits, and even beyond the privileged city center.
Invoking Kupchino, one of Saint Petersburg’s suburban commuter communities, Klimovsky
voices the ambition of bringing art beyond the streets and to the very doorsteps of city residents,
thereby re-organizing an urban hierarchy which privileges actions located within the city’s
centers of cultural, financial and political power.

A BIENNALE FOR URBAN ACTIVISTS?
The second Delai Sam festival, held in fall 2011, coincided with the 4th Moscow Biennale of
Contemporary Art and included art exhibitions and workshops in urban interventions, using a repurposed shipping container as a mobile headquarters and exhibition space. The container also
became a mobile studio, hosting a residency program for visiting artists who would contribute to
Delai Sam activities. The container-gallery was eventually incorporated into the Biennale as part
of a special program, “Media Impact: International Festival of Activist Art.” As presented on the
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Biennale website, the curatorial statement for “Media Impact” heralds the birth of a new kind of
Russian artist:
Today, we witness important changes in Russian contemporary art. Artists come
out from studios, museums and galleries to make interventions in the streets and
online social networks. They take part in different forms of social activism from
political to ecological actions, community work. The new type of artists emerging
call themselves activists: no analogues to that had been known in Russian art
before. They refuse to work with institutions, search for their own forms of artistic
existence, cooperate with subcultures and social movements.
This “new type of artist” operating within the subcultures of the urban realm, as well as online
through social networks, is presented as a social activist who denies support, and resists cooptation by established institutions. However, closer examination of the event website reveals
that the “Media Impact” exhibition itself is “supported by” a variety of well-established local and
international cultural institutions, such as the Goethe Institut, the European Cultural Foundation,
the Polish Cultural Institute and the National Center for Contemporary Art (Moscow).
Additionally the event boasts the sponsorship of corporations such as Artel Hotel Group,
Samsung and the Double V group. The support and sponsorship scheme undergirding the
“Media Impact” exhibition of the Moscow Biennale, demonstrates the complexity of relationships
that surround art-activism in the urban sphere. Biennales and cultural events, like iconic
architecture and mega projects, have lately been lauded as key assets in the competition for
global city status. In a discourse which privileges the “creative and cultural sectors” as “soft” or
“intangible” elements of a global city’s identity, which might act as “attractors” for multinational
firms, highly skilled workers, students and tourists, thereby raising a city’s global profile and
chances for economic success, biennales and other “signature cultural events” become
indispensable to urban development schemes (Sassen 2006; Harvey 2002; Hutton 2007;
Schilbach 2010; Richards and Palmer 2010). Criticism of these events point to the fact that
spectacles of art and culture, while themselves generative of gentrification and associated social
disparities, are often employed as cure-alls for deeper social and economic inequalities
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generated by neoliberal urban policies (Harvey 2002; Waitt 2008; Askoy 2008). In Moscow, the
advent of institutions and events promoting contemporary art, and the field of “cultural
management,” is connected to the exponential rise in concentrated private wealth in recent
years. As the city’s billionaires increasingly invest in art collections and sponsor art galleries,
foundations and international cultural events (Ioffe 2010), the profile of the city as a global
center for contemporary art grows steadily, and the biennale itself becomes evidence of this
greater “connectivity” in a network of competitive cities (Sassen 2006).

The role of artists and other members of the “creative class” as facilitators in the neoliberal
restructuring of the city is well documented (Zukin 1989; Deutsche and Ryan 1984; Smith 1996;
Wallis [1991]1999; Florida 2002). In these stories of gentrification and displacement of one class
of citizens by another, artists often appear as unwitting participants driven more by their need
for cheap or inviting space to create than by any explicit recognition of their roles as foot
soldiers or pioneers in the “revitalization” (Florida 2002) or “gentrification” (Deutsche and Ryan
1984) of urban areas. Cast within these roles, artists are transformed into “social assets” which
can be used to leverage the transformation of rundown inner city areas (Lukin 1989). However,
analysis of urban interventions executed in Russian cities in the past few years complicates any
easy characterizations of the role of ‘the artist’ within the (global) city. For example, Voina, a
group operating in Moscow and Saint Petersburg since 2005, whose actions skirt the lines
between art and criminal activity, clearly refuses the position of artist-as-social-asset, adopting a
much more antagonistic stance. According to the group’s website:
VOINA. A street collective of actionist artists who engage in political protest art.
Political orientation: anarchist. Enemies: philistines, cops, the regime.
Organization type: militant gang, dominated by horizontal ties in everyday life and
employing vertical relationships during actions. The group preaches renunciation
of money and disregard towards the law (“the no-whoring way”).
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Several of the group’s most well known actions targeted iconic locations in Saint Petersburg and
Moscow, such as the headquarters of the Russian federal security services, or the Kremlin.
“Dick captured by KGB,” an action executed in June 2010, involved the painting of a 210-foot
penis on the historic Liteniy drawbridge opposite the headquarters of security services.
Whenever the drawbridge was raised, an obscene salute could be seen from the windows of the
government building. The bridge soon became a local tourist attraction, and a global Internet
sensation. One month prior, the group had staged “Crazy Lenya is Our President,” an action
designed “to deprive cars with special blue signal flashers of rights to break the regulations of
road traffic.” The action involved members of the group throwing themselves into oncoming
traffic in a busy boulevard opposite the Kremlin, with the intention of physically removing blue
flashing lights from the roofs of cars. These portable emergency lights, issued by the
government to high-ranking personnel, are generally believed to be a sort of “express pass,”
used by “VIPs” to avoid Moscow’s notorious traffic jams. Both of these actions are in line with
the groups goals, stated on their website, to create “expressive art, which is sincere and honest
[in] provoking observers’ deep emotional experience” while developing a “language, adequate
for today’s cultural and socio-political context,” and destroying the “conformist Russian art
market, which is reproducing outdated forms of art.” Voina’s absurdist actions, which have
landed some members in prison, and forced others into hiding, point to the difficulty of
classifying art as part of the “cultural assets” of the city, to be judiciously managed and traded
upon for global city status. Artists in Russia that take as their goal a direct attack on the urban
symbols of power, and attempt to act out the simmering frustration that is part of everyday life in
a city with unevenly distributed conveniences, are treading dangerous ground.

And yet, despite the group’s antagonistic relationship with state authorities, and disdain for the
art-market that promotes less politically engaged work, in 2011 Voina was nominated for, and
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won, Russia’s prestigious “Innovation Art Prize.” The prize, sponsored by the Ministry of Culture,
and awarded by the National Center for Contemporary Art, has become in recent years, “a
symbol of the adversarial relationship between culture and government in Russia” (Tikhonova
2011: 46). While Voina’s nomination caused controversy among the award’s jury members, the
discussion revolved primarily around the aesthetic merit of the group’s works and not its political
implications. The argument over the aesthetic merit of Voina’s urban interventions (“But is it
even art?”), undertaken within the confines of institutionalized art practice, elides the work’s
merit as a serious critique of the powers that decide what constitutes appropriate uses of urban
space. Instead of aesthetics standing in for, or catalyzing, arguments about who has the right to
the city, the group’s nomination for the elite prize and the jury’s subsequent deliberation only
served to muddy the relationship between the political action and its aesthetic impact, such that
discussion of ‘rights’ and ‘the city’ was pushed off the table.

CREATING SPACE FOR SOMETHING ELSE TO HAPPEN
It has been one of the decisive processes of the last ten years in Germany
that a considerable proportion of its productive minds, under the pressure
of economic conditions, have passed through a revolutionary development
in their attitudes, without being simultaneously able to rethink their own
work, their relation to the means of production, or their technique in a
really revolutionary way.
--Walter Benjamin (2005[1934]), emphasis added
I have always written according to my convictions—with perhaps a few
minor exceptions—but I have never made the attempt to express the
contradictory and mobile whole that my convictions represent in their
multiplicity.
--Walter Benjamin, draft of a letter to Gershom Schloem
[My communism] is absolutely nothing other than the expression of certain
experiences that I have undergone in my thinking and in my life. That it is a
drastic, not infertile expression of the fact that the present intellectual
industry finds it impossible to accommodate my life; that it represents the
obvious, reasoned attempt on the part of a man who is completely, or
almost completely deprived of any means of production to proclaim his
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right to them, both in his thinking and in his life… Is it really necessary to
say all this to you?
--Walter Benjamin, letter to Gershom Schloem justifying his
communist approach against his friend’s disdain.

Russian urban artist-activists at the beginning of the twenty-first century find themselves at a
comparable moment to that faced by the left-wing intelligentsia of Weimar Germany on the
verge of its descent into fascism. Their means of producing art in relation to their local and
global context is undergoing a transformative process, according to loosely-defined criteria of
“social or political engagement,” at the same time as they search for new spaces and methods
beyond those imposed by market economies, within a still-volatile and restructuring post-Soviet
society. Meanwhile, art and “creative” production itself emerges as a strong currency in a
competition for economic investment in urban areas (Sassen). Amidst the search for new
(urban) spaces and alternative means for producing art, the position of the artist, and of his or
her interlocutors, continuously shifts in ways that blur disciplinary boundaries, and demand
rethinking the relation of the artist to “the social,” and “the urban,” itself. In The Author as
Producer (1934), written in response to a sojourn in Moscow several years earlier, where he
had encountered artists willingly enlisted in the project of bringing into existence a new
communist cultural life (Benjamin 1986), and intended as an address to the Institute for the
Study of Fascism in Paris, Walter Benjamin raises several questions relevant to analyzing the
relationship between activism and art today. Chief amongst these is a question that shifts the
criteria for judging the politics of artistic interventions: “Rather than asking what is the attitude of
a [literary] work to the relations of production of its time? I would like to ask, ‘What is its position
in them?’” (Benjamin 1999[1934]: 770). For Benjamin, it is no longer enough to ascertain to
what extent a work of literature (or art) intentionally expresses particular political views and,
from there, make judgments about its transformative potential. Rather, the analysis must bypass
the ‘good intentions’ of the project and proceed from the socioeconomic spaces and methods in
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which the work itself is produced. Any artwork that would intervene in a broader political struggle
must first transform the means of its own production.

Reconsidering the interventions of Pussy Riot, Partizaning and Voina, we can see how the
content of contemporary art potentially “raises questions,” about the conditions within which we
relate to each other in urban spaces undergoing endless economic restructuring. However, the
question of how exactly artists as producers are themselves positioned within a broader means
of production remains uncomfortably unanswered with regard to each art project, or process.
Whether the new social engagement expresses an explicit politics is not of relevance to my
analysis. I would rather pay attention to the potential for such art practices to transform both
their own field and those of other disciplinary spaces. Activist-art exposes itself to non-traditional
discursive arenas and unusual sites of production and exhibition. Even when they remain in the
studio, the gallery and the museum, such practices attempt to occupy those spaces in nontraditional or challenging ways. Through these interventions, the production of art embraces a
certain liminality, exceeding any social and disciplinary boundaries of aesthetics, and opening
itself up to becoming non-art—and non-art to becoming art—such that received notions of both
art and urbanism are relinquished. But how can I, read this movement to introduce new
methods for producing art and urbanism into the discourse of environmental psychology? What
does it mean to experience this threshold between disciplines?
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[Figure 5: A DIY swing in the Voikovskaya district of Moscow created by Florian Riviere
in collaboration with Partizaning. Photo credit: Maria Semenenko]
Rethinking the position of art within the means of production (of knowledge about the city),
necessarily involves engaging with art as the practice of transforming (one’s own) perceptions of
the environment. Beyond representation of existing environments, the art practices with which I
have engaged in the course of my research take up the experience of urban social conditions,
and our perception of such conditions. Each project analyzed herein has taken on liminal
spaces, spaces of transition between one world into the next—whether Partizaning and its focus
on side streets, courtyards, and alleys, disused street furniture, placing libraries in abandoned
bus shelters; or Pussy Riot’s focus on the church as a site of ongoing shadowy transition
between the socialist regime, and the new Russian power; or Voina’s insertion of their bodies
and expression into the traffic roundabout or the drawbridge. Intervening in liminal urban spaces
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can be seen as part of a larger process of transforming both participants’ perception of the
urban environment, and the means of production of knowledge about the urban, and is the
expression of a transdisciplinary process that brings into confrontation official and everyday
ways of experiencing the urban. Or to put it in Benjamin’s words, these interventionist tactics are
“drastic, not infertile expression[s] of the fact that the present intellectual industry finds it
impossible to accommodate [these artists’] lives.”

The transdisciplinary approach of urban interventionists can be compared to the
interdisciplinarity of environmental psychology, which draws upon the theories and
methodologies of social psychology, anthropology, sociology, architecture and urban planning.
The main difference is that the transdisciplinary approach is open to producing something
entirely other than art, or even disciplined knowledge, while interdisciplinary work very much
respects and maintains the boundaries of disciplines, with the aim of “constructing a common
model… based on a process of dialogue between disciplines” (Ramadier 2004:433). Where the
model of interdisciplinarity seeks a consensus around the explanation of specific phenomena
between distinct disciplinary methods, transdisciplinarity challenges notions of scientific
progress based on “the compartmentalization of knowledge into myriad separate disciplines” by
teasing out the “dynamics of the construction of objects studied on the basis of disciplinary
knowledge” (Ramadier 2004:432). Often, working with the dynamics of disciplinary
constructions requires exposing to analysis “opposing, non-overlapping, ‘marginal’ aspects of
each disciplinary model,” such that different and competing realities of the phenomena may be
experienced (Ramadier 2004:425). While both interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity depend
upon the existence of distinct disciplines, the former seeks points of relation, in the form of
specific concepts and methodologies (e.g. place identity, or mental mapping) that could exist
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comfortably within several adjacent disciplines, whereas the latter destabilizes disciplinary
boundaries, adhering to theoretical fault lines, in order to open up paradoxical ways of knowing.

Paradoxically, like much punk and DIY practices of knowing (Hemphill and Leskowitz 2012),
urban interventionism draws upon various disciplinary expertise, while simultaneously
subverting the position of ‘the expert.’ The aim of this experimental practice is less to produce
new knowledge about a pre-determined, unified object, than to make the space of paradox
available for participants to experience. Both the competing realities that exist alongside each
other in a given city, and the huge vacuum of knowledge left by the failure official narratives to
reconcile these multiple realities, become perceptible through the iterative processes of design
and implementation of the intervention. Writing about the surge in activist architecture in the
wake of the recent recessions rippling across Europe, Pier Vittorio Aureli (2013), also draws
upon Benjamin’s writings of the early 1930s to contextualize the ethical implications of these
trans- and extra-disciplinary interventions:
…we [activist-architects] are no longer expected to do something; rather we
should make room, we should create the space for something else to happen.
This act of making space (rather than creating something) requires the gesture of
stoppage and staring again from scratch. The energy for such a gesture will
come not from the invocation of some metaphysical void, but from the very sense
of vacancy that inhabits our postrecession urban landscape. Instead of solving
this vacancy, we need to invent a new architectural language that… will give
radical form to this vacancy without filling it. (2013: 126)
Aureli’s formulation of the (new) role of activist architects, in relation to the production of the
urban landscape, parallels the challenge presented by activist-artistic intervention into the
production of knowledge about Moscow. Finding, making and occupying liminal spaces, at the
edges of official discourse has consequences. There might be a loss of voice, an inability to act,
a sort of paralysis experienced by those caught in the throes of self-transformation, in the
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moments before the apprehension of a new language. This is the ethos of DIY means of
knowledge production: perpetually “starting from scratch.”

CONCLUSION
DIY urbanism, as observed in recent Russian urban interventions, may be thought of as an
activist form of engaging (with) the city that mirrors, challenges and expands institutionalized
and “powerful” processes of knowledge production. These actions are generally small and low
budget, (despite betraying no small amount of media savvy), and make use of play, mimicry and
humor, combined with a practical emphasis on working with the mundane. From turning bleak
passageways into impromptu art galleries, and drafting alternative ‘master plans’ for the city, to
staging provocative performances on symbolic ground, Delai Sam actions are intent upon
introducing a new urban vocabulary into the language of the Russian city. Discursive inroads
are made using two main registers: On the one hand such efforts draw from the current climate
of politics by proxy, in which urban aesthetics is a highly charged site for both advancing and
opposing ongoing neoliberal restructuring of the city. On the other hand, the actions draw out
the affective dimension of urban design and planning, making available for public comment
particular frustrations that are common to the everyday experiences of city dwellers but remain
unaddressed in official discourse. Considered together, these works point us towards parallel
urbanisms, in which the city is not simply an object to be studied, dissected, planned and
designed for a faceless and ideal public, but a medium for making politics-as-art, or art-aspolitics.

Art-activism or activist-art currently ongoing in Russian cities is staking claims to the urban
aesthetic that disrupt institutional notions of urban planning and design, while providing various
platforms for the experimental investigation of the actual experiences of citizens. However,
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despite the potential for these interventions to highlight gaps in urban policy, and to present
alternative urban aesthetics, DIY urban actions-as-contemporary-art, can become caught in the
very networks of neoliberal restructuring around which they are organizing. As pawns in
gentrification efforts or hot commodities at biennales, such art-activists can find themselves
making bargains that potentially undermine the alternative politics their work anticipates. Rather
than ignore these entanglements, critical DIY practice works directly with such contradictions. In
fact it is because of their direct engagements with these complexities, and their ability to deliver
unexpected yet powerful impacts on the city that DIY actions have particular relevance to the
fields of architecture, planning and design. How cities look and feel, and how people respond
creatively to their built environment, are not simply matters of professional technique and best
practice, but are increasingly central to alternative politics emerging in cities across the globe.
By politically activating these aesthetic matters, art-activism or activist-art highlights areas of
everyday life that require closer attention by the professions ostensibly most concerned with
urban aesthetics.

For those interested in engaging more directly with these overlooked aspects of urban
experience, or in “people-centered” design practices, there is a lot to be learned from DIY
urbanism. Could planning become more “ad-hoc” and responsive to the affective register of
urban experience? Could planning and architecture pay closer attention to the “forgotten
spaces,” of everyday urban life, not in order to “program” them through design, but to help
activate free spaces in which new urban aesthetics can be continually created? These
questions concern the extent to which transdisciplinarity can be embraced in urban studies, in
such a way as to bring forth serious experiments with the means of producing urban knowledge.
Lines between official and local knowledge would, of necessity, become blurred, and expert
positions challenged and relinquished. There is great risk involved in this kind of work, and
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urban interventionists working in transdisciplinary modes often find themselves in politically
precarious positions. However, this is the terrain embraced in this dissertation, itself the result of
my own eight-year experiment in DIY art and urbanism.

Notes
1.

The Moscow Urban Forum (MUF) is an annual international three-day urbanism
conference sponsored by the Moscow municipality. Begun in 2010, MUF aims to
address specific planning and design issues faced by the city by attracting big-name
international architects, scholars and potential corporate investors to interact with local
government officials, in order to create and share knowledge about the city. The forum
can be taken as gauge for the planning and design priorities and concerns of the
Moscow municipal government, and understood as an important example of the
government’s recent efforts to increase transparency about its plans for the city.

2.

One measure of the perception of social inequality in post-socialist life can be found in a
survey of Moscow residents conducted in 2001, in which only 11% of respondents rated
their family’s material condition as “good” or “very good,” and 34% characterized their
condition as “poor” or “very poor” (Kolossov and O’Loughlin 2004), with remaining
participants describing their condition as “average.” This is not surprising: despite being
one of the world’s most expensive cities, Moscow ranks 190 out of 215 large cities in
terms of quality of life (Hirt and Stanilov 2009: 73).

3.

These provisions reflect an upsurge in preservation activism by local NGOs, like
Archnadzor, and the Moscow Architectural Preservation Society (MAPS), since the mid2000s. From 1992 to 2005 the entire historic center of Moscow was listed as a UNESCO
World Heritage site (Hirt and Stanilov 2009), currently only the Kremlin and Red Square
remain on that list, and between 400 and 700 federally and locally designated
architectural landmarks have been lost since 1989 (MAPS, cited in Hirt and Stanilov
2009: 78). While Saint Petersburg’s historic center remains on the UNESCO list, about
32 percent of the residential stock and 18 percent of its non-residential stock remains
classified in “substandard” condition (over 40 percent damaged) (Hirt and Stanilov 2009:
77).
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3.
UNRAVELING THE CITY
A PSYCHOGEOGRAPHICAL EXPERIMENT
AT THE EDGE OF MOSCOW
AT THE EDGE OF THE CITY
Standing huddled together with a few people you know in Kievogorskoe Field, a large park at
the edge of Moscow, you stare across the pristine snow, towards the dense tree line at the edge
of your field of vision. You are here on this unusually clear day in February, standing calf-deep
in the snow at the invitation of Andrei Monastyrski, Nikita Alekseev, Georgy Kizevalter, Igor
Makarevich, Elena Elagina and Sergei Romashko who call themselves Collective Actions (CA),
on yet another of their “Trips Out of Town.” This time you’ve been given a piece of thread,
wound around a nail stuck in a wooden board in the center of the field. You must now unravel
this spool, while walking away from your nine companions, whose own threads go off at
different angles, heading towards the trees at the horizon. You are not sure of the length of the
thread, and how far you will have to walk, but you keep going, until you find yourself quite alone
in the quiet forest, or until you give up and go home. If you walk until the end of the thread, you
might decide to retrace your steps and return to the center of the field. As you re-emerge from
the forest, does someone snap your picture?

Trips out of Town (Poezdki za Gorod), sometimes translated as Journeys out of the City, or
Trips to the Countryside, can be understood as designed responses to the claustrophobic
spaces of Soviet Moscow. The trips to parks in the Moscow Region, conducted by the Collective
Actions group (CA) between the mid 1970s and the late 1980s, were not merely escapes into
nature, naïve attempts to divorce oneself from the over-planned environment of the city. In fact,
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according to art historian Octavian Desanu, “out-of-town-ness” (zagorodnosti) is a term specific
to the art practice of CA, and refers to a space that is neither the city nor the countryside or
“non-city.” Rather, it is a particular spatial category “missing as a concept in the topographies of
Western countries,” and encompasses a space beyond suburbia that has all the feature of the
countryside while still being close to the big city (Desanu 2009: 77). This “no-man’s land,” is
beyond “the authority of any law – for the city officials it is already country and those of the
country fear it because it is too close to the city” (Desanu 2009: 77). So for the Collective
Actions group, these journeys “out of town” were opportunities for participants to perform social
and spatial experiments in outdoor laboratories of their own design. In contrast to the politically
overdetermined space of both the city and the agricultural countryside, parkland and forests at
the edge of Soviet Moscow were treated as aesthetic “blank space” by the artists, perfect for
constructing models of parallel forms of (urban) knowledge and community. This chapter makes
a close reading of one of Collective Actions’ trips out of the city, an action titled Ten Apperances
held on February 1, 1981, in which ten participants walk through a wintry landscape while
unraveling a spool of thread as they go. The edge of the city, its very “out-of-town-ness” is read
as a space of transition, a laboratory or workshop for liminality, in which new spatial
understandings are generated for and by participants. The “out-of-town” experimentation of the
Collective Actions group, situated in ambiguous relationship to the city of Moscow, and to the
official knowledge that governed it, is contextualized by making reference to theory and
practices of environmental psychology and architecture, then emergent in Tallinn, Estonia, at
the Baltic outskirts of the Soviet Empire.

The activities of CA constituted a double life for its members and regular interlocutors, most of
whom were employed by the state as artists, poets, archivists, and researchers. During the
1970s and 1980s, through a variety of artistic interventions, CA came to be an influential part of
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the unofficial art scene known as Moscow Conceptualism (Tupitsyn 2009; Groys 2010; Jackson
2010; Bishop 2012). Despite their unrecognized status, a great amount of systematic planning
and design went into creating these experiments, (which benefitted from the artists’ access to
resources through their day jobs), as evidenced by the copious amount of documentation
created by members of the group, some of which uncannily resemble scientific notes and
sketches. The great amount of documentation produced by CA was not simply about creating
practical records of the group’s actions. Rather, documentation was as much a site of practice
as the trips out of town themselves, and took on “an aesthetic function,” such that “new artistic
concepts and possibilities emerged,” expanding the scope of Moscow conceptualist discourse in
the 1970s and 1980s, and contributing the eventual institutionalization of the group (Kalinsky
2013:105). Additionally, each experiment was followed by various methods of measuring and
collecting participant reactions, as part of a collective interpretive process, which often led to
detailed written reports of the group’s findings. It is from within this ritualized process of
mirroring, mimicking, and sometimes mocking of the procedures of official forms of scientific
knowledge production that I consider Ten Appearances.
(How) does this social experiment produce psychogeographical, architectural and behavioral
knowledge about the relationship between humans and their (urban) environment? If we see
CA’s experimentation as a response to dominant modes of Soviet social organization, just what
kind of alternative social relations are being modeled here, within Ten Appearances?

Let us imagine the snowy field of action as a ritual site, an affective alternative to Soviet
Moscow, in which everyday experiences of endless waiting and constant surveillance are
explored through (self-)reflexive actions aimed at deepening spatial perception and enacting
alternative social relationships. In the Forest of Symbols (1967), anthropologist Victor Turner,
citing the work of ethnologist Arnold van Gennep, defines three phases of the “rites of passage”
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which define points of transition in the individual’s lives across cultures.
The first phase of separation comprises symbolic behavior signifying the
detachment of the individual or group either from an earlier fixed point in the
social structure or a set of cultural conditions (a “state”); during the [second]
liminal [phase] the state of the ritual subject (the “passenger”) is ambiguous; he
passes through a realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or
coming state; in the third phase [“aggregation” or “incorporation”] the passage
is consummated. The ritual subject, individual or corporate, is in a stable state
once more and… has rights and obligations of a clearly defined and “structural”
type, and is expected to be have in accordance with certain customary norms
and ethical standards. (Turner 1967:94, emphasis added)
Viewing CA’s Trips out of Town as rites of passage allows us to better understand their effects
upon the socio-spatial perception of the participants. From this perspective, the Kievogorskoe
fields appear as a ritual space, in which the participants in the experiment conspire to
manufacture an exceptional experience, aimed at some kind of psychic self-transformation. In
keeping with the three phases of rites of passage this chapter is organized in three parts:
“Walking out, unraveling,” in which the participants are separated from their familiar urban
contexts; “In the woods, transforming,” in which participants are forced into solitary
confrontations with the limits of their own perceptions; and finally there is “Winding Up,
returning,” in which participants decide for themselves whether and how they will rejoin the
group.

WALKING OUT, UNRAVELING

We found ourselves on that same field where I had been several times before.
Leaving the road behind, we were immediately plunged into deep snow and had
to walk in step. This physical hardship of stepping with legs not very fit for the
task and without the help of skis into deep holes, into these tunnels cut deep into
the snow, immediately focused the mind on this heaviness and hardship.
(Kalinsky 2012:63)
Ilya Kabakov, an artist and regular participant in CA’s events, describes how the arduous and
repetitive exertion required to complete the task induces a meditative focus. The dragging of his
legs as he moves across the field and into the forest “create[s] a hardship that drove all
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thoughts from the mind and spirit” (Kalinsky 2012:65). Accordingly, CA describe their journeys
as “trips in the direction of nothingness, armed with equipment of an aesthetic/psychological
nature” (Tupitsyn 1999:104). The meandering, often challenging, nature of the journeys was
intended to help participants “shed their urban orientation in preparation for the action” (Tupitsyn
1999:105). The difficulty—experienced by Kabakov as the physical and psychological
“frustration and burden of stepping in this endlessly deep snow, of sinking in each time above
the knee”—is tied to the landscape itself, and the attempt to shape it by walking, while pulling an
almost weightless string. Another participant, poet Vsevolod Nekrasov, recalls the challenge of
walking steadily in one direction through the snow while pulling the thread:

It makes sense why there weren’t skis. Where’s the interest in that? And even
just visually, graphically, we would have ruined, trampled on, and marked up the
entire field. And then the tracks would have lost their meaning. But here, each
step was taken seriously. You had to concentrate—you would not jump an extra
step in this snow. You had to choose your steps carefully and, where possible, in
a straight line. It is very amusing to turn back and see that where you thought you
were walking a straight line turned out not straight at all. Only the little string
draws out perfectly straight, sketches out into a straight line, while you, for some
reason, always walk crookedly, from side to side, even when this is not in your
best interests. And then of course this little string is very beautiful in the forest.
(Kalinsky 2012:71-72)
The task forces Nekrasov into deep concentration, and in this focused state the string takes on
aesthetic meaning, its perfect straightness contrasting with the poet’s meandering steps. As with
the string method used in topographical surveys, in which the forester walks straight ahead at a
steady pace while unraveling a measured thread, Nekrasov is drawn into observing the details
of the terrain, “how [the string] snag[s] on all the little curlicues, on every tree trunk” (Kalinsky
2012:72). As each walker deliberately clears a path through the snowy field, the solitary
confrontation with the environment—with the string as both catalyst and guide—acts to clear
cognitive space.
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Here, it may be helpful to engage with the walkers through theories of perception that
allow us to see how their meandering bodies, cutting paths through the deep snow, might
simultaneously be developing a heightened, and possibly altered, perception of the environment
around them. Typically, studies of perception in modern psychology have defined it primarily as
a function of the individual “mind” or “brain.” Accepting a distinction between mind and world,
such studies tend towards conceptualizing perception and sensation as separate events,
producing different mental facts:
With few exceptions, the standard use of sensation refers to elementary
deliverances from the sensory receptors. A corollary to this definition is the claim
that there is a stage following sensation called perception during which these
elementary sensations are utilized in the construction of the individual’s
experience of the world. So, for example, sensations that themselves provide no
information about space or distance are collated or cross-referenced
associatively with sensations that do (e.g., tactile sensations) so that a threedimensional world is constructed in perception. (Heft 2001: 156, emphasis
added)
Distinctions between sensation and perception, indicate a particular understanding of the
environment and the individual, such that the three-dimensional environment appears as not
only separate from the individual, but as a construction of the individual’s experience.
Alternative theories of perception, such as presented by William James, view sensation and
perception as neither discrete nor as separate “stages.” Rather, in The Principles of Psychology
(1890), James takes sensation and perception as “processes by which we cognize an objective
world.” Rather than separate events, they are “names for different cognitive functions, not for
different sorts of mental fact” (James cited in Heft 2001). The shift that James proposes, from
thinking of sensation and perception as separate stages in the mental construction of the world,
towards thinking of sensation and perception as processes for cognizing an objective world, is
reflected in his distinctly phenomenological, and arguably “artistic,” approach to the study of
these processes.
James used analogies and metaphors throughout his works, not simply as ways
of expressing his ideas, but as ways of constructing them. He often drew on his
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artistic experiences [his first vocation was painting] in his attempt to pursue
psychological reflection. In fact, the frequency with which he drew on his artistic
experience in important, often critical passages [of The Principles of Psychology]
is noteworthy. Insofar as these passages often have to do with the nature of
human cognition and understanding, which he conceived from the start on the
model of artistic experience, this is not surprising. But his use of artistic
experience as a source of metaphorical referents suggests a basic principle of
human cognition—that humans tend, naturally enough, to draw their most telling
analogies from their own experience. In other words, they use what is familiar to
understand the less familiar. (Leary 1992: 156)
According to James, traditional psychological theories of perception, for example those of
Helmholz, Berkeley and Reid placed emphasis on the process by which those with “normal”
ways of seeing select and order the world from out of the “jungle of our optical experiences” by
choosing, based on habit, to ignore particular sensations over others (James 1983). For James,
the painter-psychologist-philosopher, sensation and perception often flowed together in complex
creative activity, in which it was possible to see and represent things as they actually felt. This
conflation of sensation in spatial perception is illustrated in his discussion of the special
perceptual training obtained by artists:
Usually we see a piece of paper as uniformly white, although a part of it may be
in shadow. But we can in an instant, if we please, notice the shadow as local
color. A man walking towards us does not usually seem to alter his size; but we
can, by setting our attention in a peculiar way, make him appear to do so. The
whole education of the artist consists in his learning to see the presented signs
as well as the represented things. No matter what the field of view means, he
sees it also as it feels—that is as a collection of patches of color bounded by
lines—the whole forming an optical diagram of whose intrinsic proportions one
who is not an artist has hardly a conscious inkling. The ordinary man’s attention
passes over them to their import, the artist’s turns back and dwells upon them for
their own sake. “Don’t draw the thing as it is, but as it looks!” is the endless
advice of every [art] teacher to his pupil; forgetting what “is” is what it would also
“look,” provided it were placed in what we have called the “normal” situation for
vision. In this situation the sensation as sign, and the sensation as object
coalesce into one, and there is no contrast between them. (James 1983: 874-75).
Taking Ten Appearances as an experiment aimed at disrupting normalized habits of perception,
we can understand the goal of that disruption as a loosening of perceptual selectivity within the
participants. In other words, in Kievogorskoe, the jungle—or in this case forest—of optical
experiences is encountered without the normalizing frames of reference that obtain in urban life,
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and the participants (many of whom are trained artists) find themselves “seeing” this strange
snowy world as it “feels.”

INTO THE FOREST, TRANSFORMING
The organizers’ instructions to unwind the string by walking into the forest becomes a
cartographic method, and the action itself, a deceptively simple algorithm intended to intervene
not so much into the physical landscape, as into each participants’ own psychic space. The
deep footsteps in the snow, taken together with the walker’s wandering mind, could constitute a
mental map of each pedestrian’s changing relationship to the space, to the action at hand, and
to his or her companions. Mental or cognitive mapping is a research technique most closely
associated with the fields of psychogeography, environmental psychology and urban design,
and is often employed in the course of investigating individuals’ spatial sense or affective
response to a given environment, usually one to which the individual is accustomed by habit.
Participants are generally asked to draw and interpret maps depicting their own perception their
everyday surroundings, such as the spatial relationship between design elements in the built
environment, or emotional responses to particular areas in a city, or preferences for certain
places or routes over others (Lynch 1960; Milgram and Jodelet 1970; Gould 1973). In mental
mapping exercises, the researcher is not usually looking for the participant to accurately depict
‘real’ spatial positions and locations, but rather to give a representation of his or her mental
constructs and metaphors for navigating the environment. The mental map is an attempt by the
researcher, in collaboration with the participant, to connect psychic “terra incognita” with the
participant’s own experience of lived space. In addition, the mental map is often used to create
a picture of the (usually urban) designed environments in which people live. Unlike the cadastral
map, or the architects plan, the aggregate of individuals’ mental maps can provide “the visual
quality” of the of the worlds they inhabit (Lynch 1960), or give a sense of a people’s “cultural
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inheritance,” expressed in their particular spatial perceptions (Gould 1973). In that sense, the
process of creating a mental map, by making visible the various subjective “terra incognitae,”
which exist alongside “official” spatial relations, can provide evidence of the existence of
alternative ways of moving in and through (urban) space, as well as the possibility for
establishing environmental relations that exceed and subvert prescribed norms.

Recent geographical and artistic research shows how traditional cartographic practice is are
transformed through artistic uses. Geographer Denis Wood has demonstrated how artists erase
the discursive lines that separate mapping from other kinds of graphic techniques, such as
drawing and painting (Wood 2006). Artist Karen O’Rourke has explored how walking becomes
both a mode of perception and a cartographic practice in artistic practices in Western Europe
and the US since the 1950s (O’Rourke 2013). In Ten Appearances the cartographic process
proceeds by walking instead of drawing, and string replaces the pen and paper usually used in
making mental maps. This sense of the walker-holding-string as a tool for drawing together
internal thoughts with the experience of the wintry environment (“I am like a pencil, a drawing
instrument,” says Nekrasov to himself as he tramples the fresh snow) is reiterated in Kabakov’s
recollections:
I stopped in this wondrous forest like Ivan Susanin [a Russian folk hero] among
completely untouched, snow-covered firs, tree trunks and so forth. Then I turned
and began to pull the string, which had landed on a branch four or five meters
away. I saw it shimmering like a ray against the snow, and this ray shone in the
beautiful sunny day… I continued to pull the string, winding it onto my right mitt. It
wound and wound, but since I was trying to understand what lay ahead, what
trick I was supposed to discover and what the whole idea [of the action] was
about anyway, it was as though my imagination was also winding with it, as
though this winding was also the time of my standing in the forest (Kalinsky
2012:65).
Designed to work directly within what they called the “Space of Intellectual Evaluation” (SIE), or
the “spectators’ consciousness,” each of CA’s mysterious actions were thought of not as ends in

70

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
themselves, but as a means for accessing the inner world of each participant (Monastyrski
1999). Once accessed, this inner “space” was divided, through the timing of the action itself, into
“pre-eventful, eventful and post-eventful” consciousness, and activated by the participants’ own
curiosity and constant attempts to understand or explain the action. Pre-event space was
characterized by the experience of taking the train out of the city, and the extraordinary sense of
anticipation aroused en route to the action site:
During [the pre-eventful phase] the spectators construct a frame of expectation.
Over the years the artists of this group have worked to prove that a journey is for
one of their actions what a frame is for a painting. One of the main aesthetical
concerns of [CA] for decades has been the idea that while journeying to see an
artwork, one must wait to see what will happen. [CA] owes this idea of “waiting as
a frame” to the poet Vsevolod Nekrasov, who theorized that the sense of waiting
for something surrounds or frames that which is about to take place.
(Monastyrski 1999)
The process of “framing” the action, begun during the pre-event stage of the experiment,
functions not only in parallel to the traditional artistic practice of framing the art object, but can
also be understood as a particularly architectural task. The white string, pulled across the white
snow, soon blends in with the environment, even while its unraveling guides the walker’s
movement. Deep footprints start to emerge in the pristine snow, radiating in ten directions from
the field’s center “like stars, like rays” (Kabakov) or like the lines of “the metro map of Moscow”
(Nekrasov) (Kalinsky 2012). (“Too bad there was no helicopter,” Nekrasov laments, “or else
[the] best photo [of the action] would have been a bird’s eye view of all these divergent tracks,
well-lit by the sun”) (Kalinsky 2012). At the moment the participants begin to fill the field with
their footsteps and their spatial metaphors and projections, the snowy expanse becomes what
geographers refer to as a cultural landscape, a reflection of the walkers’ imagination activated
even as they shape the environment around them.

Considering the field of action as a cultural landscape leads to a broader conception of
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architecture and design. As architect Amos Rapoport observes:
[T]he design of the environment is the organisation of four variables: space, time,
meaning and communication. These are largely invisible. One can also think of
environments as being about the relationships between people and people,
people and things, and things and things. Relationships are also invisible.
(1994:68)
Rapoport’s notion of design allows for an alternative understanding of Ten Appearances and its
constant “invisible” transformation of the socio-spatial relationships of the participants, both to
the landscape and to each other. In this light, the process of “framing” the action becomes an
invisible architectural practice. The poet Nekrasov expresses this experience most acutely when
he refers to the event as an “undertaking of the architects [organizers]… who have appropriated
all of the surrounding space which I am now elaborating, and the entire situation, and myself
within the situation, as their own text” (Kalinsky 2012:86) In fact, argues philosopher Elizabeth
Grosz, architecture “does little other than design and construct frames; these are its basic forms
of expression” (Grosz 2008:13). Framing is the “constitution of territory,” of “the space that is
one’s own,” and implies the fabrication of “space(s) in which sensations may emerge,” while
architecture is the “creation of frames as cubes, interconnecting cubes, cubes respected or
distorted, cubes opened up, inflected or cut open. The frame separates. It cuts into a milieu or
space” (Grosz 2008: 12-13). For CA, working in the medium of participants’ volunteered time,
the processes of framing (and later “deframing”) became their method for exploring the SIE, the
space of spectators’ consciousness. In this process the action itself (which they sometimes
referred to as “non-actions”, or “non-experiences” because of their negligible importance, and
because of the uncertainty that anything had actually happened at all) was less important than
the pre-event anticipation and the post-eventful interpretations:
[T]he action itself, or its scenario, is a decoy and that the mythical or symbolical
content (which is sometimes itself called the “eventful part”) is not important to
the organizers. “We have no intention of ‘showing’ anything to the spectator; our
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task is to preserve the experience of waiting as an important, valuable event.”
The eventful part of the action serves as mere preparation for opening up and
activation of a series of empty or undefined psychic processes. The post-eventful
part of the action relates to the process of interpretation, to writing the
participants’ reports after attending the actions. (Monastyrski 1999)
The intensive process of discussion after the events, and the copious documentation in the form
of participants’ interpretive writings, audio recording and photographs, meticulously archived by
CA, constitute an exploration “of the realm of the psyche,” or “the emotions arising in response
to what is happening in the participants’ visual field during the performance, and the emotions in
regards to what precedes and accompanies the action” (Tupitsyn 1999:105). Monastyrski
elaborates further in the preface to one of CA’s documentary collections:
Since in our work we are particularly interested in the realm of the psychological,
‘the interior,’ we are obliged to pay special attention to all kinds of preliminary
events, to that which takes place as though on the edges of the action’s
demonstrational ‘field.’ The demonstrational field itself expands and becomes the
object of observation: on it we try to discover zones that possess certain
properties and interrelationships. These properties and relationships, as we
imagine them, act to produce different levels of perception, on one of which can
be attained an experience of the events as events taking place essentially ‘inside’
a liberating consciousness. Such is the overall goal of the actions. In a
constructive sense, the goal consists of keeping from artificially breaching the
boundaries of direct perception within which nearly every action begins its
unfolding. (1980: 102)
Prefacing his discussion of one CA event series, architectural theorist Sergey Sitar notes the
inherent affinity between architecture and performance art: both are arts of environment and
event—both “treat the space of experience as their object” (2003:363). However, CA designed
its events to go beyond the initial space of experience—that is, beyond the “framing”—and
extend into the realm of archival documentation and ongoing discussion and debate, as part of
a never-ending process of analysis and interpretation. Through the process of “interpretation,”
which closely mirrored advanced Soviet systems of surveillance, the event became an
opportunity to explore and reorganize one’s own psyche—a space left beyond the purview of
official socialist realist art (Groys 2010). The process of exploration initiated by CA’s events,
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could be a form of “deframing” psychic space, a task expanding the purview of architecture, and
located squarely in the province of art. As Grosz argues:

[I]nsofar as its primordial impulse is the creation of territory in both the natural
and human worlds, art is also capable of that destruction and deformation that
destroys territory and enables them to revert to the chaos from which they were
temporarily wrenched. Framing and deframing becomes art's mode of
territorialization and deterritorialization through sensation… (Grosz 2008:13)
In the Soviet city, what was in short supply went beyond the perennial scarcity produced by the
planned economy, and its counterpart, the black market. The scarcest real estate was psychic,
and the dearest prices were paid in the currency of consciousness, transformed and placed in
service of the collective. It was this scarcity of variety of discursive and experiential space that
CA sought to address through its psychogeographical exercises. According to Jackson:

Ideally, if the Conceptualist work succeeded, the viewer would emerge on the
other side… having glimpsed something of himself outside Soviet logic… Instead
of a total, transforming, exuberant experience, [Collective Actions] events
furnished total nonexperiences, performance events in which mind and body
confronted the invisible hollow core of Soviet (modern?) consciousness…
Reanimating familiar psychological surfaces, these works prodded the spectator,
if only for a few hours, to submit herself to a wounded sociality and its
hypertrophy/deficit of meaning. In this interval, a homeopathic “Our Ownness”
might appear, a moment of collective understanding and solidarity… (Jackson
2010:167)
At this point, I would like to interrupt the artists’ walk at the outskirts of Moscow, to join the
efforts of a different group of researchers, working about a thousand miles away. Between the
early 1970s and the end of the 1980s, at the Baltic edge of the Soviet empire, psychological
investigations were being conducted which would introduce a novel approach to understanding
the relationship between humans and their environments in the USSR. At the same time that
artists were making psychogeographical explorations on the city limits of the Soviet capital,
scientists at Estonia’s Tartu University, and later Tallinn Pedagogical Institute, were developing
an alternative to the American version of environmental psychology (psichologija sredy). This
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group of researchers, inspired by research coming out of the United States, including from the
newly established program at the City University of New York, began constructing research
projects, which aimed to articulate and improve the environmental conditions in which Soviet
people were living and working. This new field emerged in response to the specific needs of
individuals who had to live, work and play in the often standardized environments of everyday
Soviet life, with the express aim of going beyond the strictly economic directives set out within
the state’s planning schemes (Valsiner 1989; Niit, Heidmets and Krussvall 1989). This research
strove to connect the behavioral sciences with the centralized bureaus of architecture and urban
planning, which created the design protocols used all across the Soviet Union. More
importantly, the researchers’ emphasis on understanding how people relate to their
environments within the socialist context led to particular innovations in psychological theory,
which, unfortunately, have yet to be widely engaged by spatial disciplines in the English
speaking world. These theories, developed in response to the conditions of living in the USSR
both extend and challenge the paradigms of Western environmental psychology, and may allow
for a more complex analysis of the experiences of Collective Actions in the forest.

Of interest to the current discussion is a particular approach to conceptualizing the place of the
subject in relationship to the environment developed in the research of the Soviet psychologists.
In Soviet psychology, the personality, and the process of personalization, emerges through
creative, productive interaction between the human and the surrounding social world. In his
paper, “The Phenomenon of Personalization of the Environment,” Tallinn-based psychologist
Mati Heidmets draws upon the work Soviet personality psychologists, A.V. and V.A. Petrovskii:
Ideas, knowledge, artistic images, a man-made object, resolved tasks, etc., can
all serve as means of personalization [of the environment]… Activity is the
principal way, the only effective way, to be a personality; through his activity an
individual continues himself in others. A produced object—a building built, a
subtle poetic line, a tree planted, a masterfully crafted detail, a book written, a
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suite composed or performed, etc.—these things are, on the one hand an object
of activity and, on the other, a means by which a person asserts himself in the life
of society. (Petrovskii and Petrovskii, cited in Heidmets 1989)
For Soviet psychologists, the emphasis in understanding subjective environmental relations was
not placed on the inner life and perceptions of the human subject, but upon the “space of interindividual bonds” (Heidmets 1989). This concept of a human subjectivity formed in creative,
productive activity is extended in the writings of Soviet philosopher, Ewald Il’yenkov, who
presents a view of embodiment that extends beyond any individual human:
…the personality is not within the body of the individual of the species, but within the
body of an individual person, which cannot be reduced to the body of that particular
individual, is not confined to it, but is a much more complex and spatially broader body,
embracing in its morphology all those man-made organs that created and continue to
create man (tools and machines, words and books, a telephone network, radio and
television channels, bonds between individuals of the human species, etc.), i.e. all that
common body within which specific individuals function as its living organs.
“The body”… must also be examined to understand each of its organs separately in
its living functioning and in the totality of its direct relations and feedback with other such
living organs, in which these are completely objective, corporeally materialized
connections, not those ephemeral “spiritual” relations in which each and every
idealistically oriented psychology has eternally attempted and is even now attempting to
interpret the personality. (Il’yenkov cited in Heidmets 1989)
Il’yenkov’s image of an expanded personhood that extends beyond anyone body into complex
and completely material bonds, created and recreated in the minute everyday objects and
actions of our man-made world, is especially potent when applied to Collective Action’s Ten
Appearances. The string, attached to the wooden board at the center of the field, and leading
solitary walkers out along ten paths into the forest, can be seen as a visualization, performance
or reenactment of the material social relations that make each individual an “organ” of “a much
more complex and spatially broader body.”

WINDING UP, RETURNING
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So far I have addressed the unfolding, or unraveling of Ten Appearances as an exercise in
cartography and design, albeit a rather ephemeral one. In this next section, I turn my attention
to the aesthetic experience of this event. It is my contention that the ephemerality of the
experience engenders a certain affective excess, extending participants beyond the logic and
habits of everyday life in the Soviet city, while offering them the “gift” of choosing the sort of
relationship they would like to have with the environment, and with their fellows. Despite CA’s
insistence that the actual activity itself—walking and unraveling the string—is a relatively
negligible portion of the event, a “nonexperience,” and that it is the documentation and
discursive analysis afterward in which the action’s significance is best sought, from the
perspective of the participants, the action that day clearly made indelible impressions. Look at
how Nekrasov describes his delight in participating:
You walk and see how beautifully, from the center out, these ten different tracks
extend in ten different directions. You experience an aesthetic pleasure, begin to
put in some effort, thinking, so what if it is difficult, and good, that’s the way it
should be. Again, there is a balance of difficulty and attainability.
In other words, there is a natural difficulty here, which is at once toy-like
and significant. There is a whole mass, a tangle of allegorical and symbolic
meanings here that need not even be mentioned. It goes without saying: the
string, the path—it’s clear as day. But this is not particularly interesting. What is
interesting is what grows out of it, i.e. real physical action, one that can be
experienced aesthetically. One that can be experienced as pleasure, a game.
(Kalinsky 2012: 78)
The aesthetic pleasure expressed above comes in a moment of pause, maybe at the tree line at
the edge of the field, after the after the activity has gone on for some time, long enough for each
participant to have made his or her move, left his or her mark in the snow. Nekrasov’s
enjoyment emerges in recognition of the connectedness of each person’s movement, from the
sense that all are involved (“toy-like”) in a “game.” Although Ten Appearances is not explicitly
presented as a “game,” it is impossible to ignore the elements of play inherent in this scenario.
In Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture, Johan Huizinga describes play as a
unique and essential cultural form, having several defining characteristics: First, it is a voluntary
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or superfluous activity, which can be stopped and started at will, and as such proves a veritable
expression of freedom. Second, play occurs outside of the boundaries of “ordinary” or “real” life,
engrossing the player in a parallel, impractical activity, thereby removing him or her from the
logic of space, time, needs and wants that govern our everyday movements. Third, play
necessarily occurs within the limits of a specific time and place, having a beginning and an end.
And finally, play is fun. While Ten Appearances eventually meets all of these basic criteria, it
possesses an additional aesthetic quality, what Huizinga associates with “the impulse to create
orderly form,” invoked by some types of play, along with a sense of “tension, poise, balance,
contrast, variation, solution [or] resolution” (Huizinga 1949:12). In Kabakov’s account of his walk
he attributes this aesthetic quality to the designs of the action’s organizers:
They had conceived ahead of time how I would feel after all these trials and
perturbations: a kind of pleasant and cheerful, terribly harmless, playful and, I
would even say, tender touching kind of game or a toy that had not only brought
no harm, no mockery, but instead brought nothing but delight. It is a familiar
situation from childhood when playing, for example, hide-and-seek: someone
devises a scheme, someone deals the slips of paper, somebody hides. But no ill
follows: nobody boxed you in the ear, stuffed shit down your collar, or tripped you
with a stick. On the contrary, it all concluded with much merriment and
amusement. In other words we are dealing with some kind of happy games,
which, apart from goodness and unity, leave nothing behind. (Kalinsky 2012: 6869)
What is remarkable about Kabakov’s comments is the surprise that seems to contribute to his
delight. His own experience of the walk into the forest had been particularly fraught with fearful
thoughts: worry at his physical inability to complete the task, the feeling that it might be neverending, a cruel trick played by the organizers at his expense. His eventual delight in the
exercise comes with the realization of its game-like qualities, and in particular, in the moment
that he accepts the truly voluntary nature of his own participation in a community of play. The
“play-community,” founded on “the feeing of being ‘apart together’ in an exceptional situation, of
sharing something important, of mutually withdrawing from the rest of the world and rejecting
the usual norms,” may outlast the game itself (Huizinga 1949:12).
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So far, I have read the ten-string walk that February afternoon primarily in one direction,
following only the tracks in the snow that lead us from the center of the field into the forest. But
what happens after each walker gets out of sight of the others, and his or her string is
completely unspooled? The individuality of each journey is most characterized by this time when
each participant, completely alone with his or her thoughts, at the end of his or her unraveled
thread and with no further instructions, must make the decision of whether to return to the
starting point or not. Why does the participant choose to return or to keep on walking?

We can see the small group of artists and their ten participants playing with strings on the
outskirts of Moscow, like children unable to resist loose threads hanging from a sweater’s
fraying seams. They pull these threads until they release themselves from the city, unraveled, if
only for an afternoon. With the string in hand, they create a small space for choice: the choice of
whether or not to rejoin the group, whether or not to weave themselves back into the city. Is this
choice “artificial,” possible only within the game world? That is not important. Focus instead on
the solitude, the space for choice, because that is the “gift” that comes with playing the game.
Here is how the moment reveals itself to Kabakov in the forest:
My fear increased when I began to watch for knots in the string and looked in
horror when a knot with additional string did actually appear. But then after a
while, I felt the tension on the string grow slacker, and suddenly, I remember, I
could see the tension of the string weaken and the length shorten in my hand.
And then suddenly, I saw something that looked like a little marble appear on the
branch that I had been watching, along which that little ray of string had been
gliding, and this was the end of the string. I had never in my life experienced
anything as incredibly gratifying and joyful as this. I had been alone, and then at
the end of this event of mine, there appeared a sign, a gift, and even a message
in the mystical sense. (Kalinsky 2012:66-67)
And this is how Nekrasov reached the end of his string:
Having [wound up the string and] pulled out and read the note, I took it as an
ending, as “regards.” As saying, there you go, comrades so-and-so are
concluding this activity, of which they are informing you; they salute you and wish
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you well on your way… The point was to go in [to the forest] and then to act
according to the circumstances. For me, it turned out that I came upon a road
and wound my string perhaps not as energetically as expected, and thus I
walked so far that I no longer saw the field but instead saw the other end of the
forest…
There is [an] image here, a powerful one: the image of centrifugal motion,
of the force that swings from the center circularly (and the circle itself, actually),
and sends one out as far as possible, like Huck Finn with the dead rat on a
string, or like a hammer thrower. Actually, the end of the string… is not so much
the umbilicus (I have never seen an umbilicus in my life), as a kind of tail trailing
the movement, and also a little crack of a whip to spur you on, as if to say, hello,
fly on farther. Did you wind the all the string up? Now wind yourself up and away.
(Kalinsky 2012:72,80)
Both Kabakov and Nekrasov distinctly recall this moment of choice, and recognize the gift being
offered. For both there is the experience of expansiveness, of personal liberty—a sense that the
next action they take, whatever it may be, will be theirs, and theirs alone. The effect of the
organizers’ arbitrary instruction has been to create a tension within the participant that
eventually must end with equal randomness, thereby allowing the participant to experience all at
once the entire openness of the field and the forest, and their own ability to respond to this
situation exactly as they please. Faced with the gift of decision, Kabakov chooses to return to
the starting point, retracing his footsteps like a map leading back to the group, while Nekrasov
continues walking, away from the center of the field, away from the group, and back into the
city. In some ways the very personal experiences of our wanderers at the end of their string
echo the discoveries of the Estonian environmental psychologists. By engaging with people
involved in specific and assigned goal-oriented behaviors, in their homes and workplaces, the
researchers found that “the environmental context [performs] the function of psychological
mediation of the person’s intra- and inter-personal psychological processes” (Valsiner
1989:211). For the researchers, the extent to which people were able to personalize their
environments, through adding in special objects, or otherwise shaping the institutional spaces in
which they found themselves, affected both their psychic states and their relationships with
others.
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Through personalization of one’s immediate environment, the person largely
determines the range of possible behavior by others toward him or her: Who can
enter the personalized territory, what one may do on that territory, and so forth.
Personalization gives stable, material form to the social relationships, which are
made explicit through their projection into the surrounding environment.
(Heidmets, 1985 p. 223)
As most Soviet citizens lived in housing uniformly designed according to centralized protocols,
this process of personalization took on special significance as an essential site of choice,
creativity and contestation for residents—a way of determining the details of how social
relations, both within the home and beyond, could be performed and (re-)structured through
interventions into the micro-environments of everyday life (Kurg 2012). In CA’s Ten
Appearances, with its string, deployed as a cartographic tool for shaping psychic space, we find
a parallel topic of investigation and research methodology. In fact, CA’s experiments and
subsequent theorization of its actions, can be read as having come, by different means, to a
similar conclusion: By performing assigned, seemingly arbitrary, but deeply personal tasks in
“controlled environments” (the “blank space” of fields and forests at the outskirts of the city),
which modify their relationships to the environmental context, participants find their intra- and
inter-personal relationships simultaneously transformed. There is one more parallel between
these artists and the psychologists: the “fun” factor. Just as the sense of play permeated CA’s
expeditions, the activities of the Tallinn psychologists were permeated with a sense of irreverent
exploration. According to one Estonian pioneer of environmental psychology, the fledgling
discipline was a “not so much a departure from or confrontation with the rest of [Soviet
psychological research], but more an interesting hobby of strange people,” who organized into
an informal network of researchers across the USSR, and held conferences, get-togethers and
“very funny evening sessions” including architects, designers, psychologists, sociologists and
other kindred spirits (personal communication with Mati Heidmets, August 2014).

*

*

*

*
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In Marcel Mauss’ classic of ethnology, The Gift, he devotes several pages to the gesture of
offering things to others in Maori culture. Anything worth giving contains within it the spirit of the
giver, his clan, and the earth to which all three are tied. The relationship between giver, group
and environment are experienced as a force, known as “hau” or “spirit,” which is contained
within, or travels with, every object of worth (taonga). The hau has one main tendency: it must
travel, and it must return to its home—it is a centrifugal force, that prompts its maker to send it
far, to give it away freely like the hammer is thrown, or like Huck’s rat on a string. Whomever
receives such a forceful object feels the pressure to return it, even if by a circuitous route. Until
the taonga finds its way back home, whosoever is holding it is tied to the original giver, as by a
thread, or a bond, which cannot easily be broken or disavowed. According to Mauss, it is just
these sorts of bonds that link individuals and clans in social relationships of varying strength and
flexibility, for generations (Mauss 1990: 10-13). Taking the string in Ten Appearances as a kind
of taonga, or ritual item, with its mysterious marble-note-package attached at the end for
participants to discover, we might be able to understand Kabakov’s overwhelming feelings of
“goodness and unity,” and “gratitude” which produced in him a desire to return to the starting
point, and “to the bosom of the group:”
It should be said that here was achieved one of the most pleasant and practically
unknown forms of society, which is today so agonizing. Here society does not
appear hostile, but benign, vouchsafed and sympathetic to the highest degree.
This is such an untried, unknown feeling, that it not only restores lost forms, but
itself seems to serve as a gift against the background of everything that exists
today (Kalinsky 2012:69)
If Kabakov, like another seven of his fellow participants, feels something akin to the Maori hau,
the string pulling them back to the center of the field of action, back into the safety and comfort
of the group, how can we explain Nekrasov’s (and one other’s participant’s) failure to return?
And why did I not return? It was with full sincerity that I did not. All of the steps
turned out to have been calculated in ideal proportion to pull me out… calculated
for unidirectional movement, for vectorness… [Y]ou discover that this road does
not go where you need it to. But to return (in the snow) is simply unthinkable.
You’ve already cleaned your coat tails and shaken out your boots… If only you
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had known it earlier… Just like in real life, in other words. And it is always thus.
There is of course, also a bit of torment here, but then the question is: whose is
it? Is it not my own, since we have all gathered here together, we conceptualists?
...
You can quarrel with this, but this is my opinion, and it was mine to walk.
(Kalinsky 2012:86).
In Nekrasov’s explanation of his failure to return, there is the key to the participant experience of
the action’s design. By gathering together, “appearing” for each other, submitting to the play of
being led into the forest by the string, the participants find themselves in a liminal space in which
the obligatory communalism of city life is temporarily suspended, and they must each decide
how it is they would like to be related to the other. In this laboratory, or ritual site, of social
experience, the current that pulls the majority of participants wholeheartedly into the group is
found to be equal to the force that pushes two lone wolves away from the pack. Here is a
parallel society—neither Soviet, nor Maori, for the duration of the game—in which there is no
punishment and no reward for participating. There is only the gift of choice.
*

*

*

*

Walking in Moscow today, one is confronted with the flickering lights of electronic displays
flashing the latest exchange rates between the ruble, the dollar and the euro; or might pass by
banks advertising their services using images of hundred dollar bills stacked high on golden
serving platters, or trussed up like holiday gifts with glittering ribbons. From the ashes of a vast
Soviet empire, closed to the capitalistic world, Moscow launched itself in just a few years to
“world city” status, boasting headquarters of major international business services firms, and
actively entering into competition with other global cities for foreign investment. The outskirts of
the city where CA once held its walks are no longer open fields, but office parks and housing
developments. Tallinn is no longer an outpost of a vast Soviet empire, but the capital city of a
thriving economy of the new Europe. Despite the disappearance of the forms of life and the
social realities in which their experiments were conducted, both the CA experiments, and the
discoveries of the Estonian environmental pscyhologists, highlight a need for “stringiness” in the
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experience of the post-Soviet city—a willingness to participate in the play of weaving alternative
spaces from which one can choose how to engage with and against the harshness of the city.
Necessary for these Soviet-era artists, with some thought and practice, such string-games might
be re-played in response to the post-Soviet ascent of financial rationales for urban growth,
which advertise choice, while seamlessly integrating implacable design aesthetics that eerily
echo the grandiosity of the early Soviet period.
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4.
“ENSTRANGING” THE CITY
THE ART OF BEING FOREIGN IN MOSCOW

The city is on its guard against him, masks itself, flees, intrigues, lures him
to wander its circles to the point of exhaustion.
--Walter Benjamin, “Moscow”
The black unicorn is greedy.
The black unicorn is impatient.
The black unicorn is mistaken
for a shadow
or symbol
and taken
through a cold country
where mist painted mockeries
of my fury.
It is not on her lap where the horn rests
but deep in her moonpit
Growing.
The black unicorn is restless
the black unicorn is unrelenting
the black unicorn is not
free.
--Audre Lorde, “The Black Unicorn”

Walking at sunset along the bustling avenue, I hear it: FUCKING NIGGER!

FUCKING NIGGER sails up above the sinewy beats pumping into my ears through my
headphones. I take a few steps forward, stop and turn around. A young couple passes me
head-on and continues walking. The young man wears sweatpants and trainers, his companion
in tight jeans and colorful windbreaker, her blond hair pulled into a slick ponytail. I take my
headphones off.
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I’m sorry did you say something to me?
Yes, she said, You are a fucking nigger.
She is smiling and facing me. Her friend chuckles, resting his arm on her shoulder.
Why would you say that, I ask, mirroring her smile. Now I am more curious than shocked.
Because: You. Are. A. Fuck-ing. Nigger.

The clarity of her enunciation, the unusual confidence of her Russian-accented English, the
irony of these very American words floating down a Russian street, headed right for me, set me
laughing. This phrase, repeated so deliberately, is somehow more absurd than the usual
sidewalk taunts, monkey noises, jungle sounds as I pass in the street. Catching my breath,
through giggles comes my retort:

Well, then, that settles it. You. Are. A. Fuck-ing. Bitch.
I turn and, with a wave, continue on down the street. Over my shoulder I glimpse her face as
she lunges towards me. The young man restrains her.

The constant hateful comments, stares and surprised, furtive glances, the monkey noises: all
are addressing a distorted reflection of me, as in a sinister fun house mirror, a version of my
body with which I cannot identify. I feel myself moving through streets that cannot accommodate
this body—streets that respond to my presence, but yet cannot receive me.

In my daily walks from my apartment to the studio—half an hour almost everyday for ten
months—I notice only one image of a black body projected over the wide boulevard. It is on a
billboard made of mechanical slats, which change every minute showing first one advertisement
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and then another. This is how, waiting for the traffic light, I see the shattering face of
international supermodel Naomi Campbell flash exactly two times in the grey sky. When my
friends in New York ask me how I am doing in Moscow, through grainy Skype windows, I
answer: I feel like a unicorn, a black unicorn, a mythical creature, every time I leave the house. I
must move slowly and carefully, and learn not to balk when the people reach out to touch my
hair.

Walking in Moscow feels more like an artistic performance, than simple urban locomotion. I am
aware of being onstage, of the arresting nature of some character, created by the city around
me, and projected on to my physical being. This projection is strong, alive and has absolutely
nothing to with me, and yet it hovers around me like a force field, defining the parameters of my
experience of the city.

American artist and philosopher Adrian Piper has dedicated much of her art and research to
investigating the construction of the self, especially the racialized self, in the context of everyday
urban interactions (Piper 1996; Bowles 2006). Early public works involved Piper donning a
variety of odd or provocative get-ups and walking through the streets of 1970s Manhattan,
performing everyday actions. In 1973, Piper undertook one of her better-known projects, “The
Mythic Being,” for which she developed an alter ego, a “militant” black man who wanders the
city repeating particular personal “mantras,” taken from Piper’s own diaries (Piper 1996).
Walking the streets in drag was a way to bring terrifying tangibility to a particularly enduring and
hostile myth of black masculinity, which forms a lynchpin of American urban folklore (Bowles
2007). As a black woman who could easily pass for white, and in fact, had often been mistaken
for white within the exclusive art and academic circles in which she moved, Piper’s notion of
selfhood and identity was particularly fluid, subject to the vagaries of her appearance and the
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willful ignorance of others. In donning the “mask” of black masculinity, her depersonalization
became complete.
As autobiography, my words are completely familiar and transparent, infused
with the intimacy of my own past. As chanted mantra they become meaningless
sounds, depersonalized expressions ascribable to anyone and everyone: They
are common property. As self-expressing utterances of the Mythic Being, they
regain their specificity, their significance, their mystery for me: They are signs of
someone else’s experience to which I have only partial access. (Piper 1996: 112)
Piper’s “autobiographical” performance, her transformation of ambiguously racialized “Self” into
ambiguously racialized “Mythic Being” could be taken as a form of “rhythmanalysis,” in which
elements of her own intimate experience in the city are made available for both personal and
public reflection. Knowledge sedimented within daily routines is released for examination
through the creation of a recognizable, but unstable character that takes a meditative walk while
chanting. According to urban theorist Henri Lefebvre, rhythmanalysis is an embodied form of
urban research, in which everyday experience is investigated and understood through an
autoethnographic investigation of the habits and routines that structure time in a given place
(Lefebvre 2004). For Lefebvre, this researcher is not a fixed entity, firmly ensconced within the
boundaries of a particular discsipline, or discrete method. Rather, the rhythmanalyst is a figure
of perpetual becoming, who is present, but does not have “presence:” (“Is it possible to do a
portrait of one who does not yet exist, and which one would have to help bring about his
existence?”) (Lefebvre 2004:19). As the psychoanalyst listens to the client, the rhythmanalyst
listens to city, but not only to its words:
He will be attentive, not only to the words or pieces of information, the
confessions and confidences of a partner or client. He will listen to the world, and
above all to what are disdainfully called noises, which are said without meaning,
and to murmurs [rumeurs], full of meaning – and finally he will listen to silences.
(Lefebvre 2004:19)
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The rhythmanalyst is an odd kind of researcher, brought into existence by the very practice of
listening, both to noises and to silence. And the first act of listening begins with the body of the
researcher itself: “He learns rhythm from it, in order consequently to appreciate external
rhythms. His body serves him as a metronome” (Lefebvre 2004:19). This act of listening goes
beyond the basic instincts developed in the course of a life lived in the city. Lefebvre is calling
for a multi-sensual, almost mythical listening, an extreme and heightened attention to the
present of the research, (as opposed to the presence of the researcher):

The rhythmanalyst calls on all his senses. He draws on his breathing, the
circulation of his blood, the beatings of his heart and the delivery of his speech as
landmarks. Without privileging any one of these sensations, raised by him in the
perception of rhythms, to the detriment of any other. He thinks with his body, not
in the abstract, but in lived temporality. He does not neglect, therefore…, smell,
scents, the impressions that are so strong on the child and on other living beings,
which society atrophies, neutralizes in order to arrive at the colourless, the
odourless and the insensible…The rhythmanalyst observes and retains smells as
traces that mark out rhythms. He garbs himself in the tissue of the lived, of the
everyday. (2004:21)
This almost extra-human sensory capability by nature carries with it a self-alienating awareness,
in which the rhythmanalyst is both sensing the world around with extreme alertness, and
observing him- or herself in the moment of perception. Lefebvre hints at the difficulty in
achieving such a state: one would have to experience something like an accident, in which
normally confused or integrated rhythms are suddenly halted, disrupted—made strange or
foreign—and thereby made available to perception for the keen researcher (2004: 21).
However, Lefebvre stops short of asking the researcher to create an actual accident in order to
make sensible the hidden rhythms of everyday life in a given city. This limitation, however, no
longer applies when one’s very appearance in the city is already a kind of “accident” –
something that disrupts the casual effects of time in the street. This is the ideal research
condition created when Adrian Piper’s Mythic Being, a characterization of vague yet powerful
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American imaginations of a “dangerous” or “inscrutable” black male, walks the streets of New
York. This is also the research condition created when I walk the streets of Moscow as a woman
who may easily, and unexpectedly, transform into a “nigger.”

AN ARCHIVE OF NIGGERS IN MOSCOW
Around the time that I was in Russia, in New York artist Yevgeniy Fiks got the idea to collect all
the images he could find of Africans and African Americans, created by Soviet artists between
the 1920s and the 1980s. As a young artist in Moscow, Fiks was trained in social realist
painting, and has turned that skill to documenting the communist world that, despite all odds,
continues to exist in the United States. Upon visiting the New York headquarters of the
Communist Party USA (CPUSA) on a mission to paint portraits of the group’s contemporary
members, Fiks was surprised to find that artists Langston Hughes, Ralph Ellison, Paul Robeson
and Richard Wright, among others, had all been card-carrying members. He began to
investigate the relationship between black political struggles and social movements, the CPUSA
and the Soviet Union. His investigations uncovered long histories of mutual political support
between black Americans and the Soviet Union, from its early years and into its decline. His
original project, of painting members of the CPUSA in an anachronistic Soviet social realist
style, gave way to a search for representations of black Americans made by other Soviet
painters. The archive of over 200 images is named for Wayland Rudd, a Philadelphia-born actor
who traveled from New York to Moscow in 1932 as part of a delegation of black artists and
never returned to the States. Taken as a whole, the Wayland Rudd Collection represents the
possibility of an alternative experience of black-Americaness, constructed in a country that no
longer exists.
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Of particular interest in the collection are the sketches and paintings of Aleksandr Deineka, a
Kursk-born painter who, in the 1920s and 30s, contributed to the invention of the social realism
that became the stylistic stamp of Soviet art and propaganda. In late 1934, Deineka traveled
from Moscow to New York on a three-month art residency sponsored by the Union of Soviet
Artists. He spent time in Harlem, making sketches of everyday (and night) life. His pictures of
people just going about their business resemble, in their attention to normalcy, strains of
modernism arising in the Harlem Renaissance. These new forms of writing, dance, music and
image-making sought, in the rhythms of regular folks’ speech and gestures, the poetic humanity
denied black people in mainstream “primitivist” representations and appropriations of blackness.
Deneika’s figures—women attending a lecture, a thoughtful young man with downcast eyes, an
elegant singer and his accompanist at the piano, a pair of clubbers with their skirts hiked up—
could be drawn directly from Nella Larsen’s stories of middle class Harlem moderns, who went
from ladies’ lunches to sweaty speakeasies in a single day. Women like the heroine of
Quicksand:

For the while Helga was oblivious to the reek of flesh, smoke, and alcohol,
oblivious of the oblivion of other gyrating pairs, oblivious of the color, the noise,
and the grand distorted childishness of it all. She was drugged, lifted, sustained,
by the extraordinary music, blown out, ripped out, beaten out, by the joyous, wild,
murky orchestra. The essence of life seemed bodily motion. And when suddenly
the music died, she dragged herself back to the present with a conscious effort;
and a shameful certainty that not only had she been in the jungle, but that she
had enjoyed it, began to taunt her. (Larsen 2001:89)
Deineka’s depictions of particular black lives bear marks of what early Soviet art theorists called
“zhizhnestronie,” or “life-building.” Life-building was a critical area of design for the young nation,
by which the novy byt, the new way of living, would be created, and artists were asked to lead
the effort (Bershtein 2006: 223). According to Art in Production, a collection of essays published
in Moscow in 1921, the purpose of art is “the introduction of artistic elements into the life of
production,” and to bring about both the “transformation of the form of the production process
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and the form of everyday life.” Art would no longer be, as art writer Nikolai Punin put it at the
time, “a holy temple where the lazy only contemplate.” Instead, the new art would be a joint
project of social activists and “art-makers,” committed to creating “a future consciousness”
(Punin quoted in Chuzhak 2009/1923). Playwright Sergei Tret’iakov was even more specific: the
new “art worker” would be a “psycho-engineer, a psychological constructor,” working to
“reorganize the human psyche with the goal of achieving the commune” (Sergei Tret’iakov
quoted in Bershtein 2006: 223). Transforming the means by which art was produced was key to
developing art forms in solidarity with the nascent proletariat society. Art could no longer be a
method for “raising questions” and “understanding life,” but would have to create entirely new
lives. Art would need to work in the streets, and not merely in the studios, galleries and
museums. It would eventually have to be no different from any other kind of work—“a temporary
activity, which in future will be dissolved into life” (Chuzhak 2009/1923). Art historian Christina
Kiaer describes Deineka’s way of making pictures as a kind of “supercharged mimesis,” which
“infects” the viewer, such that he or she can “imagine other affective possibilities under
socialism” (Kiaer 2012:248). It is possible that Deineka’s pictures express co-feeling for Harlem
and its residents, many of whom were part of the decades-long Great Migration of black people
fleeing terrible conditions in the South. Maybe he saw in the neighborhood the energy of a
proletariat struggling to recognize itself through new art forms, to re-build life in its own image.

The diversity of images that came to form the Wayland Rudd archive, from racist caricatures
and propaganda posters, to children’s book illustrations and the humanist internationalism
expressed in work like Deineka’s, overwhelmed Fiks. The images were so far reaching as to
exhaust his own knowledge and memory of the exact relation between the nation of his birth
and its black interlocutors. Confronted with this archive, Fiks became “disoriented,” as the
images “enstranged” and exceeded his own ability to make historical meaning of them (private
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correspondence with Fiks). Having grown up in the officially anti-racist yet totalitarian Soviet
Union, he was shocked to find out about the existence some of the more derogatory images, but
skeptical about whether or not the humanist images had been created out authentic solidarity
with Africans, or were a product of the coercive conditions under which Soviet artists worked.
How quickly, one wonders, can a nigger turn into a symbol of global liberation from capitalist
domination? Flipping through such a collection of images is enough to give a person whiplash.
This experience of disorientation caused him to open the archive to reactions and interpretation
by other artists and academics both in Moscow and New York, in order to gather alternative
imaginations of what this collection of images might possibly mean today. He extended
invitations to artists and academics whose work addressed otherness in Moscow, and New
York-based artists dealing with representations of race, migration and difference. Over a period
of two years, Fiks held meetings among artists and academics in his apartment in New York,
and over Skype with participants in Moscow, to discuss the images, and to develop ways of
both responding and adding to the collection. This research collaboration led to an exhibition of
images from the archive and the contemporary artists responses to it, in a New York art gallery
in January and February of 2014. The exhibition was accompanied by public events in which
Fiks and historians of African and African-American experience in Russia attempted to work out
the significance of the images contained in the archive.

In the process of investigating the possible significance of these images, Fiks presented his
archive to surviving members of the Black Arts movement at a meeting in Harlem. These elderly
artists had participated in struggles for Black Liberation and self-determination in the 1960s and
70s, and had engaged in political artistic actions aimed at generating new images and new
futures for African Americans. Unlike Fiks, these artists were neither overwhelmed by the
diversity of images and points of view contained in the collection, nor skeptical about the true
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sentiments and working conditions of the artists who had created them. Instead they focused on
the images that represented black people with dignity and as equals to all races. They
recognized some of these images from the 1960s movements, and considered them uplifting,
inspirational evidence of the continued solidarity between the Soviet Union and Black Liberation
struggles across the globe. For these black artists, the racist imagery contained among the
collection was simply to be ignored. After all, what did the ignorance expressed in caricatures of
little black sambos advertising soap in the 1920s have to do with the propagandistic posters
depicting strong black men tearing off their chains and facing down their white American
oppressors? After all, they told him, one has to seize whatever weapons are made available to
fight one’s battles, even if they be the propaganda of a failing totalitarian state, and even if the
images are produced under coercive or inauthentic conditions. I listen to Yevgeniy speak about
his encounter with these artists, and his struggles with the archive, and I cannot help but reflect
upon my own recent experience of life in Russia. Searching through the Wayland Rudd archive,
between the cartoons and the heroes, I cannot find among these pictures any that help me
understand what it means to be a real live black lady walking in Moscow. And so I am writing
now, in order to place an index of my experience into, and against, this archive.
ART AS A DEVICE FOR “ENSTRANGING” BOTH SELF AND CITY
Each day, on my walk from my apartment to my studio, I pass the statue of Friedrich Engels,
near Kropotkinskaya Square. Engels’ statue now looks out over Ostozhenka Street, onto some
of the most coveted and expensive real estate in the exclusive center of Moscow, for which
thousands of communal households were displaced (Badinya & Golubchikov 2005; Gdaniec
1997). I marvel at how solid and present he seems, stoic under the weight of endless pigeon
shit. In his anachronistic presence, I find an odd parallel with my own experience as a “social
practice” artist, on a residency sponsored by an oligarch to work creatively with internationally
renowned architects, who are at that very moment, unbeknownst to me, concocting a plan
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intended to displace millions of the city’s residents, in favor of luxury real estate and “iconic”
urban designs. Like Engels, himself a stranger to Moscow, I stand out, both as a foreigner and
as a black woman often traveling around the city alone, and on foot.

During this period in Moscow, I am reading Viktor Shklovsky’s essay, “Art as Device,” in which
he introduces the neologism, “ostraniene,” translated into English as another neologism,
“enstrangement” (Shklovsky 1990). This term emerges from Shklovsky’s studies of poetic
writing, and describes “the process or act of endowing an object or image with strangeness by
‘removing’ it from the network of conventional, formulaic, stereotypical perceptions and linguistic
expressions” (Shklovsky 1990:xix). Enstrangment is the task of the artist, and requires skill and
imagination. It is a way of addressing and expanding the foundations of perception, of
questioning not only what we perceive, but how we perceive. According to Shklovsky, “the
artistic quality of something, its relationship to poetry, is a result of our mode of perception. In a
narrow sense we shall call a work artistic if it has been created by special devices whose
purpose is to see to it that these artifacts are interpreted artistically as much as possible” (p.2). I
find Shklovsky’s definition of art particularly relevant to psychological discourse, since it points
out the experiential dimensions of art, focusing neither upon value judgments of “beauty,” nor on
placing works within disciplined art histories, but rather upon the practical technique of
manipulating perception. “Art” is art because it is designed to be perceived as artistically as
possible. As such, art is not so much in the eye of the beholder, as it is an intersubjective, or
transpersonal exchange, in which devices that play with the participants’ perception are
released to varying, often unpredictable and immeasurable effect. Art, therefore, is less about
the production of any specific objective quality or symbolic meaning, as it is about some
process, or experience (of making, doing, thinking, seeing or acting), itself.
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In this city I feel welcome in few places. While I am not shat upon by pigeons, police and other
gatekeepers do often attempt to engage me, and I take to carrying my passport like a talisman. I
find queer and queer-friendly spaces to be the most relaxing spaces. In such spaces, a kind of
détente, or respite from the war outside, can be achieved. After a typical night of “rest and
relaxation,” I am returning home alone, on the first metro trains of the weekday morning. It
seems I am the only traveler changing trains at Okhotny Ryad, unusual for this large city. In my
slightly hazy state, I step on to the long escalator linking the red and blue lines. As I near the
middle of my ascent, I look up to see a phalanx of about thirty or so young metro policemen
beginning their descent on the opposite escalator. They file on two-by-two and I fix my eyes on
their impeccable green military-style frock coats. A slow fear fills my stomach. I realize just how
suspicious I must appear to them. In this moment, with nothing else to lose, I raise my open
hand to my temple, resolving to salute each and every one of these young police officers, the
way I have often observed them do their superiors. And so, arm raised, I make direct eye
contact with each soldier as we pass each other on the escalators, and to my great surprise,
they all, to a man, salute back.

If we follow Shklovsky in considering art as a device for working with, or transforming how and
what we are able to experience, we must ask: Why fiddle with what or how we perceive? Why
go beyond thinking of art as merely the practice of making beautiful, appealing, shocking or
entertaining images? For Shklovsky, the answer begins with the notion of “automatization,”
adopted from the research of influential nineteenth-century social theorist Herbert Spencer.
Automatization refers to a certain “algebraic method of thinking,” in which “objects are grasped
spatially, in the blink of an eye. We do not see them, we merely recognize them by their
characteristics” (Shklovsky 1990:5). This perceptual “algebra,” allows us to note the existence of
an object in space and, without truly looking at it, unconsciously classify it as some type of
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object or another. “Gradually, under the influence of this generalizing perception, the object
fades away” (Shklovsky 1990:5). Analyzing a passage from Tolstoi’s diary, Shklovsky makes
the further point that this generalizing perception is a reductive force, bent towards the
annihilation of experience itself, and as such must be directly addressed by the tools provided
by art.
And so, held accountable for nothing, life fades into nothingness.
Automatization eats away at things, at clothes, at furniture, at our wives, and at
our fear of war.
If the complex life of so many people takes place entirely on the level of
the unconscious, then it is as if this life had never been.
And so, in order to return sensation to our limbs, in order to make us feel
objects, to make a stone feel stony, man has been given the tool of art. The
purpose of art, then, is to lead us to a knowledge of a thing through the organ of
sight instead of recognition. By ‘enstranging’ objects and complicating form, the
device of art makes perception long and ‘laborious.’ The perceptual process in
art has a purpose all its own and ought to be extended to the fullest. Art is a
means of experiencing the process of creativity. The artifact itself is quite
unimportant. (Shklovsky 1990:5-6 emphasis in original)
My gesture of salute slows the escalator ride for all of us, police and foreign civilian, and
extends the moment of our encounter. Instead of following my “automatic” response to Moscow
police—casting my glance down, hurrying along with some exaggerated sense of purpose—I
now direct their gaze, demanding that they look at me, each and everyone. Our mutual
perception is now “long and laborious.” We must formally recognize each other, and this
recognition is at the heart of the risk I am taking in extending the moment. Will I leave this
particular encounter a nigger, or a comrade? The uncertainty in my decision to decontextualize
the police’s own salute, and to insert myself into their ranks, is only one of many experiences of
the creative process of “enstrangement,” the hostile streets of Moscow make available to me.
ON FRACTAL PERSONS AND ELASTIC SELVES
How is it possible, in a scholarly exercise, for me to examine my self, or rather the images,
memories and projections that accrue around me as I simply walk a city’s streets? The first step
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is to place my “walkings” into conversation with other art works, and to trace a series of
aesthetic comings and goings from New York to Moscow, which may throw into greater relief
the significance of my simple daily walks. Now one more step remains, and that is to re-read
this entire conversation about artistic experiments, and urban walking experiences from the
margins of the social science disciplines in which I have been trained. At the center of this
artistic conversation is a question about what happens to the self, or the person, in movement—
in interaction with a politically-charged environment—when one is able to sense the after- and
before- images very palpably scattering around a presumably “integrated” subject. This
aesthetic experience of “enstrangement” leads me now into a short genealogy of self and
personhood, as they have been treated within anthropology and (environmental) psychology.
Both disciplines treat the construction of self and personhood as a complex interplay between
environment, collective and subjective experience, never taking for granted the apparent
“solidity” of the subject. In the following genealogies, the subject is rendered as particularly
unstable, persistently troubled, especially by issues of race, culture and sex.

Of all the social sciences, anthropology has been among the most concerned with defining,
refining and even challenging the category of the person. Applying the empirical and
hermeneutic approaches developed within the field, anthropologists, from Marcel Mauss to
Catherine Lutz, have taken comparative looks at the self, personage, and persona across
cultures in attempts to expand the naturalized phenomena of “the person.” In 1938, Marcel
Mauss, heir apparent to Emile Durkheim’s legacy of social research, gave a lecture that
represented a paradigmatic shift in the social scientific consideration of the individual human
being. While Durkheim painstakingly developed an approach that aimed at apprehending the
category of the social, in which individual persons exist as mental containers for its
constructions, Mauss began by questioning the cohesion of the person, previously imagined as
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a base unit upon and within which the social resided. The lecture, reprinted as an essay, aims to
historicize this category, focusing on cross-cultural notions of self, mind and person. The unified
self, imagined to be “innate,” is in fact, according to Mauss, “imprecise, delicate and fragile,”
open to shifts in consciousness and morality. Avoiding questions of psychology, Mauss turns
towards social history of the category of ‘self,’ highlighting a distinction between the social
persona or “mask” assumed for ceremonial or public purposes, and the intimate self, or soul.
After a cross-cultural survey of native Australian and American cultures, Mauss concludes that
while all people appear “have arrived at the notion of ‘role’ (personnage), of the role played by
the individual in sacred dramas [and] family life,” none have developed, to the extent of Western
cultures derived from “the Romans”, the metaphysical concept of ‘the person’ (personne), both
as moral character under the law, and as a “rational substance, indivisible and individual”
(Mauss 1985:12,20). For Mauss the category of the person, is by no means an inherent
property attributable to every human being, but rather a historically specific concept, naturalized
over time and through contingent processes:
Far from existing as the primordial innate idea, clearly engraved since Adam in
the innermost depths of our being, it continues here slowly, and almost right up to
our own time, to be built upon, to be made clearer and more specific, becoming
identified with self-knowledge and the psychological consciousness. (Mauss
1985:20)
Mauss’ definition of the concept of the person as a historically malleable and socially
constructed entity, while limited to Western societies, and focusing on a universal juridical and
religious (read: male) subject, opens the door for subsequent fruitful explorations into the
category. Mauss helps us to see that we have all not always been “persons,” and under the right
social conditions, we could fall into or out of this slippery category.

Sherry Ortner in an essay that has entered the canon of feminist anthropology, if such a thing
exists, undertakes a similar exercise (Ortner 1974). In her quest to “expose the underlying logic
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of cultural thinking that assumes the inferiority of women,” she carefully considers the
“universal” exclusion of women persons from realms of cultural thought and action available to
men-persons (Ortner 1974: 68). Ortner problematizes the position of man as the universal
subject, by closely examining what she takes to be the inferior positioning of women within all
cultural systems, be they symbolic and implicit, explicitly ideological, or structural. In the process
of establishing her argument for women’s oppression as universal fact, Ortner reinforces rigid
distinctions between nature and culture, and male and female:
Specifically, my thesis is that every woman is being identified with—or, if you will,
seems to be a symbol of—something that every culture devalues, something that
every culture defines as being of a lower order of existence than itself… Every
culture, or, generically, “culture” is engaged in the process of generating and
sustaining systems of meaningful forms (symbols, artifact, etc.) by means of
which humanity transcends the givens of natural existence, bends them to its
purposes, controls them in its interest. (Ortner 1974:71-72)
For Ortner, culture is equated with human consciousness and its products, such as technology,
and woman, as a category, resides at the border between nature and culture. The
consciousness of woman, or her special brand of personhood, stems from a physiological
difference, which, much like the boundary between nature and culture, is insurmountable. Just
as Mauss’ notions of the distinction between persona/personnage and self/personne, the
existence of which determines the categorical difference between the West and the rest,
Ortner’s conception of the physiological differences between the male and female is the source
of the dichotomy between the masculine and feminine personalities. It is this physiological
difference that allows for woman’s association with domestic spheres, and her exclusion from
the realms of “universalistic” cultural production. It is this physiology, which causes the negative
cultural associations that lead to what is described as the dominant and universal aspects of the
feminine psyche:
One relevant dimension that does seem pan-culturally applicable is that of
relative abstractness: the feminine personality tends to be involved with concrete
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feelings, things and people, rather than with abstract entities; it tends towards
personalism and particularism. (Ortner 1974: 81)
Females, according to Ortner, are unable to partake in the “experiences of self, others, space
and time in individualistic, objective, and distant ways” in which males experience personhood.
Rather females “represent experiences in relatively interpersonal, subjective and immediate
ways,” a distinct aspect of feminine personhood that is engendered in the process of
socialization (Ortner 1974: 81). While Ortner’s work troubles the of the category of the person as
outlined by Mauss by expanding it to include women, it also assumes the generality and
biological rigidity of gendered categories, and subscribes to the insurmountablity of the
distinctions between male and female, nature and culture, a common Western theoretical
stance.
In the 1980’s Western theories of self, which posit distinctions between mind and body and self
and other, especially as these assumptions have manifested in the anthropological imagination
of non-Western peoples, came under fire from anthropologists of emotion. Growing out of
feminist approaches to ethnopsychology, the works of Michelle Rosaldo and Catherine Lutz,
levy bold challenges to Maussian conceptions of the person:
Anthropologists, following such diverse thinkers as the Frenchman Marcel Mauss
and the American G.H. Mead, have held to a distinction between the “me” and
the “I”—between the social person characterized by ideas about the body, soul,
or role and a more intimate and private self… In challenging this standard view…
I want to argue that an analytical framework that equates “self/individual” with
such things as spontaneity, genuine feeling, privacy, uniqueness, constancy, the
“inner life”, and then opposes those to the “persons” or “personae” shaped
mask… is a reflection of dichotomies that constitute the modern Western self.
(Rosaldo 1984)
To trouble this dichotomy, Rosaldo proposes a reading of Ilongot culture that posits a world in
which “our notions of a constant ‘I’” cannot be found. According to Rosaldo, Ilongot people
inhabit a universe in which “kinship and identity are forever things to be negotiated,” and there is
no gap between ‘self’ and ‘presentation’ (Rosaldo 1984). She avoids universal descriptions of
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personhood, emphasizing instead the notion that “what we call ‘real feelings’ or the inner self
are simply silences discerned, given our analytical discourse, silences that do not necessarily
help us to grasp the ways that culture shapes and is shaped by human experience” (Rosaldo
1984, emphasis in original). Rosaldo reveals a space at the center of the universal Western “I”,
an emptiness that reveals itself in comparison with other conceptions of human experience in
which the distances between Self and Other, person and persona, are not quite so great.
Catherine Lutz provides another challenge to Western dualisms in her analysis of Ifaluk
conceptions of self:
At the core of Ifaluk ethnopsychology is a set of beliefs about the structure of
persons which portrays them as basically undivided entities. In marked contrast
to Western ethnopsychology, sharp distinctions are not made between thought
and emotion, between the head and the heart, or between a conscious and
unconscious mind. (Lutz 1988)
In Lutz’s observation of Ifaluk practices of self and emotion, the taken-for-granted dichotomies
between inner and outer, thought and emotion, body and mind, dissolve to reveal an alternative
conception of personhood. The Ifaluk conception of self is formed and supported through social
interaction, so much so that, according to Lutz, “their emotional lives are their social lives.”6 In a
sense the Ifaluk cultivate “emotional minds,” which apprehend the world in a manner that is
“simultaneously cognitive and affective” (Lutz 1988). Both Rosaldo’s and Lutz’s rethinking of the
category of the person indicate the instability inherent in rigidly universal conceptions of self.
Maintaining dichotomies in anthropological considerations of personhood may come at the
expense of breakthroughs in understanding the worlds in which we live, that is, the potential for
slippages, or transformations, to occur between person and thing, object and environment.

The relationship between “the self,” “objects” or “things” and “the environment,” is complex, as
each category is constantly (re)defined and (re)shaped in relation to the others. Recognition of
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the mutually constitutive nature of the relationship between “self,” “object” or “thing” and
“environment” is one of the defining features of environmental psychology’s transactional
approach to human-environment interactions. Within this approach, each category is neither
fixed, nor essential, and remains open to theoretical consideration on a situational basis. This
next section of the genealogy addresses the writings of theorists whose work in present key
insights into this complexity.
Humans display the intriguing characteristic of making and using objects. The
things with which people interact are not simply tools for survival, or for making
survival easier and more comfortable. Things embody goals, make skills
manifest, and shape the identities of their users. Man is not only homo sapiens or
homo ludens, he is also homo faber, the maker and user of objects, his self to a
large extent a reflection of things with which he interacts. (Csikszentmihalyi &
Rochberg-Halton 1981:1)
In their book The Meaning of Things: Domestic Symbols and the Self, Csikszentmihalyi and
Rochberg-Halton consider the role of objects and things in the shaping of the human self. For
the authors, thinking about “things” requires a definition that emphasizes their capacity to
embody and manifest features of personhood through human interaction with them. In
particular, the authors distinguish the human species not just by their tendency towards knowing
and consciousness (homo sapiens) or their capacity for play (homo ludens), but by their skill in
making and using objects (homo faber). It is this skill that transforms members of the species
into “reflection[s] of things with which [they] interact.” In this formulation, objects are not simply
passive receptors of human will, but have material impetus of their own. As the authors go on to
assert, “[t]o understand what people are and what they might become, one must understand
what goes on between people and things” (C & R-H 1981:1).

In their formulation of people—thing relations Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton present a
specific conception of the person and/or self, (terms which they use interchangeably):
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From our perspective, the most basic fact about persons is that they are not only
aware of their own existence but can assume control of that existence, directing it
toward certain purposes. This then will be our starting point for a model of the
self. How self-awareness came about is not relevant here. Thus we shall take
self-awareness and self-control as givens. (C & R-H 1981:2)
Persons are defined as those who are “aware,” and who have “control” over their existence.
This is a particularly curious position to take for theorists interested in highlighting the materiality
of the relation between people and things—a materiality that emphasizes the tactile and
mutually constitutive nature of the interaction. In defining selfhood as dependent upon
awareness and control, the authors present autonomy and interiority as valued characteristics of
personhood. This view would appear contradictory to the authors’ earlier statements about the
role of things in shaping the self. In this conception, there could not exist an autonomous “self,”
prior to its interaction with things, and the environment in, and through which both things and
humans formed. For Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg- Halton, self-awareness is a defining
feature of personhood, to the extent that it is connected to self-control. “Self awareness occurs
when the self becomes the object of reflection—that is, the self takes itself as its own object”
(1981:3). Self-control appears as the process by which the self is objectified, and manipulated,
through the transformation of “feelings, memories, thoughts” and experience itself into “signs
[which] become objects of interpretation” (C & R-H 1981:3). In a departure from the authors’
earlier statements, the role of “the object” in the formulation of this autonomous “self” becomes
quite passive. Homo faber is not simply the man who makes and uses things—he is the man
who is able to make objects (or signs) out of his experiences, in order to “use” them in the
construction of his own “self.” What of the things that are not and cannot be “made” by homo
faber? What of the experiences that resist objectification? What of the people who have neither
the desire, nor the ability, to domesticate, shape, or ‘tame’ their experiences into a coherent
narrative of the self? How might we make a more nuanced consideration of the relationship
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between “self”, “object” and “environment”—one that begins from the destabilization of each
category, without taking their apparent coherence for granted?

One point of departure for addressing these questions can be taken from Nikolas Rose’s
arguments in his book, Inventing Ourselves: Psychology, Power and Personhood (1998). Rose
begins by rejecting a view of human being that takes for granted the existence of “the” human
being as a universal, timeless entity.
The human being is not the eternal basis of human history and human culture but
a historical and cultural artifact. This is the message of studies from a variety of
disciplines, which have pointed in different ways to the specificity of our modern
Western conception of the person. In such societies, it is suggested, the person
is construed as a self, a naturally unique and discrete entity, the boundaries of
the body enclosing, as if by definition, an inner life of the psyche, in which are
inscribed the experiences of an individual biography. But modern Western
societies are unusual in construing the person as such a natural locus of beliefs
and desires, with inherent capacities, as the self-evident origin of actions and
decisions, as a stable phenomenon exhibiting consistency across different
contexts and times. (Rose 1998:22)
In outlining the specificity of a “modern Western” conception of the self, Rose sets the stage for
an exploration of the ways in which such a conception achieves currency. He proposes a
“history of this contemporary ‘regime of the self’?” which he refers to as “genealogy of
subjectification” (Rose 1998:23). Following Foucault, Rose distinguishes a genealogy of
subjectification from a history of ideas. A genealogy investigates “practices and techniques, of
thought as it seeks to make itself technical” (1998:23). Rather than accepting a priori the
existence of “the human being,” or the (psychologized) notion of “the autonomous self” Rose is
interested in exploring the “historical moment” and the “limited and localized geographical
spaces” in which “human being is understood in terms of individuals and selves, each equipped
with an inner domain, a ‘psychology’” (1998:23). Problematizing “the individual” in this manner
implies noticing the ways “the self” acts as a regulatory ideal, by which diverse practices and
techniques are organized.
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The focus of such a genealogy, therefore, is not ‘the history of the person’ but the
genealogy of the relations that human beings have established with
themselves—in which they have come to relate to themselves as selves. These
relations are constructed and historical, but they are not to be understood by
locating them in some amorphous domain of culture. On the contrary, they are
addressed from the perspective of ‘government.’ Our relation with ourselves, that
is to say, has assumed the form it has because it has been the object of a whole
variety of more or less rationalized schemes, which have sought to shape our
ways of understanding and enacting our existence as human beings in the name
of certain objectives—manliness, femininity, honor, modesty, propriety, civility,
discipline, distinction, efficiency, harmony, fulfillment, virtue, pleasure—the list is
as diverse and heterogeneous as it is interminable. (Rose 1998:24)
In his interpretation of Foucault’s notions of genealogy and problematization as methods, Rose
aims to highlight the power-inflected and –defined processes by which what appear to be whole,
autonomous, and differentiated selves, assume such forms, distinguished from each other by
particular goals such as “masculinity” and “femininity,” “discipline” and “pleasure.” It is these
particular “regimes of personhood,” or “devices of meaning production” that are the targets of a
genealogy of subjectification, which focuses on accounting for the “diversity of the languages of
personhood.”

Considering “personhood” itself as a product of human technologies, a more complex
understanding of the relationship between self, thing and environment emerges. If self is a
product, then the category cannot exist prior to the encounter with other things, or human
technologies. The definition of these technologies for the production of selves is broad,
extending beyond traditional definitions of “object” or “thing”:
…[O]ur very experience of ourselves as certain sorts of persons—creatures of
freedom, of liberty, of personal powers, of self-realization—is the outcome of a
range of human technologies, technologies that take modes of being human as
their object. Technology, here, refers to any assembly structured by a practical
rationality governed by a more or less conscious goal. Human technologies are
hybrid assemblages of knowledges, instruments, persons, systems of
government, buildings and spaces, underpinned at the programmatic level by
certain presuppositions and objectives about human beings. (Rose 1998:26)
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For Rose, technologies are complex things. They are “hybrid assemblages” which include a
variety of living and non-living things, expertise and know-how, acting in tandem and at odds to
shape humans into governable selves. In this way Rose might be read as taking up
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton’s earlier injunction to recognize that humans cannot be
understood apart from the objects with which they engage. However, in Rose’s formulation (by
way of Foucault and Deleuze), the engagement with such assemblages both challenges and
reinforces categories of “self” and “thing,” through complex regimes of power and
governmentality. Technologies are not simply “objects” made and used by “man”—they are also
places, spaces, or environments that are shaped by and shaping of relations, practices and
techniques of power. As Rose points out, “one can regard the school, the prison [and] the
asylum as examples of such technologies” (1998:26). This nuanced consideration of
“technologies” expands Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton’s conception of the relationship
between persons and things, by emphasizing how persons, things and environment are
mutually constitutive, shaping each other through particular, ever-shifting, regimes of power.

THE STRANGENESS OF WRITING
All this discussion of how unstable the category of the person and of the self, or subject, can be
leads back to the question of who, or what “I” am in Moscow. Around my walking body there
float all of these cultural, social and political historical projections, just as “real” as I am, which
take shape in looks, words and gestures. There is an absurdity inherent in even writing about
this experience. How can these shadows be captured and stilled under “scholarly” or
“academic” or “disciplined” analysis? In this next section I wish to think through the process of
writing itself. I consider this writing a key part of an operation, which I (and others before me)
have found necessary in order to transform me from a simple street “nigger” into a “Self.” It is
also simultaneously a way of undoing the integrity of this scholarly “Self,” and it’s (un)natural
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habitat, the “City.” In short, writing, in the way that I consider it here, is the ultimate act of
enstrangement.

My early training as an anthropologist encouraged me to take for granted the necessity of
writing as a method of social research, in which the ethnography is its most exalted form. If early
anthropologists could write into existence whole peoples as “ethnos,” then surely, this scholarly
work could provide me a stable identity. In Structural Anthropology (1963), Levi-Strauss
presents language itself as “a social phenomenon” with “two fundamental characteristics” that
make it susceptible to scientific study (56). First, much of linguistic behavior, for Levi-Strauss, is
located at the level of unconscious thought. Unconscious thought, in this formulation, implies the
“absence of consciousness” or lack of awareness in speaking (1963: 56-7). Unlike Freud’s
unconscious, the unconscious of Levi-Strauss is not a living place. Rather it is a condition that
may be overcome by the conscientious and properly trained scholar of linguistic structure.
Second, in accordance with semiotician Ferdinand de Saussure’s langue/parole distinction,
language may be studied scientifically only through written texts and not speech, as only texts
are able to hold and preserve language and its history (Levi-Strauss 1963:57). Through writing,
language becomes a clean and clear system, the noise of speech banished from its structure.
The process of writing and reading language, therefore, becomes an integral part of the
scientific practice.
For the structuralist, then, language exists as a construction of men, an object of scientific study,
and a jungle of raw materials, waiting for extraction and use. Language, in this understanding,
exists neither as force, nor as embodied experience. Rather, language is universal law. That
societies (especially those based on oral and not written language) may be transformed into
languages (through the “objective” observer’s writing), and reduced to universal units, is
essential to structuralist thought. In fact, it is this notion of the commensurability of all cultures
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and languages that exposes the folly of ethnocentric, chauvinistic thought, against which the
liberal project of structuralism is oriented: Under the universal, unbiased gaze of the structural
anthropologist, difference is dissolved at the same time that it is necessarily re-created. As
ethnocentric privilege is effaced, it is necessarily re-inscribed in the structuralist’s perception of
a “system of oppositions” (between modern and primitive, civilized and savage, rich and poor,
normal and abnormal, black and white and so on). This critique is best formed and articulated
within the work of Jacques Derrida.
Perhaps something has occurred in the history of the concept of structure that
could be called an “event”… What would this event be then? Its exterior form
would be that of a rupture and a redoubling (Derrida 1978:278).
In this statement, Derrida calls into question the soundness of structure, as it is built and rebuilt
within the history of Western writing-as-thought, in which Levi-Strauss and Saussure are
formidably implicated. Derrida posits the possibility of a ‘rupture,’ appearing as soon as “the
structurality of the structure had to begin to be thought, that is to say, repeated…” (1978:280).
Structures, Derrida proposes, are built from their very inception upon the opposition of center
and periphery, in which the center is fixed, “organizing the coherence of the system,” and
“permitting the play of its elements inside the total form.” This play is the play of structure itself.
It is best demonstrated in Levi-Strauss’ theory of the bricoleur, who continually rearranges the
elements of his cultural mythology in ways that, while being novel and creative, can never fully
transform the basic cosmology of his society, but instead, reinforces its underlying coherence.
Through Derrida’s analysis we can see how the presence and fixity of the center appears to be
a given, as it is the pivot around which the structure itself is built. But this center, by definition,
must remain outside of the structure as well, an absent presence. In the creation of academic
knowledge about Others beyond the academy, for example, the social researcher must maintain
a “center” position: she becomes an absent presence—erasing her own embodied positionality,
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even as she inscribes the raced, gendered, classed, or sexualized bodies of her “human
subjects,” or objects of study.

The center is the position of “presence,” the metaphysical place of being a subject. For Derrida,
the only event that can precipitate a challenge to the subject is the emergence of an
unanticipated desire, which forces a moment of self-recognition. A rupture in the structure
occurs when one recognizes the “center is not the center,” the “the center could not be thought
in the form of a present being that the center has no natural site” (Derrida 1978:280):
The center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not
belong to the totality, (is not part of the totality), the totality has its center
elsewhere. The center is not the center. The concept of centered structure—
although it represents coherence itself, the condition of the episteme as
philosophy or science—is contradictorily coherent. And as always, coherence in
contradiction expresses the force of a desire (1978:279).
What is this desire at the heart of the contradiction of the centered structure or centered
subject? The translator’s footnote tells us that Derrida is here referring to Freudian dream
interpretation, in which a symbol is understood as both the desire to fulfill and suppress a wish,
a dual, warring desire which may de-center the whole, rational European subject. Within the
context of the work of structural anthropology—the work of Levi-Strauss—I might read
differently, this force of desire at the center of structure, this absent presence. As the
anthropologist travels into the field, into the jungle, the desire to hold, to apprehend, to perhaps
understand the native, motivates the writing of culture, the construction that would enclose and
preserve the native world. On the other hand, the completion of the written construction, the
work of the anthropologist, must take place elsewhere, back in the hallowed halls of academia,
far from the native, who becomes the desire that must be felt from afar, the necessarily absent,
silent force that holds the structure in place. A desire frustrated. (In my own case, I cannot
perform such a smooth effacement of the native. In my own fieldwork, though I traveled quite far
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away, I carried with me some archetypal jungle, evidenced by the monkey noises I heard
everyday. It seems I am both the native and the anthropologist, wherever it is I find myself. Try
as I might, I cannot quite frustrate this anonymous desire to preserve in my presence in the
academy some “native” tendency. While I do not quite hear monkey calls in the halls of
American academe, I can say I have remained as foreign there as I was in Moscow. And yet,
here I am, still at it, still writing.)
The realization that the center has no natural site, that the center is never “here” but always
“elsewhere,” that this distance must be maintained for the structure to work, opens the structure
to a different kind of movement, to a different sort of play. In this sort of play, the structure can
no longer maintain its integrity. The structure becomes vulnerable to a double reading, a play-ful
reading:
Play is the disruption of presence. The presence of an element is always a
signifying and substitutive reference inscribed in a system of differences and the
movement of a chain. Play is always a play of absence and presence, but if it is
to be thought radically, play must be conceived of before the alternative of
presence and absence. Being must be conceived of as presence or absence on
the basis of the possibility of play and not the other way around. If Levi-Strauss,
better than any other has brought to light the play of repetition and the repetition
of play, one no less perceives in his work a sort of ethic of presence, an ethic of
nostalgia for origins, an ethic of archaic and natural innocence, of a purity of
presence and self-presence in speech—an ethic, nostalgia and even remorse,
which he often presents as the motivation of the ethnological project when he
moves toward the archaic societies which are exemplary societies in his eyes.
These texts are well known.
… There are thus two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of
play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which
escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of
interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin,
affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism… (292).
Derrida’s double reading implies a close reading of the canonical texts of Western philosophy in
order to tease out the binary oppositions at the basis of structure (such as center/periphery,
presence/absence, nature/culture, normal/pathological) and in order to show the ways in which
such “oppositions” might actually contain each other, merge into each other. The key to
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undermining such structures is always contained within the canonical text itself, within the play
of opposites. The double interpretation of interpretation must go on simultaneously—for Derrida
there is no choice.

Revisiting Levi-Strauss, opportunities for double readings present themselves. Within the
binarism of Self and Other, primitive and modern, there lies the privileging of a particular gaze,
of a specific positionality. For Levi-Strauss, magical thought, or myth, is the primary mode in
which the primitive mind operates (as opposed to the scientific mind of the modern). According
to Levi-Strauss, this mode of thought is not to be construed as an evolutionary moment, rather it
is to be seen as a complete system in itself:
One deprives oneself of all means of understanding magical thought if one tries
to reduce it to a moment or stage in technical and scientific evolution. Like a
shadow moving ahead of its owner it is in a sense complete in itself, and as
finished and coherent in its immateriality as the substantial being which it
precedes. Magical thought is not to be regarded as a beginning, a rudiment, a
sketch, a part of a whole which has not yet materialized. It forms a well
articulated system, and is in this respect independent of that other system which
constitutes science… (Levi-Strauss 1966:13)
What might be the meaning of this curious analogy Levi-Strauss draws between the shadow
and the primitive mind? What is a shadow if not a projection of an already-exiting object, a
stand-in for a more-present thing? One cannot have a shadow without its ‘owner.’ The shadow
is owned by another: it does not indicate a pre-historic moment, but neither does it stand
autonomous from the existence of another, more present subject. Primitive thought is
constructed as a dark space open to examination—a moonlit pool, in which a concentrated gaze
might see itself reflected. (In this framing, the anthropological project is necessarily violent.
Derrida describes this anthropological project as one of “penetration,” in his critique of LeviStrauss’ Tristes Tropiques.)!This innocuous analogy, erases the history, agency and subjectivity
of the primitive, in order to privilege the presence of a presumably modern, Western Self: in
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Derrida’s words, “an ethnocentrism thinking itself as an anti-ethnocentrism” (1974:120). This is
the sort of ethnocentric anti-ethnocentrism that places non-White and non-Euro-American
authors, for example, together on the last day of the course syllabus. In an attempt to “give them
voice,” their position as other to the mainstream or the canon, is cemented. Their value to the
syllabus, and to the academy lies expressly within their racial or cultural otherness.

Derrida traces this ethnocentric anti-ethnocentrism to the influence of Saussure’s exclusion of
writing: “a profound ethnocentrism privileging the model of phonetic writing, a model that makes
the exclusion of the graphie easier and more legitimate” (1974:120). Instead of describing the
Other as “primitive,” which implies an ethnocentric evolutionism, Levi-Strauss settles upon the
label “without writing.” For Derrida, such an analogy, in which a shadow is made to stand-in for
something else, something more-present, indicates the play of structure itself—the never-ending
chain of supplements. The “entire history of the concept of structure,” Derrida argues, “must be
thought of as a series of substitutions of center for center as a linked chain of determinations of
the center” (1978: 279). In fact, Derrida argues that the history Western thought is “the history of
these metaphors and metonymies” (279). However is not the notion of “the chain of
supplements” itself a metaphor which reproduces the very history it hopes to expose and
possibly even efface through such exposure?
Although it is born out of “needs of a different kind” and according to
circumstances entirely “independent of the duration of the people,” and according
to circumstances entirely independent of the duration of the people, although
these needs might “never have occurred,” the irruption of this absolute
contingency determined the interior unity of a life, literally infected it. It is the
strange essence of the supplement not to have essentiality: it may always not
have taken place. Moreover, literally, it has never taken place: it is never present,
here and now. If it were it would not be what it is, a supplement, taking and
keeping the place of the other. What alters for the worse the living nerve of
language (“Writing which would seem to crystallize language, is precisely what
alters it; it changes not the words but the spirit of the language…”) has therefore
above all not taken place. Less than nothing and yet, to judge by its effects,
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much more than nothing. The supplement is neither presence nor an absence.
No ontology can think its operation (1974: 314).
In Derrida’s discussion of Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Essay on the
Origin of Languages, writing emerges as the ultimate supplement. By exposing Rousseau’s
philosophical aversion and denigration of writing, as a dangerous supplement “taking and
keeping the place of the other,” Derrida aims to show how the opposition maintained between
speech and writing in Western traditions could be thought as more fluid. Derrida’s critique
demonstrates that writing is “neither presence nor absence,” neither interiority nor exteriority,
and therefore should not be subject to the ethical judgment and distinction implied in the works
of Rousseau, Saussure and Levi-Strauss:
But am I saying anything else? Yes, in as much as I show the interiority of
exteriority, which amounts to annulling the ethical qualification and to thinking of
writing beyond good and evil; yes above all, in as much as we designate the
impossibility of formulating the movement of supplementarity within the classical
logos, within the logic of identity… if at least one determines it as spiritualistic or
materialistic metaphysics has always done, within the horizon of presence and
reappropriation… For the rest, it must borrow its resources from the logic it
deconstructs. And by doing so, finds it very foothold there (Derrida, 1974:314)
In Derrida’s effort to think writing beyond good and evil, could we see a de-contexualization of
writing-as-supplement to a non-place, neither present nor absent: writing theorized as a practice
that is never situated, except within this Western metaphysical history of judgment and
distinction? Does this liberation of writing assume or re-inscribe the very differences between
langue and parole that it attempts to efface? If the supplement is less than nothing and yet
much more than nothing, then the supplement remains the shadow of another, more present
being. It is possible to read parallels between Levi-Strauss and Derrida in this method of
redemptive writing, in which primitive thought, or writing itself must be “freed” from the
constraints of Western metaphysics. Shadows and supplements flit through the work of LeviStrauss and Derrida respectively, and in this play of movement, we catch glimpses of those
without names, without place in the structure—all those “Mythical Beings.”
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What I have tried to convey in this chapter is a certain ambivalence about the process of
“embodied” social research and writing, especially if one’s body, one’s personhood and one’s
socio-political positionality are experienced as simultaneously unstable and overdetermined.
What kind of work can be produced in out of a state of enstrangement from self, city and even
academy? For me, the answer to this question is not a specific form or product, but a process,
in which a certain space can be sensed, or created, at the very center of taken-for-granted
subjects and objects of study. In my case the potential for an experience of enstrangement was
built both into my experience as a foreign artist and researcher in Moscow, and into my
experience as a black student in a very culturally and politically white academy. This built-in
ambivalence to the whole enterprise, have rendered me ironically both an anthropologist a la
Levi-Strauss (a stranger in a strange land), and a shadow, or supplement, a la Derrida, flitting
through the centers of knowledge. From this ever-shifting position I am able to produce in a
variety of languages and disciplinary styles, to “code-switch” as required, but I can still find
myself, at the most unexpected moment, a “nigger!”

But we must leave that word as the last one. Let us give thanks to that powerful spoken word,
sailing down that Russian city street on a sunny day. It allowed me to experience the space at
the absolute center of myself—this abysmal space Derrida writes about—in which all of the
shadows and supplements of our strange, shared history reside.
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EPILOGUE

During the defense of this dissertation, several members of my committee demanded an
epilogue—one that would tie together various “strings” of the dissertation, provide a sense of
“closure,” and explain “what this all means” for urbanist practice. In reflecting on what “closure”
might mean for my dissertation, I am drawn to the very specific and practice-oriented questions
raised by Maureen Connor, an artist, and member of my dissertation committee.

Responding to my dissertation, she asks questions about the ethical, theoretical and practical
implications of the work. These questions have prompted me to reflect upon my process in
doing the research and writing for this project, as well as the project’s implications for future
practice.

Connor writes:
Several weeks ago while working toward a project for a film festival in Columbia,
South Carolina I found myself using Archiving the City for both inspiration and
practical advice. As the capital of South Carolina since the 18th Century,
Columbia, like Moscow, is an archive that documents its history of conflict and
inequality. For example its statehouse is surrounded by monuments most of
which represent and even honor Confederate soldiers as well as their ideological
descendants. When visiting Columbia on a research trip last month it was made
clear to me that what they called my “Northerner’s approach” to what I might view
as their problems would not be welcomed.
I consider my art practice trans disciplinary in the sense that I use processes and
techniques from the social sciences to conduct research for my projects.
Although I have read widely about social science theory and practice and also
write essays on the work of other artists who work in similar ways, unlike
Enigbokan, I have not undertaken any formal study outside my field.
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While I feel closely aligned with the goals from the 1921 Soviet essays quoted
above, and I believe that artists have the capacity to help create “new lives” I am
often aware that I lack certain ‘conventional’ skills and knowledge that could help
make my research better and more usefuls. For this reason Archiving the City is
an invaluable contribution not just to my work but to the many artists who are
seeking more direct ways to develop “life building” rather than simply ‘raising
questions.’
I am now in Columbia, South Carolina just about to complete the installation of
my project and Archiving the City has become a manual and guide. I find both
consolation (for the resistance and difficulties I face here) and deeply useful
information throughout. I refer back almost daily to Chapter 4, in my efforts to
better understand what rules and technologies govern the various subjectivities I
come in contact with. And in Chapter 3 the description, discussion and post
mortem interviews for the project Ten Appearances reminds me again and again
of the value of presenting situations in which experience is ‘made strange’ but
also the importance of following up with a discussion of the experience. I believe
every artist interested in the creation of “new lives” must read Archiving the City.
It is, as I said already but say again here for emphasis, a service and an
inspiration.
Questions
Are you saying the academy as it exists today is condemned to deny the
personhood of the other? What, if anything could have made you feel more
welcome in the academy? Can it be changed and still exist?
What are your goals as a hybrid trans-disciplinary artist and social scientist?
What would you like to accomplish?
Columbia, South Carolina is a city in decline. I had no idea things were so bad
there. I think there must be many US cities in similar conditions. We know about
Detroit and Cleveland and now St. Louis and smaller cites in Missouri. I don’t
understand why we are not more aware of the conditions of these cities. It seems
like our dirty little secret. During a discussion I had about this with several people
down here one person mentioned the essay The Case for Reparations by Ta-Nehisi
Coates The Atlantic June 2014 as discussing the unresolved legacy of slavery,
Jim Crow and racist policies.
What do you think your practice (and other hybrid art practices) can do to:
a. Help make a case for Reparations
b. Help address urban decline
c. Address and change racists practices in other ways in addition to
Reparations
Here’s the heading for the essay:Two hundred fifty years of slavery. Ninety years
of Jim Crow. Sixty years of separate but equal. Thirty-five years of racist housing
policy. Until we reckon with our compounding moral debts, America will never be
whole.
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Respectfully submitted,
Maureen Connor
In her discussion of her ongoing project in Columbia, South Carolina, Connor presents this
dissertation as a practical guide for artists working in the field, in politically charged urban
environments, and on sensitive matters of people’s experience of history in everyday life.
Beyond being flattering, this invocation of my work as an aid to practice for a working artist,
demonstrates the work’s viability in its present form. It was always intended as a guide (an
earlier title for this work was Archiving the City: A Guide to the Art of Urban Interventions, and I
just may return to this title). The dissertation was written in such a way as to be accessible and
useful to practitioners and not only to academics. The voice(s) of the dissertation, which pass
between reportage, ethnography, philosophical reflection and memoir, allow for multiple points
of entry for practitioners from a variety of fields, from art and architecture, to psychology,
geography and anthropology. The dissertation was not intended to exclude lay people by
establishing my own expertise, but rather to mark out various inspirational paths in the practice
of creative urban research. It is this variation in voice and style that allows the work to be useful
to an artist such as Connor, as she develops an urban intervention in the field.

Through her experience applying my text in the field, Connor is moved to reflect upon my own
experience in researching and writing this dissertation in the context of the academy. She asks
for my thoughts on the propensity of the academy to deny the personhood of the other. This is a
very useful question, because it reaches to the very heart of how I believe urban research ought
to be approached, in terms of the ethics of creating new knowledge about our fellow urban
citizens. Early in my graduate school experience, I understood that the creation of academic
knowledge in the social sciences would require researchers to assume subject positions that
would distance them from their “subjects.” No matter the approach to research—qualitative or

118

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
quantitative, positivist or action-based—the researcher would appear as somehow separate
from the experience of the researched. This process became clear in my experience with the
requirements for the protection of “Human Subjects,” required for all dissertations in Psychology
and other social and behavioral sciences. This convention constructs the participant in the
research as “subject” to the stewardship of the researcher, who is regarded as a foreign force,
focused on extracting data.

In this process of professionalization, students are turned into professional researcher as they
literally subject others to their own theories about knowledge-making. Often this process is done
in and through the conventions of scientific writing. Coming from classes of people historically
and currently made (colonial) subject to the (scientific) techniques of social control, I have never
become completely comfortable with this academic ethic of taking a certain kind of
“responsibility” for the “protection” of others. Maintaining good ethical relationships have always
meant to me that one ought simply to avoid engaging in activities, or creating scenarios, from
which others might need protection. With this in mind, I conceived this dissertation in
Environmental Psychology to be one that would not create or hold human subjects. Instead I
chose to take my interlocutors, both in person and on the page, as equals, as experts in their
own lives and their own fields, and to find commonalities through creative practice. To my mind,
this approach to research is key to a future transdisciplinary urban research that aims to
intervene into the everyday lives of city dwellers. I sincerely hope that the academy, especially
the socio-spatial sciences like Environmental Psychology, will find ways to accommodate and
embrace a greater variety of researchers’ subject positions. However, this level of inclusiveness
will be hard to achieve without enthusiastic, non-tokenizing support and acknowledgement
(financial, intellectual, collegial) for the researchers wish to create alternative forms of
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knowledge without making others into “human subjects,” and who themselves are regularly
denied full personhood in everyday life, both in the city streets and in the halls of academe.

My own goals as an ‘urban research-artist’ are primarily ethical ones. This dissertation, and all
my work are fueled by the same question: How to create experiences and experiments in
everyday life that are expressive of our best potentials for living together in cities? The true test
for ethics is that they can be followed out in in everyday life. What cannot be tested and enacted
in day-to-day social reality, cannot be called ethical. For example, our political tenets, such as
“all men are created equal,” inscribed in our legal documents, and at the center of struggles for
civil rights for black American men and all women, for people with disabilities, for migrants and
for workers, are clearly not borne out in everyday interactions say, between teachers and
students, between police and members of the public, between doctors and patients, between
bosses and employees, or even between parents and children. Therefore, the concept of
“equality under law” remains a very useful political abstraction: something around which we can
mobilize, opinionate, and legislate. But until equality is practiced here and now, everyday,
within person-to-person interactions, it cannot be truly ethical. This is because our quotidian
interactions provide the true ground for ethics: the messy, often unspoken or unspeakable,
exchanges between friends, family, lovers, coworkers and (maybe especially) strangers on the
train. In other words, we cannot honestly say that we are all created equal if, in our very real
experiences as artists, academics, curators, activists, philanthropists, and so on, we do not
enact equality as lived truth. Unfortunately, in many of our interactions, (we behave as though)
we are under siege. This tense, desperate condition is not necessarily a bad thing, not
necessarily something to try and escape. It is in fact in the crucible of war—under the real or
imagined threat of annihilation—that ethical action takes on its true value and importance.
Everyday we are at war and thus, everyday we have the opportunity to be ethical.
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This notion of ethics, as appearing mainly in the realm of everyday life, and existing in a more
“grounded” reality than that of political (or utopian) abstraction, was instilled in me by my
teacher, Uday Mehta. Professor Mehta is a political scientist who teaches at the Graduate
Center, City University of New York. His work has probed and exposed the close relationship
that formed between liberalism and imperialism in the British discourse justifying holding India
as a colony, and lately he has been writing and teaching about Mahatma Gandhi as an “antipolitical” thinker, expanding ideas of Gandhi’s contribution to political and ethical philosophy with
a deep interrogation of satyagraha or the practice of truth and nonviolence (Mehta 1999; Mehta
2010). My interest in Mehta’s and Gandhi’s teachings are not only intellectual: I have tried to
make my own “experiments in truth” in order to better integrate the ethics of my everyday life
into my adventures in artistic practices (Gandhi 1993).

In this dissertation I have given examples of experiments I have studied, which have helped me
to understand the role of ethical action in the everyday ways that we intervene into urban life as
artists, architects and social researchers. In my work I have focused on understanding the
creative potentials in encounters with institutional authority. My approach continues to be
informed by the traditions of institutional critique that have emerged in Western art and social
activist practices since 1968, but it is not beholden to the utopian visions contained in the
various strands of that movement. Rather, I am motivated by a simple need to find ways to
interact with dignity and decency in situations in which I feel at a disadvantage, and in which I
might ordinarily think I have no choice. My experiences working both in Russia and at the CUNY
Graduate Center gave me ample opportunity to observe and to practice transforming
encounters with arbitrary authorities into opportunities for the release of subjugated knowledge.
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In the future I hope to continue working in this mode in a variety of settings, institutional and
non-institutional, across the globe.

In commenting on my dissertation, Connor mentions her ongoing project in Columbia, South
Carolina. The project, commissioned as part of a local independent film festival, is entitled: Can
People With a Temporary Disruption of Our Normally Linear Perception of Time Consider More
Creative Approaches to Our Future? An Experiment in Community Coloring Book Creation with
a Film Festival Audience. Produced by Connor’s artist collective, The Institute for Wishful
Thinking, the project involves asking film festival goers to participate in coloring black and white
drawings of local monuments to the city’s confederate past, along with buildings of significance
to those who would (re)imagine the city’s present and potential futures. The goal of the project is
to “give participants the opportunity to build, un-build, shape and reshape regional space
according to whatever time (past, present, future) frame they choose” (artist statement, personal
communication with Maureen Connor). This experimental method of engaging a local public in
reimagining difficult pasts is exactly the sort of practice that Archiving the City was written to
address. Based on her experience as an outsider in South Carolina, addressing sensitive
histories surrounding local sites, while creating a space for imaginations of the future, Connor
raises a question about the ethics of artists working in the often heavily racialized spaces of
American cities in decline. This question, of what artists, and other urban interventionists’ roles
might be in restoring balance to cities that have suffered years of injustice, goes to the heart of
my own practice. All of our urban everyday urban routines are shot through with historically
patterned imbalances of arbitrarily exercised power. Addressing these patterns, unmaking them,
unraveling them, or “deframing” them is exactly the work of interventionist experiments that I
admire. From Voina and Pussy Riot's urban disturbances, to Estonian environmental
psychologists research into the ways people reclaimed their living spaces; from Adrian Piper’s
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Mythic Being walks around New York, to Yevgeniy Fiks’ archive of representations of Africans
and African Americans created by Soviet artists, all of the examples featured in my dissertation
represent the various ways in which urban interventionists might call into question existing
spatial orderings, and help to redress, or repair wounds in our urban landscapes through small
and sustained everyday actions.
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